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INTRODUCTION
In last year’s Federal Circuit Review edition of the American
University Law Review, Federal Circuit Judge Arthur Gajarsa and Dr.
Lawrence Cogswell wrote of the “recent increase . . . in the frequency
1
of Supreme Court review of our decisions,” and specifically, “our
2
patent law jurisprudence.” That increase continued in 2006, and in
many ways, the Supreme Court’s greater interest in issues of patent
law—at a time when its docket of cases continues to shrink—was a
major theme of the Federal Circuit’s published patent law decisions
issued in calendar year 2006.
The year 2006 brought some other important changes to the
Federal Circuit. Judge Raymond Clevenger assumed Senior Judge
status on February 1, 2006, and was replaced on the active bench on
3
September 8, 2006 by Judge Kimberly Moore, a law professor who
has published a number of books and articles, including several
empirical analyses about patent law, generally, and the Federal
4
Circuit’s jurisprudence, in particular. She is the first Federal Circuit
judge to come to the Court from a background of academic
intellectual property scholarship.
No mention of the Federal Circuit and its judges in 2006 would be
complete without marking the passing of Howard T. Markey, the first
Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit (and the last Chief Judge of the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals), on May 3, 2006. Judge
Markey was the first judge ever to sit with every federal appellate
court in the nation, and to this day the Federal Circuit bears the
stamp of his influence—an influence marked officially by the 1998
1. Arthur R. Gajarsa & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, Foreword: The Federal Circuit
and The Supreme Court, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 843 (2006).
2. Id. at 823.
3. Nominated to be Circuit Judge by President George W. Bush on May 18,
2006, confirmed by the Senate on September 5, 2006, and assumed duties in office
on September 8, 2006.
4. E.g., KIMBERLY A. MOORE, PAUL R. MICHEL & RAPHAEL V. LUPO, PATENT
LITIGATION AND STRATEGY (2002); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped
to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2001); Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical
Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 227 (2004); Kimberly A.
Moore, Essay: Juries, Patent Cases, & a Lack of Transparency, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 779
(2002); Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889 (2001); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries and
Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000);
Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?,
9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2005).
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decision to redesignate the National Courts Building, where the
Federal Circuit sits, as the Howard T. Markey National Courts
5
building.
The end of 2006 marked the end of the bar on citing
“nonprecedential” decisions issued by the Federal Circuit. Thanks to
a change in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which now
bars appellate courts from forbidding the citation of “unpublished”
or “nonprecedential” opinions (but only those issued after January 1,
6
7
2007), the Federal Circuit’s rules have likewise been revised. Some
Federal Circuit opinions may continue to be designated as
8
“nonprecedential,” but “[p]arties are not prohibited or restricted
from citing nonprecedential dispositions issued after January 1,
9
2007,” and the court itself “may refer to a nonprecedential
disposition in an opinion and order and may look to a
nonprecedential disposition for guidance or persuasive reasoning,
but will not give one of its own nonprecedential dispositions the
10
effect of binding precedent.”
In 2006, the Federal Circuit decided only one portion of one
11
patent case en banc, and that was done mainly as a procedural
matter (the entire case was not argued to an en banc court) in order
to reconcile prior conflicting precedent on the issue of induced
12
patent infringement with the recent Supreme Court decision in
13
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., involving induced
copyright infringement. But in light of the Supreme Court’s much
more muscular review of the Federal Circuit’s patent cases—which
may not even reflect the full extent of the Court’s interest in the
Federal Circuit’s patent decisions—the relative paucity of en banc
5. Patricia Sullivan, Howard Markey: First Chief Judge of Federal Circuit Appellate
Court, WASH. POST, May 5, 2006, at B6.
6. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
7. See FED. CIR. R. 32.1 (removing the prohibition on citing to unpublished
opinions issued on or after January 1, 2007).
8. See FED. CIR. R. 32.1(a) (“An opinion or order which is designated as
nonprecedential is one determined by the panel issuing it as not adding significantly
to the body of law.”).
9. FED. CIR. R. 32.1(c).
10. FED. CIR. R. 32.1(d).
11. See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304-06, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1238, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc as to Section III(B) only).
12. Compare Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1594 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The plaintiff has the burden of
showing that the alleged infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and that he knew
or should have known that his actions would induce actual infringements.”), with
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1525, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[P]roof of actual intent to cause the acts which
constitute infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active inducement.”).
13. 545 U.S. 913, 931-32 (2005).
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decisions in 2006 is understandable, and in many ways irrelevant to
gaining a better understanding of the Federal Circuit’s patent law
jurisprudence.
In the pages that follow, we will address these and many other
developments reflected in the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisprudence
of 2006. And, as we did in our article surveying the Federal Circuit’s
14
year 2000 jurisprudence, we again conclude with an addendum that
discusses the statistical output of the Federal Circuit and its judges.
I.

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND THE SUPREME COURT

Almost fifteen years ago, two authors, writing in the Federal Circuit
Bar Journal, concluded that “[t]he Supreme Court rarely grants
petitions for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
15
for the Federal Circuit,” that “the Court appears to accord more
deference to pronouncements of the Federal Circuit on substantive
16
patent law issues than on other substantive law issues,” and that
“[t]he Court . . . appears less willing to address substantive patent law
17
than the other areas of Federal Circuit substantive law.”
No longer can any of those statements be said to be true. As 2006
ends, we appear to be in the midst of a “third wave” in the ongoing
dialogue between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit over
the content of U.S. patent law—a wave marked by more aggressive
Supreme Court review of the substance of patent law and patent
procedure and less deference to the Federal Circuit’s views of what
the content of U.S. patent law should be. This change in the
Supreme Court’s approach to the Federal Circuit’s patent cases may
well portend real and significant changes for the Federal Circuit—
and perhaps for the Federal Circuit’s bar as well.
A. The First Wave (1982-1994): A Hands-Off Approach
The Supreme Court’s first review of a Federal Circuit patent
decision, in 1986, was a largely inauspicious event. In Dennison
18
Manufacturing Co. v. Panduit Corp., the Supreme Court granted a
petition for certiorari, vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment in an
obviousness dispute (without receiving briefing on the merits or
14. Kenneth R. Adamo, Gregory A. Castanias, Mark N. Reiter, & Lawrence D.
Rosenberg, Survey of the Federal Circuit’s Patent Law Decisions in 2000: Y2K in Review, 50
AM. U. L. REV. 1435, 1699-1706 (2001).
15. Mark J. Abate & Edmund J. Fish, Supreme Court Review of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 1982-1992, 2 FED. CIR. B.J. 307, 307 (1992).
16. Id. at 308.
17. Id. at 333.
18. 475 U.S. 809, 809-11 (1986) (per curiam).
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hearing oral argument), and remanded the case to the Federal
Circuit for reevaluation of its decision in light of rule 52(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs appellate review of a
district court’s factual findings. In language that presaged many of
the common (and contemporaneous) criticisms of the Federal
Circuit’s decisional processes, the Supreme Court described the
petitioner’s (Dennison’s) contention:
Petitioner contends that the Federal Circuit ignored Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 52(a) in substituting its view of factual issues for
that of the District Court. In particular, petitioner complains of
the rejection of the District Court’s determination of what the prior
art revealed and its findings that the differences identified between
19
respondent’s patents and the prior art were obvious.

Because “[t]he Federal Circuit . . . did not mention Rule 52(a), did
not explicitly apply the clearly-erroneous standard to any of the
District Court’s findings on obviousness, and did not explain why, if it
20
was of that view, Rule 52(a) had no applicability to this issue,” the
Court sent the case back to the Federal Circuit “for further
21
consideration in light of Rule 52(a).”
On remand, the Federal
Circuit reinstated its earlier holding, but with an explanation
expressly grounded in rule 52(a); the Supreme Court denied
22
certiorari to review that subsequent opinion.
It appeared that the Federal Circuit panel was none too happy that
Dennison had managed to obtain Supreme Court review, however.
Then-Chief Judge Markey’s opinion for the Court added a blistering
“Appendix” directed at Dennison’s Petition for Certiorari and Reply
in support of certiorari. It began:
Dennison’s Petition for Certiorari and Reply ignored our earlier
opinion’s explication of legal error and need to consider all
evidence, presented material for the first time, and repeated
misstatements of law Dennison employed before the trial court but
avoided before this Court. This Appendix sets forth the more
egregious of the many obfuscating assertions in the Petition and
23
Reply.

Whether or not the accusations of obfuscation were merited, the
message delivered to the bar was that the Federal Circuit did not
appreciate Dennison’s petition for certiorari, and that the Supreme
19. Id. at 810.
20. Id. at 811.
21. Id.
22. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1565-82, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1593, 1594-1609 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987).
23. Id. at 1582, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609.
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Court had been led down the proverbial primrose path by these
omissions and “misstatements.”
Might the Panduit “Appendix” have had a chilling effect on
subsequent petitions for certiorari in other Federal Circuit cases?
After all, with all patent appeals now coming before a small cohort of
judges in Washington, D.C., lawyers and clients may not have wanted
to risk irking the court. Whether or not it had such an effect, the fact
is that the next patent case to make its way to the U.S. Supreme Court
arrived, in effect, with a backhanded invitation from the Federal
24
Circuit. In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., a case raising
antitrust claims which implicated patent issues, the Seventh Circuit
rejected appellate jurisdiction over the appeal and transferred the
case to the Federal Circuit, “based in large part on its expansive view
25
of the relevant Federal Circuit jurisdictional statutes.” The Federal
Circuit did not think it had jurisdiction either, though, finding “no
basis or rationale . . . for an expanded, open-ended view that this
court has been granted jurisdiction over all appeals in cases that
26
contain patent issues.” Despite finding that it lacked jurisdiction,
the court nonetheless decided the merits of the case, rather than
27
certifying the question to the Supreme Court, because it
“abhor[red]” placing an additional burden on the Supreme Court’s
28
“already heavy workload.” Here, again, was a statement suggesting
that the Federal Circuit would take care of the patent law so that the
U.S. Supreme Court would not be burdened with that task.
However, by disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit on the question
of jurisdiction—creating a now-rare circuit split in a patent case—and
then deciding the merits of a case over which it believed it had no
jurisdiction, which ran afoul of basic Supreme Court
29
pronouncements regarding jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit actually
30
made “the case . . . an ideal candidate for review.” The ultimate
result was that the Court agreed with the Federal Circuit that it
31
lacked jurisdiction but held that the court had erred by going on to

24. 798 F.2d 1051, 1056-57 (7th Cir. 1986).
25. Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 1, at 824.
26. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1553, 3
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1987), vacated, 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (2000) (permitting certification of questions to the
Supreme Court by a court of appeals).
28. Christianson, 822 F.2d at 1560, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252-53.
29. See, e.g., Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (“Without
jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.”).
30. Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 1, at 826.
31. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807-13 (1988).
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32

reach the merits. The Court then ordered the Federal Circuit on
33
remand to transfer the case back to the Seventh Circuit.
The Court’s next review of a Federal Circuit patent decision did
34
not occur for another two years. In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
the Court addressed a pure question of statutory interpretation:
[W]hether 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. V) renders
activities that would otherwise constitute patent infringement
noninfringing if they are undertaken for the purpose of developing
and submitting to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
information necessary to obtain marketing approval for a medical
device under section 515 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
35
Act (FDCA), 90 Stat. 552, 21 U.S.C. § 360e.

The Court noted that the Federal Circuit had held that such
activities “could not constitute infringement if they had been
undertaken to develop information reasonably related to the
development and submission of information necessary to obtain
36
regulatory approval under the FDCA.”
The Supreme Court
ultimately affirmed the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the
37
statutory provision.
Another three years elapsed before the Supreme Court returned to
the Federal Circuit and patent law. This time, in Cardinal Chemical v.
38
Morton International, Inc., the Court took up another fundamental
issue of appellate procedure largely limited to the Federal Circuit:
whether the Federal Circuit’s practice of routinely vacating
declaratory judgments regarding patent validity following a
determination of noninfringement could be squared with the case-or39
controversy requirements of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. In
two prior cases, the Federal Circuit had established the rule that a
judgment of noninfringement on a patent claim renders moot a
40
declaratory judgment challenge to the validity of that same claim.
The Court noted in its opinion why it had granted certiorari:
“Because the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals
from all United States District Courts in patent litigation, the rule
that it applied in this case, and has been applying regularly . . . is a
32. Id. at 818-19.
33. Id. at 819.
34. 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
35. Id. at 663-64.
36. Id. at 664.
37. Id. at 679.
38. 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
39. Id. at 85.
40. Vieau v. Japax, Inc., 823 F.2d 1510, 1517, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094, 1100
(Fed. Cir. 1987); Fonar Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 821 F.2d 627, 632-33, 3
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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matter of special importance to the entire Nation.”
Court reversed the Federal Circuit and held that:

[Vol. 56:4
41

Ultimately, the

[t]he Federal Circuit’s decision to rely on one of two possible
alternative grounds (noninfringement rather than invalidity) did
not strip it of power to decide the second question. . . . [T]he
Federal Circuit had jurisdiction to review the declaratory judgment
of invalidity. The case did not become moot when that court
42
affirmed the finding of noninfringement.

Finally, it is worth noting that around this same time, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in one other procedural case, Izumi Seimitsu
43
Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., but then dismissed the
44
writ of certiorari as “improvidently granted.” The question there
was whether the courts of appeals “[s]hould . . . routinely vacate
district court final judgments at the parties’ request when cases are
45
settled while on appeal.” The petition was dismissed in this case
because, upon the briefing on the merits, it became apparent that
there was a preliminary question—whether the petitioner (Izumi)
should have been allowed to intervene to challenge the vacatur
order—that was “neither presented in the petition for certiorari nor
46
fairly included in the one question that was presented.” Shortly
after this dismissal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to a Ninth
Circuit case that had addressed the same issue, and ultimately sided
47
against “routine” vacatur under these circumstances.
B. The Second Wave (1995-2002): (Mostly) Only the Biggest Issues
The tide began to turn in 1995, when the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in a number of cases that struck at the core of patent
infringement litigation: the rules for construing patent claims, the
scope and application of the doctrine of equivalents, and the right to
48
have a jury determine issues of patent invalidity. Still, the results of
most of these cases—especially the ones that went to the core of the
41. Cardinal Chem., 508 U.S. at 89.
42. Id. at 98.
43. 507 U.S. 907 (1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 27 (1993) (per curiam).
44. 510 U.S. 27, 28 (1993) (per curiam).
45. Id. at 30.
46. Id. at 28.
47. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 18-19 (1994).
48. In January 1995, the Court also decided Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S.
179 (1995), which addressed the proper interpretation of the Plant Variety
Protection Act (PVPA), 84 Stat. 1542, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (2000). “The PVPA
extends patent-like protection to novel varieties of sexually reproduced plants (that
is, plants grown from seed) which parallels the protection afforded asexually
reproduced plant varieties (that is, varieties reproduced by propagation or grafting)
under Chapter 15 of the Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164.” Asgrow Seed, 513 U.S.
at 181.
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patent system—were largely affirmances of the Federal Circuit’s
rulings.
49
The first of these cases, American Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, never
yielded a decision. The Federal Circuit had held, in a panel decision,
that the patent owner (Lockwood) had a Seventh Amendment jury
trial right in a declaratory judgment action to determine patent
50
validity. Three judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en
51
banc, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
52
question of the jury trial right. However, shortly after certiorari was
granted, Lockwood withdrew his request for a jury trial, thereby
53
mooting the case. Although the Federal Circuit has addressed the
54
Seventh Amendment issue in related contexts since then, the
Supreme Court has not seen fit to reach out to consider this issue
again in the last eleven years.
55
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the case that gave its name
to the now-ubiquitous “Markman hearing,” was decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court as a Seventh Amendment jury trial issue. The
Federal Circuit had taken the Markman case en banc to resolve two
contrary lines of its precedents: One line had said that patent claim
construction was to be determined by the court as a matter of law; the
other had held that it was appropriate to submit disputed issues of
claim construction to a jury. The en banc Federal Circuit held that
claim interpretation was a matter of law for the court, and that there
was no Seventh Amendment right to have such issues decided by a
56
jury. The Markman petition for certiorari presented only a single
question: “In a patent infringement action for damages, is there a
right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment of the United
States Constitution of genuine factual disputes about the meaning of
49. 515 U.S. 1182 (1995) (order vacating cert.).
50. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 980, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1406, 1417 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
51. Id. at 980-90 (Nies, J., dissenting) (joined by Chief Judge Archer and Judge
Plager).
52. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1121, cert. vacated, 515 U.S. 1182
(1995).
53. Am. Airlines, 515 U.S. 1182 (order vacating cert.).
54. Compare Teagal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 135152, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (granting jury trial where
accused infringer had raised invalidity as a separate claim), with In re Technology
Licensing Corp., 423 F.3d 1286, 1291, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450, 1454-55 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (denying jury trial where accused infringer raised invalidity only as a defense),
cert. denied, 74 U.S.L.W. 3675 (U.S. June 5, 2006). Note: One of the authors served
as counsel to the respondent in In re Tech. Licensing Corp. in the U.S. Supreme Court.
55. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
56. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 971, 976-79, 983-88, 34
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1322, 1327-29, 1333-37 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517
U.S. 370 (1996).
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57

a patent?”
The Supreme Court answered that particular
58
constitutional question “no.” What may prove to be most important
about the Supreme Court’s Markman decision in coming years is
understanding what the Court did, and did not, decide. It clearly did
decide that the interpretation of a patent claim term “is an issue for
59
the judge, not the jury.” But it arguably did not decide that claim
60
construction is a “question of law,” nor did it decide that all issues of
61
claim construction must be reviewed de novo on appeal. The latter
two issues remain a matter of some contention in the Federal
62
Circuit.
Next, the Supreme Court waded into the undercurrents of the
doctrine of equivalents in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical
63
Co.
There, the Court affirmed another en banc decision of the
Federal Circuit and rejected the petitioner’s (Warner-Jenkinson’s)
64
argument that the 1952 Patent Act had done away with the doctrine.
In the course of affirming the Federal Circuit, the Court offered
some important subsidiary holdings. It endorsed the Federal
65
Circuit’s longstanding “all elements” rule, it held that prosecutionhistory estoppel was an important limitation on the application of the
doctrine of equivalents but did not foreclose entirely a patentee’s
66
recourse to the doctrine, it established a presumption that patent
67
amendments bear a substantial relationship to patentability, it held
68
that intent is not an element of the doctrine, it concluded that
69
equivalents are not limited to those disclosed in the patent itself,
and it declined to decide whether the doctrine of equivalents was an
issue for judge or jury. However, the Court noted that “[t]here was
57. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Markman, 517 U.S. 370 (No. 95-26).
58. Markman, 517 U.S. at 391.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 378, 388 (characterizing claim construction as a “mongrel practice” that
may “‘fall[] somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical
fact’” (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
61. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455-56, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1169, 1173-75 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
62. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1328, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (declining to address the issues of whether claim
construction is a question of law, and whether issues of claim construction should be
granted any deference upon appellate review).
63. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
64. Id. at 25-28.
65. Id. at 29-30; see Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1739-40 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (applying the “all
elements” rule within the doctrine of equivalents).
66. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 30-31.
67. Id. at 33-34.
68. Id. at 36.
69. Id. at 37.
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ample support in our prior cases for [the Federal Circuit’s] holding”
that “it was for the jury to decide whether the accused process was
70
equivalent to the claimed process.”
The Court’s next foray into patent law again resulted in an
71
affirmance of the Federal Circuit. In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,
which involved the frequently invoked on-sale bar under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b), the Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between
Federal Circuit precedent and pre-Federal Circuit precedents from
the regional courts of appeals regarding whether an invention has to
72
be reduced to practice before the on-sale bar can apply. The Court
concluded that two conditions must be satisfied before the on-sale
bar can apply: One, “the product must be the subject of a
73
commercial offer for sale,” and two, “the invention must be ready
74
for patenting.”
A few months later, the Federal Circuit suffered a reversal on a
75
procedural issue in Dickinson v. Zurko. Zurko, a patent applicant,
had been denied a patent by the Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”). A Federal Circuit panel applied the “clearly erroneous”
76
standard of review to the PTO’s factual findings, and the en banc
77
The Supreme Court granted the
Federal Circuit agreed.
government’s petition for certiorari and ultimately reversed, holding
that the standards of review established by the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”)— “arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion,
or . . . [in limited cases subject to sections 556 and 557 of the APA]
78
unsupported by substantial evidence” —controls judicial review of
79
The Court rejected the
findings of fact made by the PTO.
argument, advanced by the applicant, that the pre-APA practice of
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had been to review Patent
Office determinations for clear error, and thus that the preexisting
70. Id. at 38 (citing Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125
(1878) and Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 344 (1854)).
71. 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
72. Id. at 60 (citing Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 299-302, 187
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257, 265-68 (2d Cir. 1975) and Dart Indus., Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co., 489 F.2d 1359, 1365 n.11, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 392, 397 n.11 (7th
Cir. 1973)).
73. Id. at 67.
74. Id.
75. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
76. In re Zurko, 111 F.3d 887, 889, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1476, 1478 (Fed. Cir.
1997), reh’g granted, 142 F.3d 1447, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1691 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc), rev’d, Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
77. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1691, 1693 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (en banc), rev’d, Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (following the
previous Federal Circuit decision in again applying a “clearly erroneous” standard).
78. Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 152 (quoting, in relevant part, 5 U.S.C. § 706).
79. Id. at 157-59.
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“clearly
erroneous”
standard
was
an
“additional
80
requirement[] . . . recognized by law.”
The Federal Circuit was again reversed less than two weeks later in
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
81
Bank. The issue there was whether Congress had, in the Patent and
82
Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, validly abrogated
83
the States’ sovereign immunity. The Federal Circuit had held that
Congress had acted within its constitutional power because it had
made its intent clear and because it was permissibly creating a moneydamages remedy against states to prevent states from depriving
patent owners of their property (patents) without due process of law,
and that such a remedy was a proportionate response to patent
84
infringement by states.
The Supreme Court, which was in the
process of reasserting a more muscular version of state sovereign
85
It held that
immunity in several cases, reversed by a 5-4 vote.
Congress did not have the authority to abrogate state sovereign
immunity by invoking its Commerce Clause power under Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution, but could only abrogate immunity, if at
all, by a proper exercise of its enforcement powers under the
86
Reconstruction Amendments.
It further held that Congress had
overstepped its power by not merely enforcing a constitutional right
87
of due process, but by changing what the right was. In particular,
the Court noted that there had been no particular history of states
infringing patents, let alone a history so compelling to warrant
congressional enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Therefore, the Court held that the congressionally
enacted remedies, giving a sweeping right to sue states for money
damages in patent-infringement cases, “are ‘so out of proportion to a
supposed remedial or preventive object that [they] cannot be
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional
88
behavior.’”
80. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2000); see Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 170-72 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that until the decision in Dickinson the “clearly erroneous”
standard was a requirement imposed upon the Patent & Trademark Office by § 559).
81. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
82. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (2000).
83. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 630 (1999).
84. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d
1343, 1347-55, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1163-70 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev’d, 527 U.S.
627 (1999).
85. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 629.
86. Id. at 645-47.
87. Id. at 645-46.
88. Id. at 646 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)).
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A year passed before the Court considered another Federal Circuit
patent decision, this one a narrow procedural issue, in Nelson v.
89
In this unusual case, Ohio Cellular Products
Adams USA, Inc.
(“OCP”) had sued Adams USA for patent infringement, but OCP’s
claim was eventually dismissed with fees and costs awarded to
90
Adams. Adams, fearing that OCP might not be sufficiently solvent
to pay the award, moved to amend its pleadings to have OCP’s
president and sole shareholder, Nelson, added as a party under rule
15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; the district court granted
the motion, which had the curious effect of simultaneously making
91
Nelson a party and entering a judgment against him. The Federal
92
Circuit affirmed, over a dissent from Judge Newman, but the
Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that the procedures
of rule 15 had not been followed, and that Nelson should have been,
consistent with due process, allowed to contest the effort to make him
liable for the judgment after being added as a party to the suit;
“instead, he was adjudged liable the very first moment his personal
93
liability was legally at issue.”
Two terms later, the Federal Circuit was affirmed in J.E.M. Ag
94
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., a case presenting the
95
question of whether utility patents may be issued for plants. J.E.M.
had argued that in view of two previously enacted federal statutes, the
96
Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 on the one hand, and the Plant
97
Patent Act of 1930 on the other, there was no room to interpret
section 101 of the Patent Act to allow other kinds of plants, not
98
addressed in these two statutes, to receive patent protection. The
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that
neither act was intended by Congress to be an exclusive means of
providing patent protection to plants, and that both statutes could be
99
reconciled with the general, broad terms of section 101.

89. 529 U.S. 460 (2000).
90. Id. at 462-63.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 464-65.
93. Id. at 468.
94. 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
95. Id. at 127.
96. Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 23212583 (2000)).
97. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (2000).
98. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 131-32.
99. Id. at 132-41.
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C. The Third Wave (2002-present): Is Everything In Play?
The Federal Circuit had been treated well by the Supreme Court
on the biggest issues of patent law—claim construction, the doctrine
of equivalents, and the on-sale bar—with affirmances across the
board on these seminal issues for the first twenty years of the Federal
Circuit’s existence.
But that began to change in 2002, when the Supreme Court
vacated the Federal Circuit’s ruling in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
100
Kogyo Kabushiki Co.
The Federal Circuit had held, en banc, that
“[w]hen a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel
with regard to a claim element, there is no range of equivalents
available for the amended claim element. Application of the
doctrine of equivalents to the claim element is completely barred (a
101
‘complete bar’).” This holding “overruled the entire Hughes Aircraft
102
line of ‘flexible bar’ cases” and yielded the clear (but rigid) rule
that where an amendment to a claim is made for reasons of
patentability, the doctrine of equivalents could not be asserted. The
Supreme Court’s vacatur of the Federal Circuit’s ruling represented a
fundamental disagreement with the Federal Circuit’s stated views and
tempered the harshness of the Federal Circuit’s rule, essentially
adopting the “presumption” approach that had been advocated by
103
the U.S. Solicitor General in his brief.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion
for a unanimous Court adopted a presumptive bar, not a “complete”
104
one. A minor change to the law, perhaps, but the Court’s opinion
did not mince words: The Federal Circuit had “ignored the guidance
of Warner-Jenkinson, which instructed that courts must be cautious
before adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the
105
inventing community.”
The Federal Circuit’s new rule “risk[ed]
destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors in their
106
property,” and there was “no justification for applying a new and
107
more robust estoppel to those who relied on prior doctrine.”

100. 535 U.S. 722 (2002), vacating 234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (en banc).
101. Festo, 234 F.3d at 569, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (en banc), vacated, 535
U.S. 722 (2002).
102. Adamo et al., supra note 14, at 1636.
103. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and
Remand at 11-26, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S.
722 (2002) (No. 00-1543).
104. Festo, 535 U.S. at 740-41.
105. Id. at 739.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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Less than a week later, the Supreme Court reminded bench and
bar alike that the Federal Circuit did not have jurisdiction over all
patent issues arising anywhere in a federal case. In Holmes Group, Inc.
108
v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., the Court reminded the
Federal Circuit that its jurisdiction was limited to cases “arising
under” the patent laws, meaning that the patent law basis for Federal
Circuit jurisdiction had to be present on the face of the “well-pleaded
109
complaint,” and could not be found in a counterclaim.
The
Federal Circuit had asserted jurisdiction over a case where the only
issue of patent law had been injected into the case by the defendant’s
compulsory counterclaim; the well-pleaded complaint had been one
110
for trade-dress infringement.
Not only did the Court reiterate the
“well-pleaded complaint” rule, but it also specifically rejected the
argument that “whenever a patent-law counterclaim is raised,” the
111
Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Justice Stevens,
concurring, accurately presaged the Court’s heightened interest in
issues of patent law:
Necessarily . . . other circuits will have some role to play in the
development of this area of the law. An occasional conflict in
decisions may be useful in identifying questions that merit this
Court’s attention. Moreover, occasional decisions by courts with
broader jurisdiction will provide an antidote to the risk that the
112
specialized court may develop an institutional bias.

Taken together, Festo and Holmes Group appear to have signaled the
end of Supreme Court fealty to the Federal Circuit’s views of patent
law. In the span of six days in 2002, the Supreme Court had accused
113
the Federal Circuit of “ignor[ing]” Supreme Court precedent and
114
creating new rules with “no justification,” and one Justice had even
raised the spectre that “the specialized court” might be infected with
115
“institutional bias.” Even then, it would be a few more years before
the “third wave” reached its crest in 2005.
In the interim, the Court granted certiorari in Zapata Industries, Inc.
116
v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Connecticut, involving the question of whether
the time limit for filing a cross-appeal was a hard-and-fast
108. 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
109. Id. at 830-32.
110. Id. at 828.
111. Id. at 832, 833-34.
112. Id. at 839 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
113. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739
(2002).
114. Id. at 739.
115. Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 839 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
116. 536 U.S. 990 (2002), cert. dismissed, 537 U.S. 1025 (2002).
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jurisdictional rule; the circuits were irretrievably split on that
question, and the Federal Circuit had sided with those circuits
117
But after
viewing the time limit as a hard, jurisdictional one.
certiorari was granted, Zapata (the petitioner) withdrew its petition
118
for certiorari, and the writ was dismissed.
The year 2005 was truly the watershed year in the Supreme Court’s
continuing dialogue with the Federal Circuit. It was certainly the
beginning of a time of transition for the Supreme Court as well. The
end of the October 2004 term of the Supreme Court in June 2005
effectively marked the end of the “Rehnquist Court”—Justice
O’Connor would announce her retirement (effective upon the
confirmation of her successor) in July 2005, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist would pass away in September 2005, leading to the
appointments and confirmations of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito. Some have speculated that these two additions will bring to the
Court a greater awareness of business issues, and in particular patent
law issues, that “presages continuing high patent activity before the
119
[C]ourt for the foreseeable future.”
And while there is no doubt that the interest in patent cases has
continued apace since the arrival of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito, the fact is that the Court had already jumped into the patent
law waters in 2005 with a big splash when these changes in
composition came upon the Court. In June 2005, with Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor joining Justice Scalia’s unanimous
opinion for the Court, it decided Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I,
120
Ltd., vacating the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the preclinical
research exemption of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) and concluding that the
safe harbor contained in that statutory provision was somewhat
121
broader than the Federal Circuit had read it to be.
Before the
retirement of Justice O’Connor and the death of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Court had already granted certiorari in Unitherm Food
122
Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., dealing with a procedural issue (the
requirement of a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule
117. Zapata Indus. v. W.R. Grace & Co.–Conn., 34 F. App’x. 688, 690 n.* (Fed.
Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 536 U.S. 990 (2002), cert. dismissed, 537 U.S. 1025 (2002).
118. Zapata Indus. v. W.R. Grace & Co.–Conn., 537 U.S. 1025 (2002) (order
dismissing cert.).
119. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Adamo & Susan M. Gerber, Reigning Supreme Over the U.S.
Patent System, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), Sept. 22, 2006, at 550.
120. 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
121. Id. at 206-07; Gregory A. Castanias & Laura A. Coruzzi, The Supreme Court
Widens the Range of Preclinical Studies, IP Frontline (June 23, 2005), http://www.
ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=4414&deptid=7 (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
122. 375 F.3d 1341, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 543 U.S.
1186 (2005).

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

2007]

4/7/2007 11:15:24 AM

2006 PATENT SUMMARY

811

50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after the jury’s verdict in
order to preserve a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge for appeal)
important to, but not unique to, patent litigation; it had also granted
123
certiorari to Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., dealing
with the question of whether the fact that a product is patented
supports a presumption of market power in that product under the
124
antitrust laws (it was held that it does not).
And although Chief
Justice Roberts had already joined the Court and initially voted on
whether to grant the petition for certiorari in Laboratory Corporation of
125
America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., he ultimately recused
himself from the case; the Court then re-voted on whether to grant
certiorari and confirmed the grant of certiorari without his
126
participation.
(The case was ultimately dismissed on the ground
that the writ of certiorari had been improvidently granted, owing
127
largely to the way the issue had been framed in the lower courts. )
The Court’s interest in Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings had
gone back even further; however—with both Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O’Connor still on the Court, it had asked the then-Acting
Solicitor General to file a brief on the question of whether the
Metabolite patent was attempting to claim “laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” in contravention of the patent
128
laws.
Perhaps the most noted patent case taken up by the Court over the
129
For years, the
past two years was eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC.
Federal Circuit had hewn to the virtually inflexible rule that, when a
patent owner obtained a judgment of infringement, a permanent
injunction followed as a matter of course. As the Federal Circuit had
put it in its decision in the eBay case, there exists a “general rule that
courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement
130
absent exceptional circumstances.” Despite the Solicitor General’s
endorsement of the Federal Circuit’s rule, a unanimous Supreme
123. 96 F.3d 1342, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 545 U.S. 1127
(2005).
124. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1293 (2006).
125. 547 U.S. 28 (2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 601 (2005) (mem.).
126. 370 F.3d 1354, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct.
601 (2005) (mem.), cert. dismissed, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (mem.).
127. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (mem.), dismissing cert. as
improvidently granted by, 126 S. Ct. 601 (2005) (mem.).
128. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 543 U.S. 1185 (2005) (mem.) (quoting Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)) (order calling for the views of the Acting Solicitor
General).
129. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
130. MercExchange LLC v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1225, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
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Court reversed, holding that “well-established principles of equity”
require that a party seeking an injunction, even if the party had
obtained a judgment of patent infringement, still must satisfy the
131
traditional four-factor test for obtaining an injunction.
As Chief
Justice Roberts noted in his concurring opinion, “[f]rom at least the
early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a
132
finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases.” While
it is far too early to ascertain meaningful trends in the case law,
particularly in the absence of Federal Circuit precedent, some district
courts applying the eBay standard after a judgment of patent
infringement have denied injunctive relief in cases where the patent
133
owner is not in competition with the infringer in the marketplace —
the sort of patent holder sometimes referred to as a “patent troll” and
134
excoriated in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in eBay.
As this article goes to press, the Supreme Court has just decided
135
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., which again reversed the Federal
Circuit, scuttled its rule that a patent licensee must terminate or
breach its patent license before obtaining declaratory-judgment
jurisdiction in an action to challenge that license or the patents
136
underlying it, and raises serious questions regarding the survival of
the “reasonable apprehension of suit” standard that governs
137
declaratory-judgment jurisdiction in most circuits.
It has heard
argument in, but not yet decided, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex,

131. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839.
132. Id. at 1841 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
133. See, e.g., Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc., No. 2:03-CV-333-TJW, 2006 WL
3741891, at *4-*5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2006) (granting permanent injunction to
competitor patentee); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Co., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL
2385139, at *4-*6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (denying permanent injunction to noncompetitor patentee); Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield Servs., Inc., No. CIV-04-1693-C,
2006 WL 2128851, at *4-*5 (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2006) (granting permanent
injunction to competitor patentee); Finisar Corp. v. DIRECTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70300, at *14 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2006) (denying
permanent injunction to non-competitor patentee); z4 Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 434
F. Supp. 2d 437, 444 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (denying permanent injunction to noncompetitor patentee). Note: One of the authors served as counsel to the defendants
in the Finisar v. DIRECTV Group case.
134. See eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“An industry has
developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods
but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”).
135. 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
136. Id. at 773-74.
137. Id. at 774 n.11. See also SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. 051300, 2007 WL 881008, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 26, 2007) (“The Supreme Court’s
opinion in MedImmune represents a rejection of our reasonable apprehension of suit
test.”); id. at *12 (Bryson, J., concurring) (expressing “reservations” at this apparent
“sweeping change in our law”).
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138

Inc.,
which presents a challenge to the Federal Circuit’s
longstanding teaching-suggestion-motivation test for determining
obviousness under section 103 of the Patent Act, and which seems to
have inspired several decisions from the Federal Circuit in 2006 that
attempted to explain the flexibility of the teaching-suggestion139
It has also heard argument in Microsoft Corp. v.
motivation test.
140
AT&T Corp., which involves the question of whether software object
code can be a “component[]of a patented invention under Section
271(f) of the Patent Act,” and if so, whether copies of software object
code are “supplie[d]” from the United States under that subsection
when the copies are created overseas by replicating a master version
141
supplied from the United States. The Court’s decision in this latter
case may bring an increased emphasis on issues of extraterritorial
application of the U.S. patent laws, issues that have been recurring in
a number of recent Federal Circuit cases (in addition to Microsoft
142
Corp. v. AT&T Corp.).
Even beyond these grants of certiorari and decisions, however,
there is another gauge of the Supreme Court’s apparently enhanced
interest in the patent law jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit. The
Court has been following the practice of issuing orders calling for the
views of the Solicitor General (known colloquially as a “CVSG order”)
when seriously considering a grant of certiorari in a patent case. It
143
did so before granting certiorari in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,
144
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., Laboratory Corporation of America
145
Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., and Merck KGAA v. Integra

138. 119 F. App’x. 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006)
(mem.).
139. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Ormco
Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1306, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1931, 1936
(Fed. Cir. 2006); Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs. Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1001 (Fed. Cir. 2006); DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H.
Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
140. 414 F.3d 1366, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1506 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct.
467 (2006) (mem.).
141. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., No. 051056 (U.S. Feb. 17, 2006) (internal quotations omitted).
142. E.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2005); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282,
75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1763 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Eolas Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 399
F.3d 1325, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1782 (Fed. Cir. 2005); cf. Voda v. Cordis Corp., No.
05-1238, 2007 WL 269431, at *15 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 1, 2007) (holding that it was an
abuse of discretion to grant leave to amend a U.S. patent-infringement complaint in
order to add claims of infringement of five foreign patents under the supplementaljurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000)).
143. 127 S. Ct. 1901 (2006) (mem.).
144. 126 S. Ct. 327 (2005) (mem.).
145. 543 U.S. 1185 (2005) (mem.).
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146

Lifesciences I, Ltd., just to name a few recent examples. But it has
also issued CVSG orders in patent cases where it ultimately did not
grant certiorari, including, recently, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex
147
Corp., presenting the question of whether the “unwitting” or
“unappreciated” prior creation of a product can constitute an
inherent anticipation under section 102 of the Patent Act; Apotex Inc.
148
v. Pfizer Inc., presenting a question regarding declaratory judgment
jurisdiction for cases filed by generic pharmaceutical manufacturers;
149
and Federal Trade Commission v. Schering-Plough Corp., a case arising in
the Eleventh Circuit but presenting the question of whether an
agreement between a pharmaceutical patent holder and a would-be
generic competitor, in which the patent owner makes a substantial
payment to the generic manufacturer allegedly to delay the generic
challenger’s entry into the market, constitutes an unreasonable
restraint of trade.
While each of these cases was ultimately deemed unworthy of
certiorari by the Supreme Court, the Court’s interest in these issues
should not go unnoticed by the practicing bar, for they did capture
enough of the Court’s interest to seek out the views of the United
States on each case. These developments, too, provide further
confirmation of the exponential leap in the Supreme Court’s interest
in the development of the U.S. patent laws.
D. Surfing the Third Wave: Lessons for the Bar
Since it now appears that an era of active U.S. Supreme Court
review of Federal Circuit decisions is upon us, what can we learn from
the recent dialogue between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme
Court? We suggest a few lessons:
1. The Supreme Court will be a more aggressive policeman of the
Federal Circuit’s decisions than it was over the first twenty years of
150
151
152
153
that court’s existence. (Festo; Holmes Group; eBay; KSR ).

146. 543 U.S. 805 (2004) (mem.).
147. 126 S. Ct. 1133 (2006) (mem.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2887 (2006).
148. 126 S. Ct. 2057 (2006) (mem.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 379 (2006) (mem.).
Note: One of the authors served as counsel to respondent in this case.
149. 126 S. Ct. 544 (2005) (mem.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006) (mem.).
150. See 535 U.S. 722, 739-41 (2002), vacating 234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (vacating the Federal Circuit’s ruling on the ground,
inter alia, that, due to inventors’ expectations, the Federal Circuit ought to have been
more cautious in its attempt to change the existing estoppel rule).
151. See 535 U.S. 826, 832-34 (2002) (holding that the Federal Circuit’s subject
matter jurisdiction is limited to cases “arising under” the patent laws; thus, a patentlaw basis for federal jurisdiction must be present in the complaint in order for the
claim to be heard in federal court); supra text accompanying notes 108-112.
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2. Lines of Federal Circuit authority, even those of long-standing
application, should be critically evaluated at the beginning of a case
to determine whether a challenge to that authority should be raised
154
155
and preserved in the lower courts or agencies. (MedImmune; KSR;
156
eBay ).
3. Old (pre-Federal Circuit) Supreme Court authority, and not
just that in the patent area, should be considered and urged, where
appropriate, on the Federal Circuit and the lower courts.
157
158
159
(MedImmune; KSR; eBay ).
4. The same rules apply to litigation involving patents as in
160
161
ordinary, non-patent litigation. (MedImmune; Unitherm; Panduit v.
162
Dennison ).
5. Lawyers need to start thinking about these issues, substantive
or procedural, and how to properly frame them for Supreme Court
review, as soon as the case is filed, and not just when the case reaches
163
164
the Federal Circuit or afterward. (Laboratory Corp.; Unitherm ).
152. See 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006) (vacating the Federal Circuit’s decision,
which had objected to the seemingly mandatory requirement for courts to issue a
permanent injunction upon a judgment of infringement, on the grounds that
injunctions are to be issued if required by the four-factor test).
153. 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (order granting certiorari).
154. See 127 S. Ct. 764, 773-74 (2007); supra text accompanying notes 135-137
(indicating that the Supreme Court’s reversal of the MedImmune decision raises
concern about the weight the “reasonable apprehension of suit” standard, which
governs declaratory-judgment jurisdiction in most circuits, will be given in the
future).
155. See 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (mem.) (order granting certiorari); supra note 138
and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme Court recently heard arguments
that challenge the Federal Circuit’s longstanding teaching-suggestion-motivation test
for determining obviousness under section 103 of the Patent Act but has yet to make
a ruling).
156. See 126 S. Ct. at 1839 (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s challenge to the general
rule that permanent injunctions should be issued once the court concludes that
there has been a patent infringement).
157. See 127 S. Ct. 764.
158. See 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (mem.).
159. See 126 S. Ct. at 1839-41 (applying the four-factor test historically employed by
courts of equity).
160. See 127 S. Ct. at 774 (applying declaratory judgment rules).
161. See 543 U.S. 1186 (2005) (order granting certiorari) (noting that the Court
would address a procedural issue–the requirement of a motion for summary
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50—which is not unique to patent litigation).
162. See 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986) (remanding the case for reconsideration in light
of FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)).
163. See 126 S. Ct. 543 (2005) (per curiam); supra note 127 and accompanying text
(indicating that the case was dismissed on the ground that, because of how the issue
had been framed in the lower courts, the writ of certiorari had been improperly
granted).
164. See 543 U.S. at 1186 (order granting certiorari) (noting that the Court would
be addressing whether a court of appeals may review the sufficiency of evidence
supporting a jury verdict when the motion for such a review was made prior to
submission of the case to a jury).
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6. The support of the U.S. Solicitor General may be useful in
165
some cases (Festo ), but the Court will not blindly accept the Solicitor
166
General’s position (eBay ).
At bottom, the single most important lesson from the Supreme
Court’s recent dialogue with the Federal Circuit may be this: The
Supreme Court is still “supreme,” even when it comes to issues of
167
patent law that fall within the aegis of “the specialized court.” That
lesson may have been forgotten in the early years of the Federal
Circuit, when patent cases were not reviewed frequently, and later,
when the Federal Circuit was affirmed by the Supreme Court on the
major issues of the day. But the world has changed, and that lesson
now has profound importance for the way cases are litigated up
through, and past, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.
Keep these principles in mind as we consider the patent law work
of the Federal Circuit in 2006.
II. FEDERAL COURT AND AGENCY PRACTICE
The cases decided by the Federal Circuit in the year 2006 involved
numerous procedural issues. Perhaps the most significant of these
were a number of decisions addressing the use of summary judgment
to resolve inequitable conduct disputes, as well as two decisions
addressing the application of the local “patent rules” that apply in
several district courts around the country.
We have organized the discussion of the Federal Circuit’s
procedural rulings in roughly the order in which they are
encountered in litigation: jurisdictional and other issues involved in
initiating the case, pre-trial matters, trial issues, and post-trial matters.
After a discussion of the special case of local patent rules, we then
turn to appellate procedural issues, and conclude with a discussion of
some procedural issues unique to the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office.

165. See 535 U.S. 722, 739-41 (2002); supra note 104 and accompanying text
(discussing how the Supreme Court adopted the “presumption” approach that had
been advocated by the U.S. Solicitor General in his brief).
166. See 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2007); supra note 131 and accompanying text
(noting that the Supreme Court disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s objection to
permanent injunctions even though the Solicitor General had given his support to
the argument).
167. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circ. Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 839 (2002)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part).
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A. District Court Practice
1.

Initiating the case
a. Standing

A party has standing to bring suit only if it has a legally sufficient
“personal stake” in a dispute to justify exercise of a court’s remedial
168
powers on its behalf. The Patent Act provides that a “patentee” may
169
bring an action for “infringement of his patent.”
The term
“patentee” includes “not only the patentee to whom the patent was
170
issued but also the successors in title to the patentee.” The courts
have recognized that in some instances a patent licensee may have
171
standing to sue for infringement, but in others it may not.
172
Issues of standing arose a few times in 2006. In Aspex Eyewear, Inc.
173
v. Miracle Optics, the district court had concluded that neither
Contour Optik (the original patent assignee) nor Aspex Eyewear (a
sublicensee) had standing to sue for infringement of an eyeglassframe patent because neither possessed the “rights of the patentee”
when the original complaint was filed, and because the sublicense
agreement between Aspex and Chic (a licensee of Contour’s) was
174
executed after the complaint was filed.
The Federal Circuit
vacated, however, holding that the Contour-Chic agreement “did not
constitute a transfer from Contour to Chic of all substantial rights to
the ‘747 patent, and hence it was not an assignment” under Waterman
175
v. Mackenzie.
Although the Chic-Contour agreement contained
provisions that “strongly favor a finding of an assignment, not a
176
license,” the dispositive factor to the Federal Circuit was the limited
168. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (invoking “personal
stake” as the primary element in determining standing and justiciability of the case
or controversy).
169. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2000) (declaring the right to a civil action as a “remedy
for infringement” under the Patent Act).
170. Id. § 100(d).
171. Compare Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891) (holding that an
exclusive territorial licensee has standing to sue for patent infringement) and Vaupel
Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875-76, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1045, 1049-50 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding same), with Rite-Hite
Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551-52, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1074 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that a non-exclusive licensee does not have standing
to sue for patent infringement).
172. See also infra notes 704-23, and accompanying text.
173. 434 F.3d 1336, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
174. Id. at 1339, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
175. See id. at 1341-42, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460 (noting that in Waterman the
Supreme Court held that an assignee has standing to bring suit if it has an exclusive
right to the patented invention).
176. Id. at 1342, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.
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time of the agreement—“As of March 16, 2006, Contour, absent an
amendment of the agreement, will regain all of the rights under the
‘747 patent that it had previously transferred to Chic. It is thus the
177
unquestioned owner of the patent . . . .”
The court remanded for
the district court to consider whether Aspex was an exclusive licensee
who was a necessary party required to be joined—an issue the district
178
court had not addressed.
179
In Bicon, Inc. v. Strautmann Co., the district court had dismissed
Bicon as a party on the ground that it was a nonexclusive licensee and
180
thus lacked standing to sue.
The legal principle at issue was
unexceptional and agreed-to by the parties—“an exclusive licensee
may sue on a patent, if the patent owner is joined as a party, but . . . a
181
nonexclusive licensee may not.” Bicon’s only argument was that the
district court should not have resolved this issue on summary
judgment, because Bicon’s president had testified that the licensed
right to practice the invention of the patent was “exclusive at the
moment”—but, as the Federal Circuit pointed out, that testimony was
further qualified by the statement that the license was only
“exclusive” in that Bicon was the only licensee of the patent at the
182
time.
That was not enough to overcome summary judgment, and
183
so the Federal Circuit affirmed.
b.

Subject-matter jurisdiction

A federal court must have subject-matter jurisdiction over a
controversy before it can reach the merits of that controversy; for a
federal court to proceed to the merits without assuring itself of
jurisdiction “carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized
judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation
184
In most patent cases, the basis for federal subjectof powers.”
matter jurisdiction is section 1338(a) of the Judicial Code, which
provides for “jurisdiction . . . exclusive of the courts of the states in
177. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.
178. Id. at 1344, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462.
179. 441 F.3d 945, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
180. Id. at 956, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
181. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277 (citing Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice
Cheese, Inc., 402 F.3d 1198, 1202-03, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1204, 1207-08 (Fed. Cir.
2005) and Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1031, 34
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444, 1446-47 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
182. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
183. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
184. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998); see Ruhrgas AG
v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1999) (noting that federal court inquiries
into subject-matter jurisdiction should be answered prior to questions of personal
jurisdiction so as to show “expedition and sensitivity to state courts’ coequal share”).
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patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.”
But
jurisdictional issues crop up under other statutes and constitutional
provisions—most notably when sovereign immunity (domestic or
foreign) is at issue.
In fact, the major developments in subject-matter jurisdiction in
2006 dealt with these sources of immunity. In Intel Corp. v.
186
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, the court
addressed the question of jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign
187
Immunities Act (“FSIA”), as the defendant, the Commonwealth
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (“CSIRO”), was
188
Australia’s national science agency.
CSIRO had engaged in
ultimately unsuccessful licensing negotiations with United States
companies such as Dell, Intel, Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, and
Netgear; when the discussions ended, each of the U.S. companies
189
filed declaratory judgment actions against CSIRO. CSIRO claimed
that it was immune from suit, and specifically urged that the
190
“commercial activity” exception to foreign sovereign immunity did
not apply to “patent licensing negotiations that do not result in a
191
fully-executed, binding contract.” The district court disagreed with
CSIRO, but, because denials of claims of immunity are immediately
appealable under the collateral-order doctrine, CSIRO was able to
192
take an immediate appeal to the Federal Circuit.
In deciding this
193
“issue of first impression for this court,” the Federal Circuit
affirmed, noting that “CSIRO’s acts of (1) obtaining a United States
patent and then (2) enforcing its patent so it could reap the profits
thereof—whether by threatening litigation or by proffering licenses
to putative infringers—certainly fall within the . . . category” of
“‘exercis[ing] only those powers that can also be exercised by private
194
citizens,’” which are not “‘powers peculiar to sovereigns.’”
The
licensing discussions with United States companies were therefore
“commercial activity” under the FSIA, and the U.S. companies’
185. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
186. 455 F.3d 1364, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
187. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611; see id. § 1604 (stating that “a foreign state shall be
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States”).
188. Intel, 455 F.3d at 1366, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509.
189. Id. at 1366-68, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509-11.
190. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(2), 1603(d) (indicating that foreign states engaging
in “a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction”
in the United States will not be immune from jurisdiction).
191. Intel, 455 F.3d at 1369, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512.
192. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.
193. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512.
194. Id. at 1370, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512 (quoting Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992)).
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declaratory-judgment actions were “based on” those commercial
195
activities of obtaining and asserting a U.S. patent.
Another immunity issue that arises with increasing frequency in the
196
Federal Circuit is the question of the states’ sovereign immunity.
This issue recurs with some regularity because state universities
(which are arms of the state for purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment) have become more active in the business of patent
procurement and enforcement, and in several cases are accused
infringers. For instance, in Pennington Seed, Inc. v. Produce Exchange
197
No. 299, Pennington Seed attempted to sue the University of
Arkansas and four of its officers for “actively growing, marketing,
offering for sale, promoting and selling a product containing”
198
Pennington Seed’s patented fescue grass. The district court found
the action barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and the Federal
Circuit affirmed, rejecting Pennington Seed’s argument that
Arkansas’s state-law claims procedures provided no adequate
remedies for patent infringement on the ground that Congress made
no specific finding that these state procedures were so inadequate
that it “abrogated state sovereign immunity” to allow a patent
199
infringement suit for damages to proceed in federal court.
The
court also noted that although injunctive relief against state officials
for continuing violations of federal law might be theoretically
200
available under Ex Parte Young; here there was no proper allegation
that the state university officials themselves were involved in any
201
ongoing violation of federal law.
Sovereign immunity was also at issue in Tegic Communications Corp.
202
v. Board of Regents of the University of Texas System. The district court
held that the University of Texas had not waived its sovereign
immunity to a declaratory judgment suit brought by Tegic by filing a
covenant not to sue, by obtaining patent rights and enforcing them
in other federal court actions, or (with respect to its immunity from
suit in Washington State) by filing suit in Texas as to the same
195. Id. at 1370-71, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512-13.
196. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial powers of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
197. 457 F.3d 1334, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1777 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
198. Id. at 1338, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778.
199. Id. at 1340-41, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
200. See 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that a state’s sovereign immunity cannot
insulate the unconstitutional actions of a state official because, upon violation of the
Constitution, that individual is stripped of his or her official capacity).
201. Pennington Seed, 457 F.3d at 1341-43, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780-82.
202. 458 F.3d 1335, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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203

patent. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the University’s
assertion of its patents against certain telephone companies in a
Texas federal court waived its immunity as to any compulsory
counterclaims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, but
did not extend to Tegic’s declaratory suit in Washington federal
204
court.
205
Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Benun presented an interesting question of
subject-matter jurisdiction vis-à-vis the district courts and the
206
Ordinarily, a patent
International Trade Commission (“ITC”).
owner can bring actions regarding importations of allegedly
infringing products in both a federal district court and before the
207
ITC.
The bases for jurisdiction (and the scope of the available
remedies) differ in the two fora: ITC jurisdiction is in rem, not in
personam, the only available remedies there are exclusion orders
enforceable at the border by the U.S. Customs Service against any
208
infringing product, and damages are unavailable.
An exclusion
order may be specific (as it is typically) or general (which is less
common): A specific exclusion order excludes from the United
States only those articles at issue in the investigation; a general
exclusion order typically excludes all infringing articles, whether or
not included in the investigation, and whether or not imported by
209
any of the respondents in the investigation. In Fuji Photo Film, the
defendants urged, in a federal court action following an ITC action,
that the ITC’s earlier issuance of a general exclusion order had
precluded a district court from granting injunctive relief, or, as the
Federal Circuit described the argument, “once the [ITC] issues a
general exclusion order, the statutory scheme that allows an importer
to challenge a seizure of its goods under such an order also prevents
a district court from considering importation issues involving those
210
same goods.”
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, noting
that 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), which grants the Court of International
Trade exclusive jurisdiction over denials of protests of general
211
exclusion orders, “says nothing about district court jurisdiction over
203. Id. at 1339, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203.
204. Id. at 1341-43, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
205. 463 F.3d 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
206. Id. at 1253.
207. Id. at 1254; Texas Instruments Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d 1325, 1330, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1674, 1678 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Three of the authors were counsel to
Texas Instruments in this case.
208. Id. at 1330, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678.
209. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2000).
210. Fuji Photo, 463 F.3d at 1254.
211. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2000).
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patent infringement claims . . . or injunctions . . . .”
This statute
only gives the Court of International Trade exclusive jurisdiction over
213
actions “commenced to contest the denial of a protest,” and
because a district court patent infringement action is not a “contest”
to “the denial of a protest,” the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
214
court’s rejection of the defendants’ jurisdictional challenge.
215
In Thompson v. Microsoft Corp., the court held that a state law claim
of unjust enrichment, based on a claim that Microsoft improperly
filed a patent application for an invention that the plaintiff alleged he
invented, did not “arise under” the U.S. patent laws for purposes of
216
the Federal Circuit’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Federal
Circuit’s decision in Thompson applied two of the most important
principles undergirding the well-pleaded complaint rule for purposes
of ascertaining federal subject-matter jurisdiction: one, if a cause of
action is not on its face one for patent infringement, it only “arises
under” patent law if “patent law is a necessary element of [a] well217
pleaded [non-patent-law] claim;” and two, even a defense on
federal preemption grounds—which Microsoft had interposed as a
defense to Thompson’s unjust-enrichment claim—will not support
218
“arising under” subject-matter jurisdiction.
Because the Federal
Circuit’s own appellate jurisdiction depends on a finding that the
219
district court’s jurisdiction “arises under” the U.S. patent laws, the
court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Thompson’s appeal
and ordered the appeal transferred to the United States Court of
220
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
c.

Personal jurisdiction

A federal district court has personal jurisdiction over a party so
long as two basic requirements are fulfilled: “First, a defendant must
be amenable to process in the forum state. Second, the court’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction must comply with the precepts of
221
federal due process.” A party is “amenable to service of process” if
212. Fuji Photo, 463 F.3d at 1255.
213. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a).
214. Fuji Photo, 463 F.3d at 1255-56.
215. 471 F.3d 1288, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1155 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
216. Id. at 1292, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158.
217. Id. at 1291, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 797, 808-09 (1988)).
218. Id. at 1292, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158.
219. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
220. Thompson, 471 F.3d at 1292, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158.
221. LSI Indus., Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1371, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1965, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash. Office of
Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
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it could be “subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general
jurisdiction in the state in which the district court is located,” such as
under a state “long-arm” jurisdictional statute or “nonresident
222
motorist statute.”
223
In Breckenridge Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit addressed several of these issues and attempted to
synthesize the law with respect to personal jurisdiction in the context
224
of “cease and desist” letters. A Florida district court had held that
Metabolite’s sending of certain “cease and desist” letters into Florida
from its Colorado home did not meet the due process standards for
225
personal jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit disagreed and held that
there were sufficient contacts between Metabolite and parties in the
State of Florida to satisfy the constitutional personal-jurisdiction
226
requirement.
The court surveyed several of its prior cases, which
reached differing results on similar (though not identical) facts, and
set forth these guiding principles:
[W]here a defendant has sent cease and desist letters into a forum
state that primarily involve a legal dispute unrelated to the patent
at issue, such as an injunction obtained for misappropriation of
227
trade secrets, the exercise of jurisdiction is improper.

....
[A] defendant may not be subjected to personal jurisdiction if its
only additional activities in the forum state involve unsuccessful
228
attempts to license the patent there.

....
A defendant may not be subjected to personal jurisdiction where
the defendant “has successfully licensed the patent in the forum
state, even to multiple non-exclusive licenses, but does not, for
example, exercise control over the licensees’ sales activities and,
instead, has no dealings with those licensees beyond the receipt of
229
royalty income.
....
222. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
223. 444 F.3d 1356, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1581 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
224. Id. at 1366, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587-88; see infra notes 227–232 and
accompanying text (laying out the court’s summary of the relevant case law).
225. Breckenridge, 444 F.3d at 1360, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584.
226. Id. at 1369, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590.
227. Id. at 1366, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587 (citing Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong
Indus., Inc., 326 F.3d 1194, 1202, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1602, 1607 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
228. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587 (citing Hildebrand v. Steck Mfg. Co., Inc.,
279 F.3d 1351, 1356, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
229. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587-88 (citing Red Wing Shoe Co. v.
Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1361-62, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1192,
1197 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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In contrast, the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the
forum state by virtue of its relationship with its exclusive forum
state licensee if the license agreement, for example, requires the
defendant-licensor, and grants the licensee the right, to litigate
230
infringement claims.

....
[T]he defendant will also be subject to personal jurisdiction in the
forum state if the exclusive licensee (or licensee equivalent) with
which it has established a relationship is not headquartered in the
231
forum state, but nonetheless conducts business there.

Thus, the Federal Circuit summarized,
the crux of the due process inquiry should focus first on whether
the defendant has had contact with parties in the forum state
beyond the sending of cease and desist letters or mere attempts to
license the patent there. Where a defendant-licensor has a
relationship with an exclusive licensee headquartered or doing
business in the forum state, the inquiry requires close examination
of the license agreement. In particular, our case law requires that
the license agreement contemplate a relationship beyond royalty or
cross-licensing payment, such as granting both parties the right to
litigate infringement cases or granting the licensor the right to
232
exercise control over the licensee’s sales or marketing activities.

Applying these standards, which are a matter of Federal Circuit law
because of their close relationship to matters of substantive patent
233
law, the Federal Circuit held that the district court had erred in
finding no personal jurisdiction over defendant Metabolite because:
Metabolite had entered into an exclusive license arrangement with
PamLab, a company that does business in Florida; that license
agreement resulted in an ongoing relationship under which PamLab
was granted “full control of the prosecution or maintenance” of any
patent or application for a patent that Metabolite abandons or lets
lapse; and the agreement also resulted in PamLab and Metabolite
cooperating in sending cease-and-desist letters and in litigating
234
infringement claims in Florida and elsewhere.
235
In Pennington Seed, Inc. v. Produce Exchange No. 299, the court
affirmed a Missouri district court’s decision that it lacked personal
230. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588 (citing Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541,
1546, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1505, 1509 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
231. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588 (citing Genetic Implant Sys., Inc. v. CoreVent Corp., 123 F.3d 1455, 1457-59, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786, 1788-90 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
232. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
233. Id. at 1362, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1585.
234. Id. at 1366-67, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
235. 457 F.3d 1334, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1777 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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236

jurisdiction over officials of the University of Arkansas. Noting that
it was only necessary for Pennington Seed to make out a prima facie
case of personal jurisdiction in its complaint, the court nonetheless
concluded that the complaint was wholly lacking in any allegation
237
that these officials had any contacts with the State of Missouri.
“Even if their residence is within sixty miles of the Missouri border, as
Pennington states in its brief to this court, such a fact does not
demonstrate activities directed at Missouri or claims arising out of
238
activities in Missouri.”
d.

Specific issues affecting the initiation of a case

In addition to these essential legal jurisdictional requirements,
there are other jurisdictional (and related) doctrines that are
occasionally invoked at the outset of a case, often involving
discretionary determinations by district courts. A few of the doctrines
that cropped up in the 2006 decisions of the Federal Circuit are
discussed below.
i. Declaratory judgments
239

As noted above,
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
240
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. raises substantial questions about
the continued vitality of the Federal Circuit’s “reasonable
apprehension of suit” (or “reasonable apprehension of imminent
suit”) test, which has governed the question of declaratory-judgment
241
jurisdiction over the years.
The pre-MedImmune decisions that the
Federal Circuit rendered in 2006 should therefore be evaluated with
a critical eye to determine what effect they may have, postMedImmune.
242
In Microchip Technology Inc. v. Chamberlain Group, Inc., the Federal
Circuit relied on the 2005 decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor,
243
Inc., concluding that an existing settlement agreement, which the
declaratory judgment plaintiff believed had brought “patent peace”
between the parties, demonstrated that the declaratory plaintiff had

236. Id. at 1344-45, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783.
237. Id. at 1344, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783.
238. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783.
239. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
240. 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
241. Id. at 774 n.11 (quoting Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324,
1332-33, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1088, 1093-94 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
242. 441 F.3d 936, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
243. 409 F.3d 1376, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 127 S. Ct.
1118 (2007).
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244

no “reasonable apprehension of suit.” However, the U.S. Supreme
Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment in MedImmune v.
Centocor, remanding the case for the Federal Circuit to reconsider its
decision in light of the Supreme Court decision in MedImmune v.
245
Genentech. So, as this article goes to press, it is unclear what weight,
if any, the Microchip Technology case will have in the future.
246
In Plumtree Software, Inc. v. Datamize, LLC, the Federal Circuit
again applied the “reasonable apprehension of suit” test but
determined based on the totality of the circumstances that
Datamize’s earlier suit against Plumtree regarding a parent patent
created a reasonable apprehension of a suit in relation to later
patents on related technology, thereby making Plumtree’s
247
declaratory-judgment suit appropriate.
The court rejected
Datamize’s argument that the passage of time since that earlier suit
had minimized or eliminated that apprehension, “because, between
the two lawsuits, Datamize continued to ‘engage[] in a course of
conduct that show[ed] a willingness to protect [its] technology’”—it
had sued nine other defendants (not Plumtree) in another suit in
federal district court in Texas and had stated in discovery responses
in that Texas suit that it also believed Plumtree was infringing these
248
patents. “Plumtree was aware of the Texas action, and whether or
not the interrogatory response was actually communicated to
249
Plumtree, the response is probative of Datamize’s intentions.”
ii. Supplemental jurisdiction
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a federal district court may exercise
“supplemental jurisdiction” over a state law claim for which the
federal court would not otherwise have jurisdiction, if the state law
claim arises from the same common nucleus of operative fact as the
250
claim or claims properly in the federal court. In 2006, the Federal
Circuit issued a pronouncement on supplemental jurisdiction in
244. Microchip Tech., 441 F.3d at 942, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298.
245. No. 05-656, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1012 (Jan. 16, 2007).
246. 473 F.3d 1152, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
247. Id. at 1159, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255-56.
248. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256 (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 956, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310, 1312 (Fed. Cir.
1987)).
249. Plumtree Software, 473 F.3d at 1159, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256.
250. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000) (granting the district courts supplemental
jurisdiction over “all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution”); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (indicating that a federal court may hear both state
and federal claims if those claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts).
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251

Highway Equipment Co. v. FECO, Ltd. The court held that a district
court had “erred in exercising supplemental jurisdiction” over a state
law counterclaim (between two nondiverse parties) for wrongful
termination of a dealership agreement, because the wrongful
termination claim and the federal patent infringement claim did not
252
The contract
arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts.
relating to the distribution of Highway Equipment’s products was
completely unrelated to the patent, which dealt with a product
manufactured by FECO; and the dealership agreement was
terminated in 2002, a year before the patent being contested at the
253
federal level was even issued.
iii. Forum non conveniens
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a district court, despite
otherwise having jurisdiction over a claim or parties, may nonetheless
decline to hear a case if it determines that the dispute is one better
254
255
heard in a foreign forum.
In Bonzel v. Pfizer, Inc., the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s alternative holding that the suit
was properly dismissed under the forum non conveniens doctrine
because “the contract at issue was made in Germany and by its terms
256
requires interpretation and application of German law.”
251. 469 F.3d 1027, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
252. Id. at 1038-39, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128-29.
253. See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129 (comparing the situation to Mars, Inc. v.
Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1621 (Fed. Cir.
1994) and Ideal Instruments, Inc. v. Rivard Instruments, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 598
(N.D. Iowa 2006), two cases in which supplemental jurisdiction was denied because
the respective agreements, products, and alleged acts were different, indicating that
there was not a “common nucleus of operative facts”).
254. See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct.
1184, 1188 (2007) (Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, “a federal district
court may dismiss an action on the ground that a court abroad is the more
appropriate and convenient forum for adjudicating the controversy.”); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 511-12 (1947), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(2000), as recognized in Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996) (finding
the New York court’s refusal of jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens
appropriate because the negligence suit, which was brought by a Virginia resident
against a Pennsylvania company (conducting buisiness in both New York and
Virginia) after a fire at the company’s Virginia warehouse had destroyed the
plaintiff’s goods, could best be heard in Virginia); see also Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller,
510 U.S. 443 (1994) (finding that state law regarding the doctrine of forum non
conveniens is not preempted by federal law in admiralty cases filed in state court
under the Jones Act and the “saving to suitors clause”). One of the authors was
counsel to Sinochem in the first-cited case in this footnote.
255. 439 F.3d 1358, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2006). One of the
authors was counsel to Pfizer, Inc. in this case.
256. Id. at 1363, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140. The district court had dismissed
the case for lack of federal jurisdiction, either “arising under” the patent laws or
diversity jurisdiction, and the Federal Circuit had affirmed that dismissal prior to
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iv. Stays pending arbitration
Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that,
where a federal district court is satisfied that an issue in a court
dispute is “referable to arbitration” under a written instrument
providing for such arbitration, “the court in which such suit is
pending . . . shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of
the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the
257
258
terms of the agreement . . . .” In Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., the
Federal Circuit concluded that the Qualcomm-Nokia agreement
clearly and unmistakably provided that the question of arbitrability
was to be decided by the arbitrator, but remanded the case for the
district court to determine whether Nokia’s claim of arbitrability, as
to the particular issues claimed to be arbitrable, was “wholly
259
groundless.”
The district court had, in denying the request for
arbitration, misunderstood its task as determining whether the
asserted issues were in fact arbitrable; because the agreement
assigned arbitrability questions to the arbitrator, not the court, only
the limited “wholly groundless” inquiry avoids “invad[ing] the
260
province of the arbitrator.”
2.

Pre-trial matters
a.

Leave to amend the complaint

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
leave to amend a complaint after a responsive pleading is filed “shall
261
be freely given when justice so requires.” However, leave to amend
a complaint need not be granted when there has been undue or
prejudicial delay, the moving party acted in bad faith, or an
262
amendment is legally futile.
Moreover, where a district court has
entered a scheduling order under rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the deadline for amendment under that order
has passed, a party seeking amendment must also demonstrate “good
263
In Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos
cause” for the amendment.
264
Vegetales Del Centro S.A. de C.V., the Federal Circuit applied these
reaching the alternative forum non conveniens holding. Id. at 1362-63, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1139-40.
257. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000).
258. 466 F.3d 1366, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1669 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
259. Id. at 1373-74, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674-75.
260. Id. at 1374, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675.
261. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).
262. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
263. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b).
264. 464 F.3d 1339, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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principles (under Eighth Circuit law) and held that two proposed
amended counterclaims, and three proposed new counterclaims,
which the defendant attempted to add after trial, were indeed
265
futile.
The two proposed amended counterclaims were legally
foreclosed by the earlier judgment as to patent invalidity and
unenforceability, and the three proposed new counterclaims had not
been shown by the defendant to be sufficiently supportable that they
266
would survive summary judgment. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
267
affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend.
b.

Res judicata, collateral estoppel, and judicial estoppel

The doctrines of res judicata (or claim preclusion) and collateral
estoppel (or issue preclusion) serve to prevent unnecessary multiple
lawsuits on matters that parties have had a “full and fair opportunity
268
to litigate.” Under the doctrine of res judicata/claim preclusion, “a
final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their
269
privies based on the same cause of action.” Thus, such a judgment
prevents relitigation of claims that were or could have been brought
270
in the first action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel/issue
preclusion, “once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in
subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party
271
to the prior litigation.”
In 2006, the Federal Circuit had several opportunities to apply
these and related doctrines. In Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. U.S.
272
Surgical Corp., the court (applying Ninth Circuit law) held that an
earlier determination of a seven percent reasonable royalty for
infringement damages as to an earlier version of U.S. Surgical’s
infringing trocars (surgical devices used as access ports in
laparoscopic abdominal surgery) did not have collateral-estoppel
effect in a later suit involving a redesigned U.S. Surgical trocar
265. Id. at 1356, 80 U.S.P.Q.3d (BNA) at 1397.
266. Id. at 1355-56, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394-97.
267. Id. at 1356, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397.
268. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979) (noting that
preclusion under these doctrines “conserves judicial resources” and fosters reliance
on judicial precedent “by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions”).
269. Id. at 153 (emphasis added) (citing Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351,
352 (1877)).
270. See Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 476 (1998) (referring to FED.
R. CIV. P. 8(c), which states that claim preclusion is an affirmative defense that must
be pleaded in the initial action).
271. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979)).
272. 435 F.3d 1356, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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273

because the issues in the two cases were not the same.
The court
explained that the infringements were not the same because there
274
were vast differences in the products, timing, and market.
Furthermore, “[b]ecause the determination of reasonable royalty
damages is tied to the infringement being redressed, a separate
infringement beginning at a different time requires a separate
275
evaluation of reasonable royalty damages.” As such, the issues were
not the same in the two cases, and collateral estoppel could not
276
apply.
The Federal Circuit addressed two recurring issues of claim
277
preclusion in Pactiv Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co.
There, Pactiv and
Dow had (in 1998) resolved an earlier case between them through a
278
joint stipulation and a dismissal with prejudice. Pactiv did not
dispute that claim preclusion would apply to its later suit, but
contended that two exceptions to that doctrine applied: It had
reserved its rights in the joint stipulation to later challenge two Dow
279
patents, and it had not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
these issues in the earlier case as the result of “fraudulent
280
misrepresentations” by Dow in the earlier action.
The court
281
As to the first, the court
rejected both of Pactiv’s assertions.
acknowledged that an “express” reservation in an earlier stipulated
282
judgment will avoid claim preclusion in a second case, but held that
Pactiv “ha[d] the standard backwards”—it was arguing that nothing
in the stipulation precluded a later challenge to the patents, when its
burden was to demonstrate that there had been an express
reservation of the otherwise—applicable claim-preclusive effect of the
283
And as to the second, the court held that the only
stipulation.
proper ground for concluding that a party lacked a full and fair
opportunity to litigate an issue in a prior action was upon showing
that the deprivation amounted to a denial of due process; Pactiv’s
“fraud” allegation did not rise to that level, and was, besides,

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id. at 1361, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
Id. at 1362, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670-71.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670-71.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670-71.
449 F.3d 1227, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1939 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1229, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940.
Id. at 1230-31, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.
Id. at 1232-33, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943.
Id. at 1231, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942.
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(a) (1982); id. § 26 cmt. A; and 18 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur
R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4415, at 354 (2d ed. 2002)).
283. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942.
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284

inappropriately invoked as a defense to claim preclusion.
According to the court, such an attack on a prior judgment properly
lies under rule 60(b), but would not be permitted in a collateral
285
attack to the application of res judicata.
The doctrine of “judicial estoppel” applies when a party asserts a
position, succeeds, and attempts later to switch positions; in that
286
circumstance, the switching of positions will generally be barred. In
287
Bonzel v. Pfizer, Inc., the Federal Circuit (somewhat obliquely)
appeared to endorse application of judicial estoppel in a
jurisdictional dispute, noting that “[t]he district court observed that
Dr. Bonzel had successfully obtained a transfer back to state court in
the earlier federal case, on the position that there is no substantial
question of patent law and that this is an action to enforce a contract,
288
not to decide patent infringement.”
The district court and the
Federal Circuit both rejected Bonzel’s efforts to claim, in this later
case, that resolution of the contract issues “‘necessarily depend[s] on
289
resolution of a substantial question of federal [patent] law.’”
Nonetheless, the panel disclaimed “primar[y]” reliance on estoppel,
because “Dr. Bonzel sufficiently changed his complaint [in the
290
second case] to require a fresh look in the district court.”
c.

Summary judgment

In the past, we (and others) have chronicled the extensive use of
291
summary judgment in patent cases.
For the year 2006, it is worth
focusing on the use of summary judgment in a particular class of
cases: those involving inequitable conduct.
284. Id. at 1233, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943.
285. Id. at 1234, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944.
286. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) (holding that judicial
estoppel barred New Hampshire from claiming that the Piscataqua River boundary
runs along the shore of Maine because the State had previously agreed (after
litigation) that the boundary fell in the middle of the river); U.S. Philips Corp. v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 55 F.3d 592, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1699 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(finding that the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevented an alleged infringer,
Windmere Corporation, from relitigating its antitrust counterclaims in Illinois,
having already litigated antitrust claims in Florida).
287. 439 F.3d 1358, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
288. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139-40.
289. Id. at 1363, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988)).
290. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
291. See Adamo et al., supra note 14, at 1439-41 & n.8 (reviewing the numerous
Federal Circuit Court patent cases that were decided via summary judgment in
2000); Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the
Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1187-88 (1999) (noting that “[s]ummary
judgments . . . make up a large portion of [the Federal Circuit] caseload” and
proceeding to discuss several key cases decided by summary judgment).
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“Determining at summary judgment that a patent is unenforceable
292
That
for inequitable conduct is permissible, but uncommon.”
statement, from the Federal Circuit’s decision in Digital Control, Inc. v.
Charles Machine Works, served as a theme for several of the decisions
that would follow it in 2006. In synthesizing its prior decisions in
Digital Control, the court stated, “we have upheld grants of summary
judgment on inequitable conduct where, for example, ‘the affidavits
submitted to explain the representations made to the PTO were
“bare declaration[s] of lack of intent to mislead” and . . . the
explanations provided in the affidavits were either “nonresponsive”
293
or lacked evidentiary support.’”
On the other hand, the Federal
Circuit has
refused summary judgment where the plaintiff submitted an
affidavit that “set[] forth a non-frivolous explanation that could
lead a finder of fact to determine that his declaration [to the PTO]
was not false or misleading,” or where the plaintiff “state[d] facts
supporting a plausible justification or excuse for the
294
misrepresentation.”

In Digital Control itself, the court reversed a determination of
inequitable conduct on the ground that the district court had
improperly determined, on summary judgment, that the failure to
cite a particular patent (the Rorden patent) was a material
295
omission. Because “the scope and content of the prior art and what
the prior art teaches are questions of fact,” and because the parties
had a material factual dispute over what the Rorden patent disclosed
and taught (under one version of the facts, it was merely cumulative;
under another, it was not), summary judgment on the issue of
296
materiality was inappropriate.
297
However, in Ferring B.V. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., decided only one
week after Digital Control, a divided panel of the Federal Circuit
298
upheld a summary judgment of inequitable conduct. On the issue
292. Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Machine Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313, 77
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1826-27 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
293. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Bayer BioScience
N.V., 363 F.3d 1235, 1240, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2004), in turn
quoting Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1191-92, 25
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1561, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
294. Id. at 1314, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827 (quoting Monsanto, 363 F.3d at
1240, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261-62, in turn quoting Paragon Podiatry, 984 F.2d at
1191, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569).
295. Id. at 1319, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831.
296. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831 (citing Para-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS
Imps. Int’l, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1088, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1237, 1239 (Fed. Cir.
1995)).
297. 437 F.3d 1181, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
298. Id. at 1194, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
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of materiality, the court upheld the district court’s conclusion that
the inventors’ failure to disclose the prior business relationships
between several declarants (on a highly material issue—the
understanding of the term “peroral” in the relevant art) and the
inventors’ employer (and ultimate assignee of the patent) was a
299
“A witness’s interest is always
failure to disclose a material fact.
pertinent to his credibility and to the weight to be given to his
testimony, and relevant interests are not limited to direct financial
300
interests.”
Similarly, the court upheld summary judgment on the
issue of intent, concluding (as did the district court) that it was
proper to infer culpable intent from the high materiality of the
301
withheld information.
While not being willing to “attempt to lay
down a general rule as to when intent may be or must be inferred
from the withholding of material information by an applicant,” the
court did recognize “three conditions” under which summary
judgment on the issue of intent would be appropriate: “(1) the
applicant knew of the information; (2) the applicant knew or should
have known of the materiality of the information; and (3) the
applicant has not provided a credible explanation for the
302
withholding.”
The fatal flaw in appellants’ efforts to overcome
summary judgment, the court said, was in the third condition: “In
short, appellants’ argument concerning credible explanations
consists entirely of speculation. Conclusory allegations and attorney
arguments are insufficient to overcome a motion for summary
303
judgment.”
Indeed, the court added, “[f]ar from there being a
credible explanation for the withholding, there is evidence in the
summary judgment record supporting a conclusion that the past
304
relationships were deliberately concealed.”
305
In her
Judge Newman “respectfully, but urgently, dissent[ed].”
view, the panel decision had returned the court to the pre-Kingsdown
306
era of inequitable-conduct law, the benighted era when inequitable299. Id. at 1188-90, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166-68.
300. Id. at 1188, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
301. Id. at 1194, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
302. Id. at 1191, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169.
303. Id. at 1193, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170 (citing Biotec Biologische
Naturverpackungen GmbH & Co. KG v. Biocorp, Inc., 249 F.3d 1341, 1353, 58
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2001) and Glaverbel Societe Anonyme v.
Northlake Marketing & Supply, Inc., 45 F.3d 1550, 1561-62, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1496, 1503 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
304. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
305. Id. at 1197, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (Newman, J., dissenting).
306. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 827, 873-74,
9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1389-91 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc in relevant part)
(limiting potential claims of inequitable conduct by holding that: (1) a failure to
realize that a patent claim does not correspond to an amended version of another
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conduct claims were present in virtually every case, placing a
307
In particular, she saw the
“scourge” on U.S. patent litigation.
majority’s error as embracing a “casually subjective standard,” and
imposing a “positive inference of wrongdoing, replacing the need for
evidence with a ‘should have known’ standard of materiality, from
which deceptive intent is inferred, even in the total absence of
308
evidence.”
Ferring’s petition for rehearing was denied, over the
309
dissents (without opinion) of Judges Newman, Lourie, and Gajarsa.
Another summary judgment of inequitable conduct, and another
Federal Circuit reversal, occurred in M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v.
310
Fisher Tooling, Inc.
The patent was directed to an invention for
removing decals from motor vehicles, and in connection with the
application, the inventor submitted a declaration stating that “he was
311
not aware of any relevant prior art . . . .” Eventually, the examiner
allowed the claims “because none of the art of record shows all of the
detailed internal workings of the instant claims including [various
312
listed components].” The district court granted summary judgment
of inequitable conduct, in particular because the patentee had sold a
prior-art product (for twenty years) that contained the components
313
listed by the examiner as missing from the prior art, and from this
omission—and the lack of a good faith explanation for the
314
omission—the district court inferred culpable intent.
In an
opinion by Judge Lourie, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that
“[w]hen the absence of a good faith explanation is the only evidence
of intent, however, that evidence alone does not constitute clear and
315
convincing evidence warranting an inference of intent.”
There is
some obvious tension between this holding of M. Eagles and the
court’s decision, just weeks earlier, in Ferring, yet the M. Eagles court

claim does not necessarily demonstrate inequitable conduct, and (2) it is not
inequitable to file a patent application in order to lawfully exclude a competitor’s
product from the marketplace).
307. Ferring, 437 F.3d at 1195, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172 (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Michael D. Kaminski, Effective Management of U.S. Patent
Litigation, 18 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 13, 24 (2006)).
308. Id. at 1196, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (Newman, J., dissenting).
309. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 05-1284, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 10811
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 2006).
310. 439 F.3d 1335, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
311. Id. at 1336, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
312. Id. at 1337, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
313. Id. at 1338, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
314. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
315. Id. at 1341, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
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did not even cite the Ferring decision, and its author, Judge Lourie,
316
later dissented from the denial of en banc rehearing in Ferring.
Moving away from the context of inequitable conduct, the Federal
Circuit issued an important exposition on summary judgment
procedure and burdens of proof and production in Exigent
317
Technology, Inc. v. Atrana Solutions, Inc.
There, Atrana had
successfully moved for summary judgment of non-infringement in
the district court, and the Federal Circuit affirmed that grant despite
Exigent’s argument that “Atrana did not properly support its motion
for summary judgment of non-infringement with evidence sufficient
318
to establish non-infringement.”
The court’s opinion explained
319
that, under Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, the summary judgment movant
need not produce evidence on issues where the non-movant bears
320
the burden of proof to prevail: “In the light of Celotex, we conclude
that nothing more is required than the filing of a summary judgment
motion stating that the patentee had no evidence of infringement
and pointing to the specific ways in which accused systems did not
321
meet the claim limitations.”
Another important procedural aspect of summary judgment
practice addresses the level of detail required of an expert affidavit or
declaration to demonstrate a “genuine issue of material fact.” A bare
or conclusory affidavit will not suffice; some level of detail is
322
323
required.
In Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
the court reversed a grant of summary judgment where the district
court had concluded that a witness declaration was “conclusory and
lacking particularized testimony and linking argument necessary to
324
establish equivalence.”
The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding the
declaration in question was “not overly conclusory,” and sufficiently
325
particularized to meet the doctrine-of-equivalents standards.

316. See Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 10811, at *2 (Fed.
Cir. Apr. 12, 2006) (noting that Judges Newman, Lourie, and Gajarsa would have
heard the appeal en banc).
317. 442 F.3d 1301, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
318. Id. at 1307, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
319. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
320. Exigent, 442 F.3d at 1307, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325 (quoting Celotex, 477
U.S. at 325); id. at 1307 n.6, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325 n.6 (quoting Saab Cars
USA, Inc. v. United States, 434 F.3d 1359, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
321. Id. at 1308-09, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
322. Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., No. SACV 03-1267, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 42653, at *25 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2005).
323. 448 F.3d 1324, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1807 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
324. Id. at 1335, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814.
325. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814.
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Attorney-client privilege and work-product protection
326

In 2006, the Federal Circuit in In re EchoStar Communications Corp.
invoked the extraordinary procedure of a writ of mandamus to
address several important issues regarding the scope of waiver (of
both attorney-client privilege and work-product protection) when an
327
advice-of-counsel defense is asserted to a willful-infringement claim.
The district court had found a waiver of both attorney-client privilege
and work-product protection, and issued a sweeping discovery
328
order. EchoStar and its law firm, Merchant & Gould, P.C., sought
mandamus from the Federal Circuit, which was granted in limited
329
part. EchoStar urged that there had been no waiver of the attorneyclient privilege because it relied solely on an “in-house investigation
330
supervised by in-house counsel.” The court rejected that argument,
noting that in-house counsel are still lawyers, and reliance on the
conclusions of in-house counsel constitutes reliance on a legal
331
opinion, which thereby waives the attorney-client privilege.
EchoStar’s argument about the work-product doctrine had more
332
success. The court noted three categories of work-product relevant
here:
(1) documents that embody a communication between the
attorney and client concerning the subject matter of the case, such
as a traditional opinion letter; (2) documents analyzing the law,
facts, trial strategy, and so forth that reflect the attorney’s mental
impressions but were not given to the client; and (3) documents
that discuss a communication between attorney and client
concerning the subject matter of the case but are not themselves
333
communications to or from the client.

The Federal Circuit concluded that, where an advice-of-counsel
defense is proffered, the “waiver extends to the third category [of
334
work-product] but does not extend so far as the second.”
Mandamus was thus granted, in limited form, to protect that second
335
category of documents from disclosure.

326. 448 F.3d 1294, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1676 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 846 (2006) (mem.).
327. Id. at 1296, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
328. Id. at 1297, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677-78.
329. Id. at 1297-98, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678-79.
330. Id. at 1299, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
331. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
332. Id. at 1300-05, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680-84.
333. Id. at 1302, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
334. Id. at 1303, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
335. Id. at 1305, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
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Rule 54(b)

Under rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district
court may, in appropriate cases, enter a partial final judgment on one
or more, but fewer than all, of the claims in a case (or as to all claims
336
involving one or more, but fewer than all, parties to a case).
The
ability to obtain an early partial final judgment (for example, on a
claim on which summary judgment has been granted) is important to
the ability to secure immediate appellate review over that partial
337
dismissal while the rest of the case continues in the trial court.
When counterclaims (or other claims) remain pending in the trial
court, rule 54(b) may be the only practical way of securing immediate
338
appellate review. Thus, in Exigent Technology, Inc. v. Atrana Solutions,
339
Inc., the Federal Circuit had identified, after the case had been fully
briefed and the day after argument, that “counterclaims concerning
invalidity and unenforceability remained pending in the district
340
court.”
The court thus instructed the parties to return to the
district court and seek a nunc pro tunc order entering a partial final
341
judgment under rule 54(b). This is a frequent problem of appeals
to the Federal Circuit, and subsequent panels of the court dealing
342
with the same issue have not been so charitable.
3.

Trial
a.

Right to jury trial

As noted above, the question of when, in a patent case, the parties
are entitled to a trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution has reached the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Court
336. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
337. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1315, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that the district court had
entered partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) “with respect to the invalidity of the
‘944 patent”).
338. See Exigent Tech., Inc. v. Atrana Solutions, Inc., 442 F.3d 1301, 1311, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart,
803 F.2d 661, 667, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 363, 367 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that
under rule 54, interlocutory decisions can be reviewed by the district court prior to
the entry of a final judgment)).
339. Id. at 1301, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321.
340. Id. at 1305 n.2, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324 n.2.
341. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324 n.2 (citing State Contracting & Eng’g Co. v.
Florida, 258 F.3d 1329, 1334-35, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1498, 1501-02 (Fed. Cir.
2001)).
342. See, e.g., Int’l Elec. Tech. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Corp., 2007 WL 189341, at
*2, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1543, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he parties and other
members of the bar are hereby placed on notice that the court shall in the future
begin to cite counsel for failure to determine whether or not the appealed judgment
is final.”).

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

838

4/7/2007 11:15:24 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:4

343

has never issued a decision on that issue. The Supreme Court has
yet to address the issue again, despite several opportunities to do so,
in varying factual contexts, over the years. And the Federal Circuit
continues to reach divided opinions when the subject arises. In Agfa
344
Corp. v. Creo Products, Inc., Agfa urged that it was entitled to a jury
trial on Creo’s inequitable-conduct defense (the district court, sitting
345
without a jury, had held all of Agfa’s patents unenforceable). The
court found Agfa’s case indistinguishable from the Federal Circuit’s
346
prior decision in Gardco Manufacturing, Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co.,
with the exception of two slight procedural differences. Gardco was a
declaratory judgment case, and involved a “claim” of inequitable
conduct rather than a defense, but the court explained that those
type of procedural differences have no “bearing on the question of
347
the right to a jury trial.”
The court rejected Agfa’s analogy to the
348
Supreme Court’s decision in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, which
had held that there was a Seventh Amendment jury trial right on
even equitable claims, when the resolution of the equitable claim
would resolve issues that are “common” with a juriable claim; while
acknowledging that the inequitable conduct defense and the
invalidity defense “overlap to some degree,” the court concluded that
349
“they [were] not ‘common’ issues as in Beacon Theatres.” The court
also rejected Agfa’s analogy to the writ of scire facias, where jury trials
were allowed at common law, distinguishing away “some dicta in a
350
footnote in In re Lockwood . . .” suggesting that “[t]he contemporary
analog of the writ [of scire facias] is . . . an action for a declaration of
351
unenforceability due to inequitable conduct not due to invalidity.”
352
While acknowledging that this footnote is “easy to misread,” the
court ultimately held that “a writ of scire facias was not, in fact, a suit at
353
common law analogous to modern inequitable conduct.”
Judge
343. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (describing that the jury trial
issue became moot after the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this issue).
344. 451 F.3d 1366, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
345. Id. at 1369, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386-87.
346. 820 F.2d 1209, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2015 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
347. See Agfa, 451 F.3d at 1372, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389 (explaining that the
“right to jury trial is examined without regard to the alignment of the parties or the
posture of the issue, i.e. a defense or separate claim”) (citing In re Tech. Licensing
Corp., 423 F.3d 1286, 1288, 1290-91, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450, 1452, 1454 (Fed.
Cir. 2005))).
348. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
349. Agfa, 451 F.3d at 1372, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
350. Id. at 1373, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390.
351. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390 (quoting In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 974
n.9, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1406, 1412 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Am.
Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995)).
352. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390.
353. Id. at 1374, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390.
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Newman dissented, urging that she would have ordered a jury trial
based upon the court’s prior opinion in Lockwood and her own
research on English common law (and early American) practice with
354
respect to the writ of scire facias.
b.

Stipulated judgments

On occasion, parties will stipulate to a judgment of noninfringement after the district court reaches a claim construction.
This allows the loser on the claim-construction issues to make the
adverse judgment final and immediately appealable, and it saves the
parties (and the district court) the time and expense of a trial that
the parties would view as an academic exercise. (To our knowledge,
through the end of 2006, the Federal Circuit had never granted an
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1) on a question of
claim construction, even after the Markman decision established that
patent claim construction is a question of law, ordinarily decided on a
limited, intrinsic record. Just before this Article went to press, the
Federal Circuit did just that, but in a case having an “unusual”
procedural posture—the same patent claims were before the Federal
355
Circuit in a parallel appeal. ) In Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich
356
& Bradsby, the parties utilized the stipulated judgment option; the
procedural question before the Federal Circuit was the appropriate
357
The court
appellate standard for reviewing the court’s judgment.
rejected the analogy to a summary judgment ruling, where appellate
358
review is de novo, and instead accepted the Seventh Circuit’s
analogy to a bench trial—“review[ing] the district court’s legal
359
conclusions de novo and any factual inferences for clear error.”
At the same time, however, Judge Rader’s opinion for the court
again expressed a general displeasure with such appeals from
360
361
stipulated judgments. Similar to his recent opinions, he wrote in
Wilson Sporting Goods that:
354. Id. at 1380-84, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395-98 (Newman, J., dissenting).
355. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Dako N. Am., Inc., 2007 WL 471167, at *1, 81
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926, 1927 (Feb. 14, 2007).
356. 442 F.3d 1322, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
357. Id. at 1324, 1326-27, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383-84, 1385-86.
358. Id. at 1326, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385.
359. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385 (citing Hess v. Hartford Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 274 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2001)).
360. See id. at 1327, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386 (explaining that the “sparse
record lacks the complete context for accurate claim construction”).
361. See, e.g., Serio-US Indus., Inc. v. Plastic Recovery Techs. Corp., 459 F.3d 1311,
1319, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a trial court may consult
the accused device for context that informs the claim construction process”); Lava
Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Mgmt., 445 F.3d 1348, 1350-51, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1624, 1625-26 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Without the vital contextual knowledge of the
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[t]his court reviews claim construction only as necessary to reach
that final judgment on an infringement cause of action.
Therefore, in reviewing claim construction in the context of
infringement, the legal function of giving meaning to claim terms
always takes place in the context of a specific accused infringing
device or process. While a trial court should certainly not prejudge
the ultimate infringement analysis by construing claims with an aim
to include or exclude an accused product or process, knowledge of
that product or process provides meaningful context for the first
362
step of the infringement analysis, claim construction.

Nonetheless, despite those complaints, the court reviewed the
363
claim-construction issues presented there.
c.

Evidentiary rulings

Reversals by the Federal Circuit on evidentiary issues are rare
indeed. This is a consequence of the extremely limited, deferential
standard of review that applies, as well as the requirement that any
364
such error be seriously prejudicial in the context of the trial. The
concomitant facts (1) that the Federal Circuit applies regional circuit
law to such issues, and (2) that evidentiary rulings have limited
importance to the court’s mandate to bring unity and coherence to
the patent law, may also affect the relative lack of sweeping
365
developments in this area.
The deferential standard of review was summarized (under Ninth
366
Circuit law) in Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.:
“The Ninth Circuit reviews evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion;
to reverse, we must conclude both that the district court abused its
discretion and that the error was prejudicial so that it more probably
367
than not tainted the verdict.”
As a consequence, each of the

accused products or processes, this appeal takes on the attributes of something akin
to an advisory opinion on the scope of the ‘982 patent.”); Bayer AG. v. Biovail Corp.,
279 F.3d 1340, 1349, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1675, 1682 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[I]t would
be premature for this court to engage in its own claim construction without, for
instance, evidence of the meaning of the terms to one of skill in the art at the time of
invention.”).
362. Wilson Sporting Goods, 442 F.3d at 1326-27, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386.
363. Id. at 1327-28, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386-87.
364. See Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 435 F.3d 1356, 1365, 77
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666, 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (requiring both abuse of discretion
and prejudicial error to reverse an evidentiary ruling).
365. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673 (noting that the Federal Circuit applies
regional circuit law to evaluate evidentiary rulings).
366. Id. 1356, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666.
367. Id. at 1365, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673.
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Federal Circuit’s 2006 decisions involving contested evidentiary
368
admission or exclusion resulted in affirmances on these points.
d.

Jury instructions

The content of the law that a jury applies is provided through the
369
instructions read to the jury before its deliberation. Rule 51 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs most questions regarding
jury instructions; it provides that a party must object to jury
instructions “before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating
370
distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds for objection.”
Although it is ordinarily said that compliance with rule 51 is a matter
371
of regional circuit law, the Federal Circuit has honored this rule
more in the breach than in the observance. Indeed, in some cases, it
has required more than the distinct objection and grounds that rule
372
51 requires on its face.
For example, in Advanced Display Systems,
373
Inc. v. Kent State University, it set forth four requirements for “[a]
party seeking to alter a judgment based on erroneous jury
instructions[:] . . . (1) it made a proper and timely objection to the
jury instructions, (2) those instructions were legally erroneous,
(3) the errors had prejudicial effect, and (4) it requested alternative
374
instructions that would have remedied the error.” Yet in Primos, Inc.
375
v. Hunter’s Specialties, Inc., the court cited Advanced Display Systems
and said that “[a] party seeking to alter a judgment based on
erroneous jury instructions must establish” only two things: “that
‘those instructions were legally erroneous,’ and that ‘the errors had
376
prejudicial effect.’”
Advanced Display Systems purported to apply
377
378
Fifth Circuit law; Primos applied Eighth Circuit law.
368. Id. at 1365-66, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673-74; see, e.g., DSU Med. Corp. v.
JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1309-10, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1249-50 (Fed. Cir.
2006); Cook Biotech, Inc. v. Acell, Inc., 460 F.3d 1365, 1379 n.8, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1875 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Primos, Inc. v. Hunter’s Specialties, Inc., 451
F.3d 841, 850-51, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1136-37 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
369. See FED. R. CIV. P. 51(b)(3) (“The court . . . may instruct the jury at any time
after trial begins and before the jury is discharged.”).
370. Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1281-82, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1679 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 51).
371. See, e.g., id. at 1282, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
372. See, e.g., id. at 1281, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (explaining that there are
four requirements that a party must satisfy to alter a judgment based on an
erroneous jury instruction).
373. Id., 212 F.3d 1272, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673.
374. Id. at 1281, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (citations omitted).
375. 451 F.3d 841, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
376. Id. at 852, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138 (quoting Advanced Display Sys., 212
F.3d at 1281, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679).
377. Advanced Display Sys., 212 F.3d at 1282, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
378. Primos, 451 F.3d at 847, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134.
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In any event, it is crucial to make the timely objection required by
rule 51; otherwise, the appellant will be relegated to arguing plain
error under rule 51(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
379
which is an extremely narrow standard of appellate review.
This
situation occurred in Serio-US Industries, Inc. v. Plastic Recovery
380
Technology Corp. —the appellant failed to object as required by Rule
51, which limited the Federal Circuit’s plain error review (under
381
Fourth Circuit law) to finding a “miscarriage of justice.”
e.

Resolving inconsistent verdicts

Regional circuit law applies to the review of inconsistent jury
382
verdicts.
The only Federal Circuit case in 2006 to deal with this
383
addressed not only the
issue, L & W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc.,
reconciliation of inconsistent verdicts, but the question of waiver. In
this case, L & W sought to challenge the adverse verdict as
inconsistent; however, it failed to raise the issue with the trial court
before the jury was discharged:
Trial counsel could have objected either before the court
discharged the jury or immediately thereafter, when the court
directed the jurors to return to the jury room and asked counsel,
‘Anything anybody would like the record to reflect at this time?’ If
counsel had raised the issue of verdict inconsistency at that point, it
would have been a simple matter for the court to recall the jury
and direct it to resume its deliberations until the inconsistency in
384
the verdict was resolved.

The Federal Circuit was unpersuaded by L & W’s claim “that the
return of the verdict, the poll of the jury, and the discharge of the
jury all occurred within six minutes, and that counsel therefore ‘did
385
not have adequate time to evaluate the verdicts for the first time.’”
And, it declined to apply a plain-error exception to the waiver rule
despite L & W’s urging; it concluded that the Sixth Circuit would
look unkindly upon such an analysis:
No published Sixth Circuit opinion has recognized such an
exception with respect to inconsistent verdicts, and we think that
379. See Serio-US Indus., Inc., v. Plastic Recovery Tech. Corp., 459 F.3d 1311, 1317,
80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (concluding that in the absence of
an objection, an appeal is not permitted unless there is “plain error”).
380. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065.
381. Id. at 1317-18, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068-69.
382. L & W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc., 471 F.3d 1311, 1318, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1198, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
383. Id., 471 F.3d 1311, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1198.
384. Id. at 1319, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203-04.
385. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
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the pragmatic justification behind the waiver doctrine—preventing
misuse of procedural rules to obtain a new trial when
inconsistencies are most efficiently resolved by the original jury—
would lead the Sixth Circuit to reject such an exception if it were
386
asked to create one.

4.

Post-trial matters
a.

Post-trial motions under rules 50, 52, and 59

The most significant development in the area of post-trial motions
came in the Supreme Court decision Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v.
387
Swift-Eckrich, Inc. There, the Court held that courts of appeals lack
“power” to review the sufficiency of the evidence—even to order a
new trial under rule 59 rather than order judgment as a matter of law
(“JMOL”) under rule 50—in the absence of a proper and timely
388
motion in the district court.
As with most procedural matters (so long as not unique to patent
law), regional circuit law applies to issues arising under rules 50, 52,
389
and 59.
With respect to rule 50 practice, perhaps the most important issues
include timing of the motions and the requirement that issues raised
in a rule 50(b) motion be first timely and properly raised in a rule
390
50(a) motion.
That is certainly a principal lesson of the Supreme
Court’s Unitherm decision, and it was also controlling in Syngenta Seeds,
391
In Syngenta Seeds, applying Eighth
Inc. v. Delta Cotton Co-op., Inc.
Circuit law, the court noted that “a post-verdict motion for judgment
as a matter of law may not raise issues not previously raised in a pre392
verdict motion.” Accordingly, because the pre-verdict motion only
addressed the issue of sufficiency of the evidence, appellate review of

386. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
387. 546 U.S. 394 (2006).
388. Id.
389. See, e.g., DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1302, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1238, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating the the court evaluates a motion for a
new trial under an abuse of discretion standard); Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence
Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 1314, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1708-09 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (explaining that the Federal Circuit applies the district court’s standard for
evaluating a JMOL motion); Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d
1354, 1358, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1004, 1007-08 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (describing that the
court would apply Fifth Circuit law to determine whether granting a rule 52(b)
motion was appropriate).
390. Unitherm Food Sys., 546 U.S. at 985-87.
391. 457 F.3d 1269, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1576 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
392. Id. at 1274, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579 (citing Walsh v. Nat’l Computer
Sys., 332 F.3d 1150, 1158 (8th Cir. 2003)).
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the denial of the post-verdict motion could not expand beyond that
393
one issue.
394
In Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., the court addressed
procedural issues relating to rule 52, which allows a court to alter or
395
amend its findings on motion made within ten days of judgment.
Peterson, the defendant, argued that the district court had clearly
erred by vacating all of its non-infringement findings since Golden
Blount’s rule 52(b) motion only sought to amend some of the court’s
396
findings.
The Federal Circuit rejected that argument, concluding
that the district court had acted within its discretion by vacating its
prior findings and entering findings of infringement that had been
397
proposed, subsequently, by Golden Blount.
398
Finally, DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co. is a good example of the
various issues that might be raised on a motion for a new trial under
rule 59. There, DSU moved for a new trial on a variety of grounds:
399
that the jury’s verdict was “against the clear weight of the evidence,”
400
that the trial court improperly admitted or excluded evidence, or
401
that the damages were inadequate or excessive. DSU also illustrates
the difficulty of obtaining appellate reversal of an order denying a
motion for a new trial due to the deferential standard of appellate
review: All of DSU’s new trial arguments were rejected by the trial
402
court and affirmed on appeal.
b.

Post-judgment relief under rule 60(b)

Although requests for relief under rule 60(b) are often coupled
with requests for a new trial under rule 50(b), rule 60(b) relief is of a
403
different type entirely.
Rule 60(b) allows relief from a judgment,
sometimes years after it is entered (even after it has been subject to
appellate review), when newly discovered evidence, changed
circumstances, fraud, or other exceptional circumstances justify this
404
extraordinary relief. Regional circuit law ordinarily applies to rule
393. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.
394. 438 F.3d 1354, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
395. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(b).
396. Golden Blount, 438 F.3d at 1357, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
397. Id. at 1358, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
398. 471 F.3d 1293, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
399. Id. at 1302-03, 1306-07, 1311, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244, 1247-48, 1250-51.
400. Id. at 1308-09, 1310-11, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248-49, 1250-51.
401. Id. at 1307, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248.
402. Id. at 1310-11, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250-51.
403. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) (stating that a party can file a motion within ten
days to renew a request for a judgment as a matter of law), with FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)
(describing that parties can file a motion for relief of judgment based on certain
circumstances such as mistake, new evidence, and fraud).
404. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1)-(6).
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60(b) motions, and district court rulings on those motions are
405
reviewed for abuse of discretion.
406
In Louisville Bedding Co. v. Pillowtex Corp., Louisville Bedding
sought relief under rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which allows relief where there is “any other reason
407
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.”
Previously,
Louisville Bedding and Pillowtex had been engaged in litigation
408
involving a Louisville Bedding patent; the case ended, after claim
construction, with a settlement agreement between the parties
providing for a license, and a court order determining that
Pillowtex’s accused bedding material did not infringe the asserted
claims of the Louisville Bedding patent, as construed by the trial
409
court. Pillowtex, however, dissolved, and Louisville wanted to assert
410
In the
its patent against another bedding manufacturer.
subsequent case against this second manufacturer, Perfect Fit, the
“[district] court determined that it would give the claim construction
411
from the earlier Pillowtex action collateral estoppel effect.”
The
district court denied Louisville Bedding’s rule 60(b)(6) motion, and
412
the Federal Circuit affirmed.
Explaining that rule 60(b)(6)
motions are to be granted only in the case of “exceptional or
extraordinary circumstances,” the court concluded that this was not
413
such a case, “[b]ecause businesses fail every day,” and “‘[p]ublic
414
It is worth
policy dictates that there be an end of litigation . . . .’”
noting that the Federal Circuit might equally well have decided this
case under the rubric of U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall
415
Partnership, which held that vacatur of lower-court judgments when
cases settle on appeal should only be granted in “exceptional
416
circumstances” because of the interest in “the orderly operation of
417
the federal judicial system,” but the court did not cite U.S. Bancorp.

405. See, e.g., Louisville Bedding Co. v. Pillowtex Corp., 455 F.3d 1377, 1379-80, 79
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
406. Id., 455 F.3d 1377, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1698.
407. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6).
408. Louisville Bedding, 455 F.3d at 1378, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
409. Id. at 1378, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
410. Id. at 1378-79, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699-1700.
411. Id. at 1379, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700.
412. Id. at 1379-80, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700-01.
413. Id. at 1380, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.
414. Id. at 1380-81, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701 (quoting Baldwin v. Iowa State
Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931)).
415. 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
416. Id. at 29.
417. Id. at 27.
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418

In Venture Industries Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., the Federal Circuit
addressed both timing and substance issues in connection with a rule
60(b)(2) (newly discovered evidence) and 60(b)(3) (fraud,
misrepresentation, etc.) motion based on the use of fraudulent
company financial statements by an expert witness, which was only
419
discovered after trial and during appeal. The fraud was discovered
after Venture’s SEC disclosures came to light, while the appeal was
pending, so the Federal Circuit stayed the appeal to allow Autoliv to
420
file its 60(b) motion with the district court. Ultimately, the district
court denied Autoliv’s motion based on an expert’s testimony at an
evidentiary hearing that the fraudulent financial statements had no
421
effect on his calculation of damages.
Although the district court
did not expressly address the merits of Autoliv’s rule 60(b)(3)
motion, it did hold that Autoliv had failed to establish prejudice
422
under rule 60(b)(2). Ordinarily, one might think that the finding
of lack of prejudice under rule 60(b)(2) would simply carry over to
the rule 60(b)(3) analysis, but the Federal Circuit concluded that—
under governing Sixth Circuit law—the standards for showing
423
prejudice are different under the two subsections of rule 60(b);
under subsection (3), where fraud, misrepresentations, or other
misconduct are shown, the burden shifts to the non-movant to
424
demonstrate that the misconduct had no effect on the judgment.
Accordingly, the court vacated the denial of Autoliv’s rule 60(b)(3)
425
motion and remanded for consideration of this issue.
5.

Local patent rules
A signal development in the Federal Circuit in 2006 was its
consideration of the interpretation and application of local patent
rules, which have gained popularity in several district courts around
the country, including two of the most active venues for patent
cases—the Northern District of California and the Eastern District of
Texas. The two 2006 decisions implicating local patent rules came
out of these two districts; both opinions were written by Judge Dyk.
426
In Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Abacus Software, the
Federal Circuit held that the district court for the Eastern District of
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

457 F.3d 1322, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1758 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1323, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759-60.
Id. at 1327, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1762.
Id. at 1326-27, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1762.
Id. at 1332, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
Id. at 1333-34, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766-67.
Id. at 1333, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766-67.
Id. at 1334, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
462 F.3d 1344, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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Texas had erred by barring plaintiffs from asserting Microsoft
Windows as an infringing product based on the application of that
427
court’s local patent rules. The district judge had entered a Docket
Control Order (“DCO”) setting a September 3, 2002 deadline for the
428
parties’ preliminary infringement contentions;
after claim
construction (which was issued on July 3, 2003), the district court
entered an amended DCO requiring those infringement contentions
to be updated by November 21, 2003 (later extended to December
429
22, 2003).
Along with the amended DCO, the court notified the
parties—for the first time—that “Judge Ward’s Rules” for patent cases
would apply, and that under those rules, preliminary infringement
contentions could be amended only upon a showing of “good
430
cause.”
MIT nonetheless attempted (timely, under the DCO) to
update its infringement contentions to add Microsoft Windows as an
infringing product, but the district court rejected that effort on the
431
ground that no “good cause” had been shown.
The Federal Circuit, although acknowledging that “district courts
are afforded broad discretion in interpreting their own orders,”
nonetheless held that the court had failed to provide clear notice of
432
the requirements of those rules. The court “conclude[d] that MIT
was not provided with sufficient notice that its preliminary
infringement contentions would be deemed final or that they could
433
only be updated upon a showing of good cause.”
Chief Judge
Michel dissented because he did not find abuse of discretion in the
434
district court’s application of its own rules.
By contrast, the court in 02 Micro International Ltd. v. Monolithic
435
Power Systems, Inc., affirmed the Northern District of California’s
application of its “good cause” requirement with respect to a party’s
attempted amendment of final infringement contentions based on
newly discovered evidence; the Federal Circuit ruled that 02 Micro’s
lack of diligence in seeking the amendment amply supported the
436
district court’s refusal to allow it.
We can expect to see more such challenges in the coming years, as
more federal districts adopt local patent rules.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

Id. at 1347, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226-27.
Id. at 1349, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228.
Id. at 1358, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
Id. at 1358-59, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234-35 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b)).
Id. at 1359, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
Id. at 1364-67, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238-41 (Michel, C.J., dissenting).
467 F.3d 1355, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1367-68, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777-78.
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B. Federal Circuit Practice
1.

Appellate jurisdiction
437
As noted earlier, the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all cases where the well-pleaded complaint in the
district court shows that the case “arises under” the patent laws, or
where an issue of federal patent law is a necessary element of one of
the well-pleaded claims. Moreover, Christianson v. Colt Industries
438
Operating Corp. provides that where another appellate court makes a
“plausible” decision to transfer a case to the Federal Circuit, that
decision should be respected by the Federal Circuit lest the courts
engage in a “jurisdictional ping-pong” match that has to be settled by
439
the Supreme Court, as with the Colt decision.
In Parental Guide of
440
Texas v. Thomson, Inc., the court applied both of these principles,
respecting the Fifth Circuit’s decision to transfer a case involving a
breach-of-contract claim that required the court to interpret section
284 of the Patent Code, which was an essential part of the contract
441
claim.
442
Contrast that holding with that of Thompson v. Microsoft Corp.
There, the Federal Circuit concluded that it had no jurisdiction over
a complaint sounding in unjust enrichment under Michigan law
because even though Thompson’s unjust enrichment claim involved
a claim that Microsoft had filed a patent application for something
Thompson had invented, neither that, nor Microsoft’s federal
preemption defense, made the case one where federal patent law was
443
an essential element of the claim.
The court thus transferred the
444
case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
As noted above in connection with rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules
445
of Civil Procedure, the final-judgment rule imposes an important
limitation on the power of the Federal Circuit to hear appeals.
Interlocutory appeals are rare in the Federal Circuit, but they do arise
446
occasionally. In Gemmy Industries Corp. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., the
437. See supra notes 208-210 and accompanying text (explaining that the patent
issue must be part of the well-pleaded complaint for the court to have subject matter
jurisdiction over the case).
438. 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
439. Id. at 818-19.
440. 446 F.3d 1265, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
441. Id. at 1268, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631-32.
442. 471 F.3d 1288, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1155 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
443. Id. at 1291-92, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157-58.
444. Id. at 1292, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158.
445. See supra notes 337-338 and accompanying text (explaining that a court can
enter a partial final judgment to expedite appellate review).
446. 452 F.3d 1353, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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court noted that it had allowed an appeal from an otherwiseinterlocutory grant of a summary-judgment motion on invalidity to be
appended to an appeal as of right from a preliminary-injunction
ruling, “on the basis that the preliminary injunction depends on the
447
ruling of invalidity.”
This is an unusual procedure, under the
doctrine of “pendent appellate jurisdiction,” whose validity in
448
interlocutory appeals is still a matter of some question.
2.

Appealability and cross-appeals
449
In Nautilus Group, Inc. v. Icon Health and Fitness, Inc., on a motion
to dismiss Icon’s cross-appeal, the court (writing per curiam)
reiterated the ordinary rule of appealability and cross-appeals: “A
party has no right of cross-appeal from a decision in its favor.
Similarly, a party who prevails on noninfringement has no right to
file a ‘conditional’ cross-appeal to introduce new arguments or
challenge a claim construction, but may simply assert alternative
450
grounds in the record for affirming the judgment.” The court thus
dismissed Icon’s cross-appeal, which was styled as a conditional crossappeal on certain claim-construction issues “in the event that
451
Nautilus prevails on appeal.”
3.

Waiver and preservation of error
The rule for preserving error on appeal is this:
“Absent
exceptional circumstances, a party cannot raise on appeal legal issues
452
not raised and considered in the trial forum.”
We have already
seen applications of this general rule in connection with JMOL and

447. Id. at 1354, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173.
448. Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 44 n.2 (1995). The Seventh
Circuit has referred to Swint as reflecting “profound skepticism concerning judgecreated doctrines of appellate jurisdiction” and as leaving the doctrine “hang[ing] by
a thread.” In re Rimsat, Ltd., 98 F.3d 956, 964 (7th Cir. 1996). Yet the doctrine still
survives, even twelve years later. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 686, 707 n.41 (1997)
(describing that the two legal issues were “inextricably intertwined” (quoting Swint,
514 U.S. at 51)); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 318 (1995) (explaining that it would
assume that exercising “pendent appellate jurisdiction” can sometimes be
appropriate).
449. 437 F.3d 1376, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2012 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
450. Id. at 1377, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
363 F.3d 1207, 1216, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated, 376
F.3d 1382, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
451. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
452. Sw. Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1289 n.7, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1161, 1167 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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new-trial motions, as well as jury instructions and inconsistent
453
verdicts.
With respect to waiver on appeal, two cases decided by the Federal
Circuit applied the cardinal rule that issues and arguments must be
made in the opening appellate brief or they will be considered
454
waived. As the court concluded in Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex
455
Corp., “[o]ur law is well established that arguments not raised in the
456
opening brief are waived.” The same rule of waiver was applied by
the Federal Circuit in Optivus Technology, Inc. v. Ion Beam Applications,
457
S.A. There are corollaries to this rule, too: “[M]ere statements of
disagreement with the district court . . . do not amount to a
458
So, too, “arguments
developed argument”; those, too, are waived.
459
raised in footnotes are not preserved.”
While the court always
460
retains “discretion” to consider issues not properly raised, parties
461
cannot rely on courts to exercise this discretion.
Cardinal Chemical issues
462
463
As noted above, the Supreme Court in Cardinal Chemical
concluded that a holding of noninfringement on appeal did not
464
“moot” a declaratory judgment counterclaim of invalidity.
This
continues to be a source of some controversy in the Federal Circuit.
465
In Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., the panel split on
4.

453. See supra notes 368-373, 381-385, 389-393, and 399-402, and accompanying
text (identifying the recent case developments regarding JMOL, motions for a new
trial, jury instructions, and inconsistent verdicts).
454. See Optivus Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam Applications, S.A., 469 F.3d 978, 80
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex
Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
455. 439 F.3d 1312, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
456. Id. at 1319, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102 (citing Cross Med. Prods. v.
Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1320-21 n.3, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1662, 1683 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
457. 469 F.3d 978, 989, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839, 1847-48 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
458. Smithkline, 439 F.3d at 1320, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103.
459. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103 (citing Cross Med. Prods., 424 F.3d at 1320-21
n.3, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683 n.3; Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394
F.3d 1368, 1375 n.4, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678, 1684 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Graphic
Controls Corp. v. Utah Med. Prods., 149 F.3d 1382, 1385, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622,
1624 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
460. Id. at 1320 n.9, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103 n.9 (citing Becton Dickinson &
Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 800, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1103 (Fed. Cir.
1990)).
461. See id. at 1320 n.9, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103 n.9 (“But here, as in Becton,
we see no reason to exercise that discretion.”).
462. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s resolution of
whether a non-infringement judgment moots the declaratory judgment issue).
463. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
464. Id. at 98.
465. 448 F.3d 1309, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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the question of Cardinal’s applicability. The majority affirmed the
district court’s noninfringement finding, but then addressed the
issues of invalidity and unenforceability raised by the defendant’s
466
counterclaims (and cross-appeal). Judge Mayer dissented from this
procedure, contending that there was no longer a live case or
controversy for the declaratory judgment counterclaims once the
infringement risk had been removed by the panel’s affirmance of the
467
noninfringement finding because there was “no longer . . . any
468
reasonable apprehension of suit.” (Query, however, whether Judge
Mayer’s analysis can survive the Supreme Court’s recent MedImmune
v. Genentech opinion, or at least the dicta regarding the “reasonable
469
apprehension of suit” requirement. )
5.

Reassignment on remand
Ordinarily, the reassignment of a case to another judge on remand
is an extraordinary request, and granted by an appellate court only in
470
“rare and compelling circumstances.”
But in the Seventh Circuit
and the Northern District of Illinois, local rules exist that require, in
most cases, that actions remanded to the district court for a new trial
471
be reassigned to a new judge. The Federal Circuit has no such rule.
472
Thus, in Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit
granted permission for an interlocutory appeal on this issue, and
ultimately held that because the question of reassignment was not a
question unique to the Federal Circuit, the Seventh Circuit’s
reassignment rule would apply to Federal Circuit remands to district
473
courts within the Seventh Circuit.
This decision will have
repercussions in any case remanded for a new trial from the district
courts in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin, which, as a circuit,

466. Id. at 1318-22, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711-15.
467. Id. at 1323, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715-16 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
468. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1716 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
469. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 774 n.11 (2007).
470. Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 424 F.3d 1235, 1244, 76
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1506, 1512-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2021 (2006)
(mem.); see, e.g., Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 382 F.3d 1367, 1373-74, 72
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (denying reassignment since there
was no showing of personal bias or unusual circumstances); Micro Chem., Inc. v.
Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 1122, 1126, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1695, 1697, 1700
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (denying reassignment since the party did not provide evidence of
bias or favoritism). Two of the authors were counsel to Micro Chemical, Inc. in the
last-cited case in this footnote.
471. 7TH CIR. R. 36; N.D. ILL. R. 40.5.
472. 163 F. App’x. 899, 900 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
473. Eolas Tech. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 457 F.3d 1279, 1282-84, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1597, 1598-1600 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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produced the second-most published decisions from the Federal
474
Circuit in 2006.
C. Patent and Trademark Office Practice
Finally, the Federal Circuit had three occasions to consider matters
of practice and procedure before the U.S. Patent and Trademark
475
Office (“PTO”). In Brown v. Barbacid, the Federal Circuit held that,
in an interference, prior conception must be proven with
476
corroborated evidence,
and that waiver for failure to raise
arguments below will apply in PTO practice, as it does in court
practice. Barbacid argued that Brown was required to show diligence
measured from the date of Barbacid’s date of conception, not
Barbacid’s date of reduction to practice, but the Federal Circuit held
that Brown’s prior silence on this issue, including in a prior Federal
Circuit appeal in the same case, “waived the issue of the length of the
477
period during which diligence should be shown.”
478
In Lacavera v. Dudas, the Federal Circuit held that the PTO’s
decision to grant an alien attorney only limited recognition, and not
full registration, was not an abuse of its discretion under the PTO’s
479
governing statutes and regulations.
The court rejected the
applicant’s arguments that the PTO’s reliance on the applicant’s visa
restrictions was: (1) an unreasonable interpretation of the PTO’s
own regulations, (2) beyond the PTO’s statutorily granted powers,
480
and (3) a denial of equal protection based on alienage.
481
In Sheinbein v. Dudas, the court upheld the PTO’s decision to
exclude Sheinbein from PTO practice based on his disbarment in
other jurisdictions (for illegally assisting his son to flee the country
after learning that the son was being investigated in connection with
482
a murder).
The court also held that the five-year statute of
limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2462 did not begin to run until his
disbarment by the State Bar of Maryland (the condition precedent to

474. See infra tbl. 4B.
475. 436 F.3d 1376, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1848 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
476. Id. at 1380, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851 (citing In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317,
1328, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1901, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
477. Id. at 1379-80, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851 (citing Barrow v. Falck, 11 F.3d
729, 730 (7th Cir. 1993)).
478. 441 F.3d 1380, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1955 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 75
U.S.L.W. 3106 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2007).
479. Id. at 1383, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1957.
480. Id. at 1383-84, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1957-58.
481. 465 F.3d 493, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1537 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
482. Id. at 495-96, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1538-40.
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his exclusion from PTO practice under the appropriate regulations);
483
it did not run from the acts that led to his Maryland disbarment.
III. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY
Perhaps the most significant development in 2006 in the area of
patentability and validity was the dialogue that the Federal Circuit
and the Supreme Court had over the proper standard for
determining obviousness. As this article goes to press, the Supreme
Court has yet to issue its decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex,
484
Inc., involving the appropriate standard to use in determining an
obviousness challenge. Even before the Supreme Court has decided
KSR, however, the decision to grant certiorari in that case has
prompted the Federal Circuit to defend its “motivation-teachingsuggestion” test in several of its 2006 decisions, and, at the same time,
to engage in a remarkable conversation with the Supreme Court and
the members of the bar on this issue.
While the Federal Circuit’s obviousness cases have demonstrated
(even before a Supreme Court decision in KSR) that the court is
making obviousness into a more muscular defense to a patent’s
validity, the court’s cases are also suggesting a similarly more
muscular anticipation defense, and they further show that the court is
closely scrutinizing attempts to invalidate a patent on the ground of
inequitable conduct. Additionally, the Federal Circuit in 2006
invalidated, for the first time, a dependent claim for failure to meet
the drafting requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 4. And the
court gave further guidance on the doctrine of recapture. These and
other issues of patentability and invalidity arising out of the court’s
2006 cases are surveyed below.
A. Validity in the Preliminary-Injunction Context
For a moving party to obtain a preliminary injunction, it must
establish: “(1) a reasonable likelihood of its success on the merits;
(2) irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted; (3) a balance of
hardships tipping in its favor; and (4) the injunction’s . . . impact on
485
486
the public interest.” In Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., the Federal
Circuit considered the patent challenger’s request to overturn, on
483. Id. at 496, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1539-40.
484. 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (mem.).
485. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1374, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1097, 1100 (Fed. Cir. 2006); accord Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d
1331, 1334, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
486. 470 F.3d 1368, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097.
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invalidity grounds, the district court’s grant of a preliminary
487
The court explained that an order granting a
injunction.
preliminary injunction will be overturned on appeal only if “the court
made a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors or
exercised its discretion based upon an error of law or clearly
488
erroneous factual findings.” The Federal Circuit affirmed the grant
of the preliminary injunction and held that the challenger had not
sufficiently demonstrated a clearly erroneous finding and an abuse of
489
discretion.
When seeking a preliminary injunction, a patent holder bears the
burden of proving a likelihood of success in establishing the patent’s
490
validity.
The presumption of validity created by 35 U.S.C. § 282
491
assists, but does not relieve the patentee of this burden.
487. Id. at 1373-74, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1100; cf. Abbott, 452 F.3d at 1332, 79
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322 (granting motion to review the validity of a preliminary
injuction).
488. See Sanofi-Synthelabo, 470 F.3d at 1374, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100 (quoting
Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1364, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); see also Abbott, 452 F.3d at 1335, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1324 (“An abuse of discretion in granting or denying a preliminary injunction may
be found ‘by showing that the court made a clear error of judgment in weighing
relevant factors or exercised its discretion based upon an error of law or clearly
erroneous factual findings.’”) (quoting Polymer Techs., Inc. v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d
970, 973, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1185, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see also Curtiss-Wright
Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1378, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1988,
1992 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The court’s determination can be overturned only on a
showing that it abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or seriously
misjudged the evidence.”) (quoting We Care, Inc. v. Ultra-Mark Int’l Corp., 930 F.2d
1567, 1570, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1562, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
489. See Sanofi-Synthelabo, 470 F.3d at 1385, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108; cf. PHG
Tech., LLC v. St. John Co., Inc., 469 F.3d 1361, 1369, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1088,
1093-94 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (vacating preliminary injunction where patentee failed to
establish likelihood of success on merits weighs in its favor); Gemmy Indus. Corp. v.
Chrisha Creations Ltd., 452 F.3d 1353, 1354-55, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1172, 1173
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (vacating summary judgment of invalidity, thus vacating preliminary
injunction as to patent marking); Abbott, 452 F.3d at 1332, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1322 (vacating preliminary injunction where alleged infringer raised substantial
issues as to the validity of asserted claims); Curtiss-Wright, 438 F.3d at 1381-82, 77
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994 (vacating preliminary injunction where district court
erred in its claim construction, thus subsequent infringement analysis was flawed).
490. See Sanofi-Synthelabo, 470 F.3d at 1375, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101; see also
Abbott, 452 F.3d at 1335, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324 (“When moving for the
extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction, a patentee need not establish the
validity of a patent beyond question. The patentee must, however, present a clear
case supporting the validity of the patent in suit.”) (citing Amazon.com, Inc. v.
Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1359, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747, 1758
(Fed. Cir. 2001)).
491. See Sanofi-Sythelabo, 470 F.3d at 1375, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101; see also
PHG Tech., 469 F.3d at 1365, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Our
case law and logic both require that a movant cannot be granted a preliminary
injunction unless it establishes both of the first two factors, i.e., likelihood of success
on the merits and irreparable harm.”) (citing Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1350, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751).
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Accordingly, to show a likelihood of success, the patentee must
demonstrate that: (1) the alleged infringer’s product likely infringes;
and (2) the patentee will likely withstand the alleged infringer’s
492
challenges to validity and enforceability.
In Sanofi-Synthelabo, the
alleged infringer stipulated to infringement, thus only the second
493
The Federal Circuit explained that the
inquiry was at issue.
likelihood-of-success factor is properly satisfied if the alleged
494
infringer fails to raise a substantial question concerning validity.
The party resisting a preliminary injunction need not make out a case
of actual invalidity, but instead must raise a substantial question as to
495
invalidity. The court examined each validity challenge proffered by
the alleged infringer and reviewed the district court’s ruling on each
496
defense. The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court did
not err in determining that the alleged infringer failed to raise a
497
substantial question of invalidity.
Having ruled that the first factor for a preliminary injunction was
satisfied, the Federal Circuit turned to the remaining three factors
and concluded that the district court did not clearly err in ruling for
the patentee nor abuse its discretion in granting preliminary
498
injunctive relief.
Further, the Federal Circuit noted that it
considered the district court’s grant of the preliminary injunction in
the context of the standard applicable to a motion for a preliminary
injunction, and that the district court is not bound to its prior
499
conclusions at later stages of the litigation.
B. Standard of Review for Validity in JMOL Context
500

In SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Engineering Inc., the Federal Circuit
reviewed a district court’s ruling (made on cross-motions for
summary judgment) that prior art did not invalidate a claim of the
501
patent in suit. In its decision, the Federal Circuit repeated the wellknown standard under 35 U.S.C. § 282 that patents enjoy a
492. See Sanofi-Synthelabo, 470 F.3d at 1374, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100.
493. See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100.
494. See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100.
495. See Abbott, 452 F.3d at 1335, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324 (“[‘]Vulnerability
is the issue at the preliminary injunction stage, while validity is the issue at trial. The
showing of a substantial question as to invalidity thus requires less proof than the
clear and convincing showing necessary to establish invalidity itself.[’]”) (citing
Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1359, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758).
496. Sanofi-Synthelabo, 470 F.3d at 1374-75, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100-01.
497. Id. at 1379, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103.
498. Id. at 1385, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108.
499. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108.
500. 465 F.3d 1351, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
501. Id. at 1355-56, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366.
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presumption of validity that can be overcome only by clear and
502
To invalidate a patent on
convincing evidence of invalidity.
summary judgment, therefore, the moving party must submit clear
and convincing evidence of invalidity to the extent that no reasonable
503
jury could find otherwise. Moreover, in the context of a summaryjudgment motion, the panel noted that the evidence must be viewed
504
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
C. Anticipation
The Federal Circuit’s year 2006 cases addressing anticipation to any
significant degree began by stating that anticipation is a question of
505
fact. Therefore, the Federal Circuit will affirm a jury verdict if it is
506
The Federal Circuit reviews a
supported by substantial evidence.

502. Id. at 1357, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367 (citing U.S. Surgical Corp. v.
Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1563, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
see also Aero Prods. Int’l Corp. v. Intex Recreation Corp., 466 F.3d 1000, 1015, 80
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1490-91 (Fed. Circ. 2007); Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm.
Prods. Inc., 471 F.3d 1363, 1367, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1860, 1862-63 (Fed. Cir.
2006); Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharms. Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1378, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1001, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs. Inc., 464 F.3d 1286,
1290, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,
459 F.3d 1328, 1336-37, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813, 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Gemmy
Indus. Corp. v. Chrisa Creations Ltd., 452 F.3d 1353, 1358, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1172, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S. Inc., 441 F.3d 963, 968, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Stern v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 434
F.3d 1375, 1377, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1702, 1704 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
503. SRAM, 465 F.3d at 1357, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367; see also L & W Inc. v.
Shertech, Inc., 471 F.3d 1311, 1320, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1198, 1204 (Fed Cir. 2006)
(quoting Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893, 221
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 669, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
504. SRAM, 465 F.3d at 1357, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367 (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
505. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1375,
81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (positing that anticipation is a
question of fact); Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc. 468 F.3d 1366, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (remarking that anticipation is a factual matter); SRAM, 465 F.3d at 1357,
80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367 (stating that anticipation is a question of fact); Kim v.
ConAgra Foods Inc., 465 F.3d 1312, 1325, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495, 1503 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (“‘What a prior art reference discloses in an anticipation analysis is a
factual determination.’”) (quoting Novo Nordisk Pharms., Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen.
Corp., 424 F.3d 1347, 1355, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811, 1816 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1300, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1705, 1713 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (commenting that anticipation under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 is a question of fact); Atofina v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 995,
78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that anticipation is a question of
fact)).
506. L & W, 471 F.3d at 1320, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204 (“In reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we may inquire only whether
the findings necessary to the jury’s verdict are supported by the evidence . . . “); Kim,
465 F.3d at 1326, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503 (holding that jury verdict that claims
are not invalid was supported by substantial evidence).
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507

district court finding of anticipation for clear error. In the context
of summary judgment, however, the Federal Circuit reviews de novo a
508
district court’s ruling on an anticipation issue. And, in the context
of a district court ruling on a preliminary injunction, the Federal
Circuit reviews a finding of anticipation under an abuse of discretion
509
standard.
There are two steps to an anticipation analysis: (1) claim
construction, and (2) a comparison of the construed claim to the
510
prior art.
“[I]nvalidity by anticipation requires that the four
corners of a single, prior art document describe every element of the
511
claimed invention.”
The elements can be described explicitly or
512
“[A]nticipation by inherent disclosure is appropriate
inherently.
only when the reference discloses prior art that must necessarily
513
include the unstated limitation.”
Additionally, a “reference may
anticipate even when the relevant properties of the thing disclosed
514
were not appreciated at the time.”
Furthermore, “[i]n order to anticipate, a prior art reference must
not only disclose all of the limitations of the claimed invention, but
515
also be enabled.”
And to be enabling, a prior art reference must
disclose the claimed subject matter so that one skilled in the art may

507. Amgen, 457 F.3d at 1304, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713 (“Anticipation under
35 U.S.C. § 102 is a question of fact, which we review for clear error after a bench
trial.”); Atofina, 441 F.3d at 995, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (“[W]e review
[anticipation] for clear error.”).
508. Go Med. Indus. Pty. Ltd. v. Inmed Corp., 471 F.3d 1264, 1270, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1629, 1633 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that summary judgment of invalidity is
reviewed without deference); SRAM, 465 F.3d at 1356, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367
(“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment without deference.”).
509. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1374, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1097, 1100 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
510. SRAM, 465 F.3d at 1352-53, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364 (vacating partial
summary judgment because district court erred in claim construction, and
remanding to district court for decision under new claim construction); Amgen, 457
F.3d at 1304, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713 (vacating and remanding for new ruling
on anticipation based on a new claim construction); In re Johnston, 435 F.3d 1381, 77
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1788 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (upholding the United States Patent and
Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interference’s construction of claims
and ruling of anticipation based on construction).
511. Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 458 F.3d 1310, 1322, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1916,
1927 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212
F.3d 1272, 1282, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1679 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
512. Atofina, 441 F.3d at 999, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423 (“Anticipation
requires a showing that each limitation of a claim is found in a single reference,
either expressly or inherently.”).
513. Id. at 1000, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424.
514. Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., 471 F.3d 1363, 1367, 80
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1860, 1863 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
515. Amgen, 457 F.3d at 1306, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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516

make or use it.
Importantly, however, “[t]he enablement
requirement for prior art to anticipate under section 102 does not
require utility, unlike the enablement requirement for patents under
517
section 112. . . . [P]roof of efficacy is not required . . . .”
Many of the Federal Circuit’s anticipation decisions engage in a
detailed analysis in construing the claims and applying those claim
518
constructions to the specific prior art at issue. A recitation of each
case and its facts thus provides limited insight into the overall state of
Federal Circuit law. Nevertheless, some of the decisions warrant an
examination of relevant legal principles as articulated in their specific
factual contexts.
519
In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., the Federal Circuit was
faced with a product-by-process claim directed to paroxetine, an anti520
depressant, made by an allegedly novel, dry admixing process. The
court ruled that it need not reach the issue of whether the claims
should be construed “broadly to cover the product made by any
process or narrowly to cover only the product made by a dry
admixing process,” because “[e]ither way, anticipation by an earlier
product disclosure . . . cannot be avoided. While the process set forth
in the product-by-process claim may be new, that novelty can only be
521
captured by obtaining a process claim.”
The Federal Circuit faced the question of new uses of known
processes in Abbott Laboratories v. Baxter Pharmaceutical Products, Inc.,
which dealt with method claims directed to adding water to the
inhalation anesthetic sevoflurane to prevent degradation by certain
522
acids. The prior art taught adding water to sevoflurane, but did not
523
appreciate that adding the water would prevent such degradation.
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit held that the claim was anticipated.
While noting that new uses of known processes may be patentable,
516. Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc. 468 F.3d 1366, 1381, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1001, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
517. Id. at 1381-82, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012.
518. See supra note 510 and accompanying text; see also Planet Bingo, LLC. v.
Gametech Int’l, Inc., 472 F.3d 1338, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(construing claims as part of infringement analysis and then applying same
construction in finding claims invalid).
519. 439 F.3d 1312, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
520. Id. at 1314, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098. A product-by-process claim is “‘one
in which the product is defined at least in part in terms of the method or process by
which it is made.’” Id. at 1315, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099 (quoting Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 158-59 n.*, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1847,
1859 n.a1 (1989)). “[I]t is clear that such claims are always to a product, not a
process.” Id. at 1317, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100.
521. Id. at 1318-19, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102.
522. 471 F.3d 1363, 1365, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1860, 1864 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
523. Id. at 1366, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
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both the prior art and present purpose was the delivery of a safe,
effective sevoflurane anesthetic. The prior art taught removing the
added water from the solution during the manufacturing process to
remove impurities. The patent at issue accomplished that goal
524
mainly by adding water, but the use was the same.
In a number of cases the Federal Circuit was asked to determine
whether a genus disclosed in a prior-art reference anticipated a
525
claimed species falling within that genus. “It is well established that
the disclosure of a genus in the prior art is not necessarily a
disclosure of every species that is a member of that genus. . . .
[However,] a very small genus can be a disclosure of each species
526
within the genus.”
The problem is often viewed as one of
enablement: A person having ordinary skill in the art should be able
to “‘at once envisage each member of th[e] . . . class’ for the individual
compounds, i.e., species, to be enabled. . . . If the members cannot be
envisioned, the reference does not disclose the species and the
527
reference is not enabling.”
The court also looks for a “pattern of
preferences” that can limit a “generic” class to a “narrow class”
528
including the claimed element.
The Federal Circuit applied these principles in Atofina v. Great
529
The patent claim disclosed a preferred
Lakes Chemical Corp.
temperature range of 330 to 450 degrees Celsius for synthesizing the
chemical difluoromethane, and the prior art reference disclosed a
530
range of 100 to 500 degrees Celsius.
The court found no
anticipation, because “[a] temperature range of over 100 degrees is
not a small genus, and the range of temperatures of [the prior art
531
reference] does not disclose Atofina’s temperature range.”
The

524. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
525. See Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1377, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1097, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 468
F.3d 1366, 1383, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Atofina v. Great
Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1423 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
526. Atofina, 441 F.3d at 999, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423 (internal citations
omitted).
527. Impax, 468 F.3d at 1383, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(quoting In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681, 133 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 275, 280 (C.C.P.A.
1962)).
528. See Sanofi-Synthelabo, 470 F.3d at 1377, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
529. 441 F.3d 991, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417.
530. Id. at 999, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423.
531. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423. “Given the considerable difference
between the claimed range and the range in the prior art, no reasonable fact finder
could conclude that the prior art described the claimed range with sufficient
specificity to anticipate this limitation of the claim.” Id.
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court further noted that the prior art “disclosure is only that of a
532
range, not a specific temperature in that range . . . .”
533
In Impax Laboratories, Inc. v. Aventis Pharmaceuticals Inc., the
Federal Circuit dealt with an enablement question in a genus-species
534
context with two prior art references.
The issue was whether the
references, a patent and an application to which the prior art patent
claimed priority, disclosed riluzole, a compound used to treat
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (“ALS”). The patent reference disclosed
a large genus of compounds and specifically mentioned riluzole. The
district court concluded that the patent was not enabling, however,
because it did not disclose that riluzole was “effective” in treating
535
ALS.
The Federal Circuit explained that efficacy is not required,
and remanded to the court to make the proper determination on
536
enablement. The application did not specifically mention riluzole,
and the Federal Circuit held that it was not enabling, because of “the
large number of compounds included” in the disclosed formula and
537
lack of a “specific identification.”
538
In Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., the challenged patent covered
clopidogrel bisulfate, which inhibits platelets from aggregating and is
539
used to reduce thrombotic events such as heart attacks or strokes.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the prior art lacked a “pattern of
preferences” serving to narrow the prior art class of compounds to
540
one that included the claimed compound. Thus, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction,
because the patentee was likely to succeed against the accused
541
infringer’s anticipation challenge.

532. Id. at 1000, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424. The court distinguished Atofina
from Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 782, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 773,
779 (Fed. Cir. 1985), which stands for the proposition that an earlier species
reference anticipates a later genus claim, not that an earlier genus anticipates a
narrow species. Atofina, 441 F.3d at 999, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423.
533. 468 F.3d 1366, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
534. Id. at 1381-83, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012-13.
535. Id. at 1381, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012.
536. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012.
537. Id. at 1383, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013.
538. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
539. Id. at 1372, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099.
540. Id. at 1377, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103. “The principal, obvious distinction
is that the generic formula [of the prior art] does not include a salt. On this basis
alone, we find that clopidogrel bisulfate is not a species of any genus comprised by
[the prior art].” Id. at 1377, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102-03.
541. Id. at 1384, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107.
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D. On-Sale Bar and Public Use Bar
A claimed invention will trigger the on-sale bar to patentability of
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) if it is sold or offered for sale more than one year
542
before the filing date of the patent application. The statute guards
against undue delay in commencing the patenting process, while
providing a year wherein an inventor may assess the commercial
potential of the invention without losing the opportunity of patenting
543
it in the United States. The determination of whether an invention
was on sale within the meaning of Section 102(b) is a question of law
544
to be reviewed without deference.
Because patents bear a
presumption of validity, invalidity based on the on-sale bar must be
545
established by clear and convincing evidence.
546
In Plumtree Software, Inc. v. Datamize, LLC, the Federal Circuit
vacated a summary judgment invalidating a patent for a computer
547
program based on the on-sale bar.
The court reiterated the
548
Supreme Court’s two-part test in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. for
determining whether there was a sale or offer for sale for purposes of
35 U.S.C. § 102(b): “First, the product must be the subject of a
commercial [sale or] offer for sale. . . . Second, the invention must be
549
ready for patenting.”
In Plumtree, the court noted that the patent
challenger could meet Pfaff’s first prong by either: (1) showing there
was a commercial offer to perform the patented method before the 1year on-sale bar cut-off date; or (2) showing that the patentee, in fact,
performed each of the steps of the patented process before the
550
critical date pursuant to a contract.
The Federal Circuit held that
the record did not establish that this Pfaff prong was satisfied, and the
court therefore vacated the district court’s order of summary
judgment of invalidity due to the on-sale bar.
551
Gemmy Industries Corp. v. Chrisha Creations Ltd., also vacated a
summary judgment based on the on-sale bar. In Gemmy, the district
court bound the plaintiff to statements in its sworn affidavit despite
contradictory evidence. In reversing, the Federal Circuit explained
542. Plumtree Software, Inc. v. Datamize, LLC, 473 F.3d 1152, 1163, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1251, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
543. Gemmy Indus. Corp. v. Chrisha Creations Ltd., 452 F.3d 1353, 1358, 79
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1172, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
544. Plumtree, 473 F.3d at 1160, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256.
545. Gemmy, 452 F.3d at 1358, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176.
546. 473 F.3d 1152, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1251.
547. Id. at 1164, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
548. 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
549. Id. at 67.
550. 473 F.3d at 1162, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258.
551. 452 F.3d 1353, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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that a party can overcome the averments in its own sworn affidavit
regarding the dates its invention was “ready for patenting” or when it
made the first “commercial offer of sale” if there is credible evidence
552
supporting the contradiction. Without undisputed evidence that a
patented invention is “fully disclosed” in that the product displayed
for sale is the product that is claimed in the patent, summary
judgment is not appropriate on the ground of the on-sale bar of
553
§ 102(b).
Also included within § 102(b), and almost identical in application
to the “on-sale bar,” is the so-called “public use bar.” Under § 102, a
patent will not be awarded if “the invention was . . . in public use . . .
in this country, more than one year prior to the application for
554
patent in the United States.” Public use includes “any public use of
the claimed invention by a person other than the inventor who is
under no limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy to the
555
inventor.”
In assessing whether a particular use is “public” within
the meaning of § 102(b), the Federal Circuit considers the policies
556
underlying the public-use bar.
557
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the court
considered whether a drug, olanzapine, used in clinical trials for over
one year was subject to the public-use bar to patentability. The court
held that the experimental character of the trials negated any
statutory bar, stating that “even a use that occurs in the open may not
invoke a bar when undertaken to experiment on or with the claimed
558
invention.”
The Federal Circuit then quoted the U.S. Supreme
559
Court from City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co.: “The
use of an invention by the inventor himself, or of any other person
under his direction, by way of experiment, and in order to bring the
560
invention to perfection, has never been regarded as [a public] use.”
In Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit listed six indicia that may be
considered to determine the experimental character of a use for
negating the public use bar: (1) the length of the test period, (2) any
confidentiality agreement, (3) any records of testing, (4) any
552. Id. at 1359, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176-77.
553. Id. at 1360, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177, citing Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 68.
554. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2002).
555. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1380, 81
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127,
1134, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 976, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
556. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
557. Id. at 1369, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1324.
558. Id. at 1381, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
559. 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877).
560. Eli Lilly, 471 F.3d at 1381, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
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monitoring and control of the test results, (5) the number of tests,
and (6) the length of the test period in relation to tests of similar
561
inventions.
E. Obviousness
The appropriate legal standard for obviousness determinations led
to an unusual dialogue in 2006 between the Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court. The Patent Act defines obviousness in section
103(a):
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner
562
in which the invention was made.

The Federal Circuit has uniformly defined obviousness as a
563
question of law based on underlying factual issues.
The court
reviews obviousness de novo, because the ultimate conclusion of
obviousness is a legal conclusion, but it reviews a district court’s
564
determination of the underlying factual issues for clear error. For
561. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
562. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
563. Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs. Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1289, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Obviousness is a question of law . . . based upon
underlying factual questions . . . .”); Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299,
1306, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1931, 1936 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Obviousness is a legal
question where, as here, the relevant underlying facts are undisputed.”); In re Kahn,
441 F.3d 977, 985, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The ultimate
determination of whether an invention would have been obvious is a legal
conclusion based on underlying findings of fact.”); Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L.,
437 F.3d 1157, 1164, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1869 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(“Obviousness . . . is a legal conclusion . . . based in turn on underlying factual
determinations . . . “).
564. Eli Lilly, 471 F.3d at 1377, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (noting that the
court reviews the obviousness determination without deference, but it reviews a
district court’s determination of the underlying factual determinations for clear
error); Alza, 464 F.3d at 1289, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003 (“Obviousness is a
question of law, reviewed de novo, based upon underlying factual questions which are
reviewed for clear error following a bench trial.”); Old Town Canoe Co. v.
Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 1319, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1715
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (vacating a district court’s judgment as a matter of law of noninvalidity for obviousness, because patent challenger produced clear and convincing
evidence that prior art references, in combination, disclose every element, and
evidence that there was a motivation to combine the prior art references, thereby
establishing an issue of fact for the jury); Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1164, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1869 (“Obviousness . . . is a legal conclusion that is reviewed de novo;
however it is based in turn on factual determinations which are reviewed for clear
error.”).
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orders originating from the patent office and jury verdicts, the
Federal Circuit reviews the factual record for the presence or absence
565
of substantial evidence.
The Supreme Court defined the underlying factual questions in
566
Graham v. John Deere Co. to include the following: “(1) [the] scope
and content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary skill in the prior
art; (3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior
567
art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness.”
Examples of
the fourth factor, also called “secondary considerations,” include
“commercial success, long-felt but unsolved needs, and failure of
568
569
others,” and also unexpected results.
The Federal Circuit has
considered two subsidiary factual inquiries pertinent to the Graham
analysis: the “presence or absence of a motivation to combine the
570
references”
and the “presence or absence of a ‘reasonable
571
expectation of success’ from making such a combination.”
Of all the factors recited by the Federal Circuit regarding
obviousness, the court focused most on the issue of “motivation to
572
combine.” This increased focus appears to be, at least in significant
565. Kim v. ConAgra Foods Inc., 465 F.3d 1312, 1320, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495,
1503 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (reviewing jury verdict for substantial evidence); Kemin Foods
L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales Del Centro S.A. de C.V., 464 F.3d 1339, 1344, 80
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (reviewing jury verdict for substantial
evidence); Kahn, 441 F.3d at 985, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1344 (reviewing the
United States PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interference’s decisions on the
underlying factual determinations for substantial evidence).
566. 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) (stating that several factual inquiries must be
satisfied to determine patent validity).
567. Alza, 464 F.3d at 1289, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003 (quoting In re
Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 998, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614, 1616 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
See DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d
1356, 1360, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Kahn, 441 F.3d at 985,
78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334-35 (“[I]n assessing whether the subject matter would
have been non-obvious under § 103, the Board follows the guidance of the Supreme
Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.”); Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1164, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1869 (“The ultimate determination of whether an invention would have been
obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is a legal conclusion based on the factual Graham
findings . . .”).
568. DyStar, 464 F.3d at 1360, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645 (citing Graham,
383 U.S.at 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 467 (1966)). See Eli Lilly, 471 F.3d at 1380, 81
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.
569. See id. at 1380, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331; Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S., Inc.,
441 F.3d 963, 970, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that
the patentee overcame a prima facie case of obviousness by providing evidence of
unexpected results).
570. Alza, 464 F.3d at 1289, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003 (quoting In re Gartside,
203 F.3d 1305, 1316, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1776 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). See DyStar,
464 F.3d at 1360-61, 1372, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
571. Alza, 464 F.3d at 1289, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003 (quoting Medichem, 437
F.3d at 1165, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870).
572. See supra note 570 and accompanying text; see also Ormco Corp. v. Align
Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1307, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1931, 1938 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
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part, a reaction to the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in a case
573
Under the
involving this test, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.
Federal Circuit’s “motivation to combine” inquiry, it is not enough to
574
find each element of a claimed invention in the prior art; rather, “a
court must ask ‘whether a person of ordinary skill in the art,
possessed with the understandings and knowledge reflected in the
prior art, and motivated by the general problem facing the inventor,
would have been led to make the combination recited in the
575
“The ‘motivation-suggestion-teaching’ requirement
claims.’”
protects against the entry of hindsight into the obviousness
576
analysis . . . .”
In light of the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari, the Federal
Circuit has taken several opportunities to emphasize that its
“motivation-suggestion-teaching” test is not an inflexible, categorical
rule:
In contrast to the characterization of some commentators, the
suggestion test is not a rigid categorical rule. The motivation need
not be found in the references sought to be combined, but may be
found in any number of sources, including common knowledge,
577
the prior art as a whole, or the nature of the problem itself.
In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 986, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335 (explaining that to make a
prima facie case of obviousness, the Board must “explain the reasons one of ordinary
skill in the art would have been motivated to select the references and combine them
to render the claimed invention obvious”) (quoting In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350,
1357-59, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); Medichem, 437 F.3d at
1164, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
573. 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (mem.). See also DyStar, 464 F.3d at 1367 n.3, 80
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654 n.3 (acknowledging the Supreme Court’s grant of
certiorari).
574. See Eli Lilly, 471 F.3d at 1377, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
575. Alza, 464 F.3d 1286 at 1290, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003 (quoting Kahn, 441
F.3d at 998, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337).
576. Kahn, 441 F.3d at 986, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
577. DyStar, 464 F.3d at 1361, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645. DyStar surmised that
confusion about this aspect of the test probably led to the Court’s grant of certiorari
in KSR:
DyStar’s argument and the above-cited commentary highlight the danger
inherent in focusing on isolated dicta rather than gleaning the law of a
particular area from careful reading of the full text of a group of related
precedents for all they say that is dispositive and for what they hold. When
parties like DyStar do not engage in such careful, candid, and complete legal
analysis, much confusion about the law arises and, through time, can be
compounded.
Id. at 1367, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650. See Alza, 464 F.3d at 1290-91, 80
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004 (quoting Kahn, 441 F.3d at 987-88, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1336-37); Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1307-09, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1931, 1937-39 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Kahn, 441 F.3d at 987-88, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1366); Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309,
1319, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1712-13 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that the
defendant introduced enough evidence that a motivation to combine would have
been inherent in the techniques known in the art and the nature of a problem to be
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However, while “common knowledge and common sense” are
sufficient to establish a motivation to combine, “assumptions about
578
Put
common sense cannot substitute for evidence thereof . . . .”
another way, “rejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained
by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some
articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support
579
the legal conclusion of obviousness.”
Particularly because they
played such a notorious role in the briefing and argument before the
Supreme Court in KSR, a brief discussion of these decisions is
worthwhile.
580
In In re Kahn, which was decided before the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in KSR, the Federal Circuit upheld a decision by
the PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences that claims in a
patent application for a “reading machine” for blind readers were
581
unpatentable as obvious.
Kahn’s claimed invention concerned a
device operated by eye control and sound localization that can read a
word “looked at” by a totally blind user, in a fashion that the user can
tell, by the direction of the sound, the area of the screen where he
582
was looking.
The Board and the Federal Circuit focused on a
combination of three references: a patent to Garwin, one of two
patents to Anderson, and a patent to Stanton. Garwin disclosed an
eye-controlled processor that sensed where on a visual display the
user looked, presented the user with a number of targets (such as
words), and provided feedback to indicate a selection has been
received.
Two Anderson references, which were used
interchangeably, each disclosed an interactive “electronic teaching
aid” that enabled a user viewing text to select a portion for
vocalization. Stanton disclosed an acoustical imaging system allowing
a user to locate the position of a sound; the preferred embodiment

solved in order to create a factual issue for a jury); Kahn, 441 F.3d at 987, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336 (“A suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine the
relevant prior art teachings does not have to be found explicitly in the prior art, as
‘the teaching motivation or suggestion may be implicit from the prior art as a whole,
rather than expressly stated in the references’”) (quoting In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365,
1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted));
In re Johnston, 435 F.3d 1381, 1385-86, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1788, 1791 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (finding motivation with respect to an invention relating to a large diameter,
shaped, spiral pipe for two references to be combined because they deal with the
same field of technology and show spirally formed pipe of large diameter, even
though the motivation was not explicit in the prior art).
578. DyStar, 464 F.3d at 1367, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
579. Kahn, 441 F.3d at 987-88, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
580. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
581. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
582. Id. at 980-81, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

2007]

4/7/2007 11:15:24 AM

2006 PATENT SUMMARY

867

had four speakers at the corners of a vertical display that produce a
583
directional sound based on the location of a cursor.
Kahn did not dispute that each element of his claimed invention
could be found in either the Garwin, Anderson, or Stanton
references, or that a person having ordinary skill in the art would
584
have been motivated to combine Anderson and Garwin.
Rather,
Kahn challenged the Board’s finding of a motivation to apply
585
Stanton.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board, however,
noting that a skilled artisan who knew of a “learning machine”
capable of reading aloud the word on a screen at which a user is
looking, and who desired to permit a visually impaired user to better
control the device, would have had reason to add Stanton’s teaching
that a two-dimensional sound could help a blind person locate a
586
point in space. In so deciding, the Court noted that “[t]he use of
patents as references is not limited to what the patentees describe as
587
their own inventions”
and “the skilled artisan need not be
motivated to combine Stanton for the same reason contemplated by
588
Kahn.”
589
In Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, Inc., decided by the Federal
Circuit after the grant of certiorari in KSR, the court applied its rule
590
that the motivation to combine need not be explicit in the prior art.
The invention was a series of retainers to progressively move teeth
and instructions to a patient regarding the order of use of the
591
retainers. The court held that providing the medical devices in one
package as opposed to multiple packages did not make the claim
distinct, based on the well-known practice of packaging things in the
592
most convenient manner. Also, adding the instructions was obvious
based on a general practice of providing instructions on how to use
medical devices, along with regulations under the Food, Drug, and
593
Cosmetic Act that generally require such instructions. Additionally,

583. Id. at 982-83, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
584. Id. at 988-99, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
585. Id. at 988-89, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
586. Id. at 989, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
587. Id. at 990, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338 (quoting In re Heck, 699 F.2d 1331,
1333, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1038, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (internal quotations
omitted)).
588. Id. at 990, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
589. 463 F.3d 1299, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1931 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
590. Id. at 1313, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942.
591. Id. at 1302, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933-34.
592. Id. at 1309, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
593. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
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the court ruled that there were no secondary consideration of
594
commercial success to rebut the prima facie case of obviousness.
595
In Alza Corp. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., the Federal Circuit upheld
596
a bench trial finding of obviousness.
The court explained that a
motivation to combine need not be found in the prior art, and it
ruled that the district court did not make a clear error in finding
motivation based on expert testimony, which the Federal Circuit
597
found consistent with the prior-art references. In DyStar Textilfarben
598
GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., the court ruled that
the patent claims were invalid as a matter of law for obviousness,
599
notwithstanding a jury finding of non-invalidity.
Both Alza and
DyStar, too, came after the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in
KSR, and both took pains to claim that the indictment of the
teaching-suggestion-motivation test offered in the Supreme Court by
600
KSR and its amici curiae was unfounded.
(Notably, all four
decisions resulted in appellate holdings of obviousness.)
One way in which patentees “negate” a motivation to combine is to
show that one prior art reference teaches away from the
601
modifications required to reach the claimed invention.
“A
reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill,
upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following
the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction
602
divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.”
In
603
Optivus Technology, Inc. v. Ion Beam Applications S.A., the court found
that the prior art disclosing a neutron beam for cancer therapy did
604
not teach away from an invention involving a proton beam.
The
patentee argued that if the neutron beam, which worked by shooting
a proton beam at beryllium to produce neutrons, were modified so
594. Id. at 1312, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941 (noting that while the requirement
that “the commercial success [be] due to the patented invention” is presumed when
the product is successful, in this case “the evidence clearly rebuts the presumption
that [the] success was due to the claimed and novel features”).
595. 464 F.3d 1286, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
596. Id. at 1290-91, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006-07.
597. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006-07 (also finding that there exists clear and
convincing evidence a person having ordinary skill in the art would have perceived a
reasonable likelihood of success).
598. 464 F.3d 1356, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
599. Id. at 1372, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
600. Dystar, 464 F.3d at 1364-71, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648-53; Alza, 464 F.3d at
1290-91, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006-07.
601. Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1308, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1931, 1938 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
602. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 990, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (citations omitted).
603. 469 F.3d 978, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
604. Id. at 991, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848.
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that it was directed at a patient in the fashion of the claimed proton
beam, it would be a “death ray,” and thus the neutron beam teaches
605
The court rejected the argument,
away from such a modification.
responding that a person having ordinary skill in the art would know
606
to adjust the intensity of the beam. On the other hand, in Eli Lilly
the court accepted a “teach away” argument, ruling that the prior art
showed a preference for halogenated compounds to treat
schizophrenia, and therefore taught away from the present invention,
607
which used a hydrogen atom instead of a halogen atom.
The Federal Circuit also had occasion in 2006 to address issues
other than the “motivation to combine” and related questions. The
court at least twice addressed the issue of rendering claimed ranges
obvious. In Ormco, the court held that a prior-art range of 14-21 days
for using a particular device rendered obvious the claimed range of 2608
20 days.
The court explained: “Where a claimed range overlaps
with a range disclosed in the prior art, there is a presumption of
obviousness. The presumption can be rebutted if it can be shown
that the prior art teaches away from the claimed range, or the
609
claimed range produces new and unexpected results.”
Applying
this principle in DyStar, the court ruled that a reference disclosing a
thirty-percent aqueous solution of leuco indigo renders obvious a
610
claimed range of ten to thirty-five percent. Also, it ruled that expert
testimony that a reference discloses a solution containing 5.1% alkali
and claim language from the reference disclosing at least 6.5% alkali
611
render obvious a claimed range of two to ten percent.
The Federal Circuit also addressed a threshold question as to what
references can serve as prior art for obviousness purposes. In one
case, the court noted that while a prior art reference must be enabled
612
to anticipate a claim, it need not be enabled to be used in an
613
In another, the court concluded that a
obviousness analysis.
Canadian patent application was valid prior art for obviousness
605. Id. at 989, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848.
606. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848.
607. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1378, 81
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
608. Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1309-11, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1931, 1940 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
609. Id. at 1311, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940.
610. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464
F.3d 1356, 1372, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
611. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
612. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, 457 F.3d 1293, 1306, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1705, 1714 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
613. Id. at 1307-08, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715-16 (noting its reason for remand
in a previous order in the same case) (citing Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel,
Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1357, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1417-18 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
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purposes, because a reasonably diligent person of ordinary skill in the
art could have located the application based on the information
614
In a third case, the court
provided in the patent issuing from it.
held that there was no evidence that a prior invention was suppressed
or concealed, which would exclude the device as prior art under 35
615
U.S.C. § 102(g)(2).
F.

Enablement

Section 112, paragraph one, requires a patent application to
describe the invention “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms so
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
616
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same . . . .”
“In order to enable the claims of a patent pursuant to § 112, the
patent specification must teach those of ordinary skill in the art ‘how
to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without
undue experimentation.’ Some experimentation is permissible
617
although it cannot be unduly excessive.”
In Falko-Gunter Falkner v.
618
the Federal Circuit explained that whether undue
Inglis,
experimentation is required is a
conclusion reached by weighing many factual considerations . . .
includ[ing] (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the
amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or
absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention,
(5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art,

614. Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1375, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1684, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding the application qualifies as a “printed
publication” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000)).
615. Flex-Rest, LLC v. Steelcase, Inc., 455 F.3d 1351, 1358-60, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1620, 1624-25 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that no evidence supports a jury
instruction that prior invention was abandoned, suppressed, or concealed, either
intentionally or by inference). The jury found the claims invalid for anticipation as
well as obviousness. Id. at 1354, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
616. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
617. Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., Inc., 449 F.3d 1209, 1224, 79
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094, 1104 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Bruning v. Hirose, 161 F.3d
681, 686, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1934, 1938 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). See Monsanto Co. v.
Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1338, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813, 1819 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(noting that the fact that some experimentation may be required does not invalidate
the patent); Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1365, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (accepting United States PTO Board of Patent
Appeals and Interference analysis that “the mere fact that experimentation may have
been difficult and time consuming does not mandate a conclusion that such
experimentation would have been considered ‘undue’ in this art”).
618. Id. 1357, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1006.
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(7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the
619
breadth of the claims.

“Enablement is a question of law involving underlying factual
620
The ultimate determination of enablement is reviewed
inquiries.”
621
de novo.
The Federal Circuit reviews jury determination of the
factual inquiries to determine whether substantial evidence supports
622
the verdict, and judge determinations of the inquiries for clear
623
error.
For decisions of the PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and
Interference, the court will “set aside actions of the Board if they are
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law, and . . . set aside factual findings that are
624
unsupported by substantial evidence.”
625
the Federal Circuit dealt with
In Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,
enablement in the context of genetic material. The Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of validity,
explaining that “because of the level of skill in the art and the
publicly available information about [the claimed genetic material],
no specific gene sequence needed to be claimed for someone of
ordinary skill in the art to understand how to make and use the
626
invention.”
The court also addressed the issue of undue
experimentation, holding that the “fact that some experimentation
may be necessary to produce the invention does not render the
627
[claims] invalid for lack of enablement.”
G. Utility
The Federal Circuit did not meaningfully address the utility
628
requirement of § 101 in any precedential opinions in 2006.
The
619. Id. at 1363, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. The court went on to note that
“[a] patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art.” Id.,
79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
620. Id. at 1363, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
621. Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 1320, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1713 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Enablement is a matter of law that
we review without deference . . .”).
622. Id. at 1320, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1713 (“[T]his court reviews the factual
underpinnings of enablement to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to
support a verdict by jury.”).
623. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1307, 79
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1715 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that “the underlying factual
inquiries made by the district court are reviewed for clear error” in dealing with the
issue of enablement with respect to an alleged anticipating reference).
624. Falko-Gunter Falkner, 448 F.3d at 1363, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
625. 459 F.3d 1328, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
626. Id. at 1338, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819.
627. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819.
628. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000 & Supp. 2005) (granting patent protection only to
“new and useful” inventions).
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court, however, considered the issue in Classified Cosmetics, Inc. v. Del
629
Laboratories, Inc., a non-precedential opinion in which the court
reversed and remanded for further proceedings the district court’s
630
grant of summary judgment in favor of the alleged infringer.
Under the § 101 utility requirement, an invention must be operable
631
to achieve useful results. In Classified Cosmetics, the Federal Circuit
noted that “[a] claim is inoperable when it contains a limitation that
632
is impossible to meet.”
The court ruled that the expert opinion
relied upon by the alleged infringer did not establish inoperability as
633
a matter of law.
In another case, Impax Laboratories, Inc. v. Aventis Pharmaceuticals
634
Inc., the Federal Circuit commented on the close relationship
635
between utility and enablement issues.
In Impax Labs., the court
considered, inter alia, whether a prior-art reference anticipated a
636
The court noted that, to anticipate, a prior art reference
claim.
637
must be enabling, and explained that “[p]rior art is not enabling so
as to be anticipating if it does not enable a person of ordinary skill in
638
The court, however, stressed
the art to carry out the invention.”
that “[t]he enablement requirement for prior art to anticipate under
[§ 102] does not require utility, unlike the enablement requirement
639
for patents under [§ 112].” The Federal Circuit vacated the district
court’s determination that the claims at issue were not invalid by
640
reason of anticipation. The court held that the effectiveness of the
prior art was not relevant to whether it was enabling for anticipation
purposes and remanded the issue to the district court to determine
whether the prior art satisfied the enablement requirement by
629. No. 06-1010, 2006 WL 3615511 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 12, 2006).
630. Id. at *3.
631. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 4.04 (2005) (adding that the inventor
must also disclose how an invention is operable, and an element of prior reduction
to practice).
632. Classified Cosmetics, slip op. at *2 (citing Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim
Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1359, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
633. Id.
634. 468 F.3d 1366, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see 3 DONALD S.
CHISUM, PATENTS § 7.03[6] (2005) (“There is a close relation between the how-to-use
aspect of the enablement requirement under Section 112 and the utility requirement
under Section 101.”).
635. 468 F.3d at 1381, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011-12.
636. See Impax Labs., 468 F.3d at 1380-83, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010-13.
637. Id. at 1381, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011-12.
638. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012.
639. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012 (citing Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1326, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1297, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[A]
prior art reference need not demonstrate utility in order to serve as an anticipating
reference under section 102.”)).
640. Id. at 1384, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014.
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describing the claimed invention sufficiently to permit a person of
641
ordinary skill in the art to carry it out.
642
an infringement and Fifth
In Zoltek Corp. v. United States,
Amendment Takings Clause case under the Tucker Act, Judge
Gajarsa wrote a concurring opinion in which he distinguished, as
643
“fundamentally different,” the concept of utility for a device from
644
that for a process.
As Judge Gajarsa explained, “[w]hereas utility
can be extracted from a device only after it has been ‘made,’ utility is
645
extracted from a process concurrent with its being ‘practiced.’”
H. Adequate Written Description
The requirement that a patent contain an adequate written
description of an invention is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1:
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it,
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
646
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

The purpose of the written description requirement is to ensure
that the scope of the exclusion right does not exceed the ambit of the
647
“[T]he applicant
inventor’s contribution to the field of art.
must . . . convey to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date
648
sought, he or she was in possession of the invention.”
Although
“‘reduction to practice ordinarily provides the best evidence that an
invention is complete[,] . . . it does not follow that proof of reduction
to practice is necessary in every case.’ . . . Pfaff makes clear that an
invention can be ‘complete’ even where an actual reduction to
641. Id. at 1383-84, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013-14.
642. 442 F.3d 1345, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
643. Id. at 1365, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
644. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495.
645. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495 (“Because a process is nothing more than
the sequence of actions of which it is comprised, the use of a process necessarily
involves doing or performing each of the steps recited. This is unlike use of a system
as a whole, in which the components are used collectively, not individually.”) (citing
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1763, 1790 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
646. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
647. See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1336, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813,
1818 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The written description requirement helps to ensure that the
patent applicant actually invented the claimed subject matter and was in possession
of the patented invention at the time of filing.”).
648. Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1365, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1001, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555,
1563-64, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

874

4/7/2007 11:15:24 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:4

649

practice is absent.”
Additionally, it is not necessary to provide
examples in the specification explicitly covering the claims as long as
the specification describes the claimed invention to one of ordinary
650
skill in the art.
The adequacy of a written description is “a question of fact, judged
from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art as of the
651
relevant filing date.”
The court reviews a trial court’s
652
determination for clear error.
In 2006, the Federal Circuit twice addressed the written description
requirement in the context of biotechnology inventions. The
653
invention in Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis related to making vaccines
safer by deleting or inactivating an essential gene from a viral vector’s
654
genome.
The case came to the Federal Circuit as an appeal by a
patentee who lost an interference; the subject matter of the
interference was specifically related to the case where the vector virus
655
was a poxvirus.
The court resolved whether the interference
winner’s application described the invention, addressing three
656
written description-related questions. First, it held that the absence
of examples involving poxviruses did not render the written
657
description inadequate. Second, it held that a patentee may meet
the written description requirement even without an actual reduction
658
to practice.
Third, it held that there is “no per se rule that an
adequate written description of an invention that involves a biological
659
macromolecule must contain a recitation of a known structure.”
The court explained that “where, as in this case, accessible literature
sources clearly provided, as of the relevant date, genes and their
nucleotide sequences . . ., satisfaction of the written description
649. Id. at 1367, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008 (quoting Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525
U.S. 55, 66 (1998)) (emphasis omitted).
650. Id. at 1366, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (“A claim will not be invalided . . .
simply because the embodiments of the specification do not contain examples
explicitly covering the full scope of the claim language . . . because the patent
specification is written for a person of skill in the art . . . .”) (quoting LizardTech,
Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, PTY, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1724, 1732 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
651. Id. at 1363, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005; see also Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S.,
Inc., 441 F.3d 963, 967, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(explaining that “compliance with the written description requirement is a question
of fact”).
652. Id. at 967, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
653. 448 F.3d 1357, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001.
654. Id. at 1360, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
655. Id. at 1359-60, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1001-02.
656. Id. at 1366, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
657. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
658. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
659. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
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requirement does not require either the recitation or incorporation
660
by reference . . . of such genes and sequences.”
661
In a second biotechnology case, Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, the
662
invention related to genetically modified soybean and cotton seeds.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment of no invalidity, ruling that the written description was
663
sufficient. The infringer argued that the asserted claims failed the
written description requirement for not disclosing specific gene
664
The court first stated a general rule for applying the
sequences.
requirement to inventions involving DNA: the disclosure must
provide “sufficiently detailed, relevant identifying characteristics . . .
i.e., complete or partial structure, other physical and/or chemical
properties, functional characteristics when coupled with a known or
disclosed correlation between function and structure, or some
665
combination of such characteristics.”
Then, as it did in Falko666
Gunter, the court found that “[g]iven the knowledge in the art, it
667
was unnecessary . . . to include specific gene sequences.”
I.

Best Mode

Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, a patent specification must set forth
the “best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
668
669
invention.” In Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., the
court stated the traditional two-part factual inquiry used to determine
670
compliance with the “best mode” requirement.
Under the
subjective prong of that inquiry, “[f]irst, the fact-finder must
determine whether at the time an applicant filed an application for a
patent, [the applicant] had a best mode of practicing the
671
invention.” Under the next, objective prong, “if the inventor had a
660. Id. at 1368, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008-09.
661. 459 F.3d 1328, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
662. Id. at 1332-33, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817.
663. Id. at 1332, 1337, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817-18.
664. Id. at 1337, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818.
665. Id. at 1336, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818 (quoting Enzo Biochem Inc. v. GenProbe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1613 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(citation omitted)).
666. See Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1365, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1001, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding, inter alia, that the patentee did not need to
provide examples or demonstrate actual reduction to practice to meet the written
description requirement).
667. Monsanto, 459 F.3d at 1337, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818.
668. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2005 & Supp. 2005).
669. 448 F.3d 1309, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
670. Id. at 1321, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714.
671. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714 (quoting Nobelpharma AB v. Implant
Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1064, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1101 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (citations omitted)).
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best mode of practicing the invention, the fact-finder must determine
whether the best mode was disclosed in sufficient detail to allow a
672
skilled artisan to practice it without undue experimentation.”
Old Town Canoe involved a challenge to a patent covering a
technique and device for making plastic laminate boat hulls by
673
rotational molding. The challenging party alleged that “at the time
of [the] filing of the patent application, the inventor had a preferred
way of using the invention” that was not disclosed, and further that “it
would not have been clear to a person of ordinary skill in the art”
674
how to implement the invention. In support of that allegation, the
challenging party offered a document, drafted by the inventor before
675
The
the patent filing, in which he described the process at issue.
Federal Circuit determined that a reasonable juror could have found
a violation of the “best mode” requirement, and vacated the district
court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law to the inventor on that
676
ground.
677
In Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., a jury found that
Vaughan had infringed a patent for a system of pumps in storage
tanks, and that Vaughan had failed to prove that the patent was
invalid. The district court denied Vaughan’s motion for judgment as
a matter of law on the issues of invalidity, infringement, and
678
willfulness.
In upholding that determination on the “best mode”
issue, the Federal Circuit pointed to evidence from the proponent of
the patent that the improvements alleged by Vaughan would not
change the patented process or invention, as well as evidence that the
alleged improvements did not need to be disclosed to a person of
679
ordinary skill in the art.
680
However, in Go Medical Industries Pty. Ltd. v. Inmed Corp., the
patent applicant was deemed to be in violation of the “best mode”
requirement. In its analysis of the first prong of the inquiry—
whether the inventor had a “best mode” for practicing the invention
when the patent application was filed—the court observed that the
patent applicant had altered his usage of the urinary catheter design
in dispute before he had filed the application with the PTO, and that
672. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714.
673. Id. at 1312, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707.
674. Id. at 1320, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
675. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
676. Id. at 1321, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714.
677. 449 F.3d 1209, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 75
U.S.L.W. 3263 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2006).
678. Id. at 1213, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1096.
679. Id. at 1224, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104.
680. 471 F.3d 1264, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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he considered the new usage “the preferred embodiment at that
681
stage.” As for the objective component of the inquiry, the applicant
682
did not clearly disclose the preferred design. On the basis of these
rulings, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment and its determination of invalidity for failure to
683
meet the “best mode” requirement.
J.

Indefiniteness

A determination of whether a claim adequately recites the subject
matter of a claimed invention and is sufficiently definite to satisfy 35
U.S.C. § 112 is a legal conclusion that the Federal Circuit reviews de
684
novo. A patent is presumed valid, and the party asserting invalidity
as to any claim of a patent bears the burden of establishing it by clear
685
and convincing evidence.
686
If a claim cannot be construed, it is indefinite under § 112.
However, if a claim is amenable to construction, “even though the
task may be formidable and the conclusion may be one over which
687
reasonable persons will disagree,” the claim is not indefinite. Claim
definiteness is analyzed “not in a vacuum, but always in light of the
teachings of the prior art and of the particular application disclosure
as it would be interpreted by one possessing the ordinary level of skill
688
in the pertinent art.”
689
In Energizer Holdings v. International Trade Commission, a case
concerning a patent for mercury-free alkaline batteries, the patent
was found to be invalid for indefiniteness by the U.S. International
Trade Commission on the grounds that the term “said zinc anode” in
690
a claim had no antecedent basis.
The requirement of antecedent
basis is a rule of patent drafting, administered during patent
691
examination.
The Federal Circuit noted that “[t]he Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure states that ‘[o]bviously, however, the
681. Id. at 1271, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1634.
682. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633.
683. Id. at 1272, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633.
684. Aero Prods. Int’l Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp., 466 F.3d 1000, 1015, 80
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1491 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
685. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490-91.
686. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490-91.
687. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491 (citing Exxon Res. & Eng’g Co. v. United
States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
688. Energizer Holdings v. Int’l Trade Comm., 435 F.3d 1366, 1370, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1625, 1628 (Fed Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235, 169
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 236, 238 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
689. Id. at 1366, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1625.
690. Id. at 1370, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628.
691. Id. at 1370, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626.
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failure to provide explicit antecedent basis for terms does not always
692
render a claim indefinite.’” The court then made clear that where
the meaning of the claim would reasonably be understood by persons
of ordinary skill when read in light of the specification, the claim is
not subject to invalidity from the patent-drafting protocol of
693
“antecedent basis.”
Despite the absence of an explicit antecedent
basis for the term at issue, the court held that the claim could be
construed by implication and that “a claim that is amenable to
694
construction is not invalid on the ground of indefiniteness.”
695
In Aero Products International Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp., the
Federal Circuit considered whether the terms “complete hermetic
seal” and “substantially hermetic seal” appearing in a claim
696
containing only one seal rendered that claim indefinite. Both the
district court and Federal Circuit accepted Aero’s explanation that
the term “complete hermetic seal” referred to the mechanical
completeness of the seal, while the term “substantially hermetic seal”
referred to the quality of the seal, and determined that “[t]hese terms
when read in combination and in light of the specification of the
[patent], would be understandable to a person of ordinary skill in the
697
art.”
Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp. was an appeal from a district court’s
holding that a patent for a computerized handwritten text
interpretation system was invalid for indefiniteness. The Federal
Circuit reversed, stating that the term “sloppiness space,” and
accompanying
descriptions,
“[w]hile
not
rigorously
precise[,] . . . provide adequate guidance . . . particularly in light of
698
articulating a more exact standard for the concept.”

692. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628, (citing MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2173.05(e) (8th ed. Rev. 2, May 2004)).
693. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628 (“Whether this claim, despite lack of
explicit antecedent basis for ‘said zinc anode,’ nonetheless has a reasonably
ascertainable meaning must be decided in context.”).
694. Id. at 1371, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628; see id. at 1371, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1628 (holding that “the term ‘anode gel’ is by implication the antecedent
basis for ‘said zinc anode’”).
695. 466 F.3d 1000, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
696. Id. at 1009, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
697. Id. at 1016, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
698. Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 458 F.3d 1310, 1323, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1916,
1927 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Bancorp Servs. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367,
1371, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1996, 1998 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that a claim will not
be held invalid if the “meaning of the claim is discernable, even though the task may
be formidable and the conclusion may be one over which reasonable persons will
disagree”)).
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K. Dependent Claims
The statutory requirements for dependent claims are set forth in
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 4:
Subject to the following paragraph, a claim in dependent form
shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then
specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim
in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference
699
all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.
700

In 2006, for the first time, the Federal Circuit held a claim invalid
for failing to meet the requirements of this section, as the dependent
claim at issue, claim six, did not “narrow the scope” of the dependent
claim to which it directly depended, claim two; “instead, the two
701
claims deal[t] with non-overlapping subject matter.”
While the
court recognized that “the patentee was attempting to claim what
might otherwise have been patentable subject matter” and “claim
[six] could have been properly drafted either as dependent from
claim [one] or as an independent claim,” it explained that it “‘should
702
not rewrite claims to preserve validity.’”
The court explained that
invoking the fourth paragraph of § 112 as an invalidating provision
“does not exalt form over substance,” and “is consistent with the
overall statutory scheme that requires applicants to satisfy certain
requirements before obtaining a patent, some of which are more
703
procedural or technical than others.”

699. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
700. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1291-92, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1583, 1589 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (agreeing with the district court that at the time
the district court wrote its opinion, “there was no applicable Federal Circuit
precedent,” and noting that after the district court decision, the Federal Circuit
issued an opinion where it “suggested that a violation of a § 112 ¶ 4 renders a patent
invalid”). In the prior opinion that suggested such invalidity, Curtiss-Wright Flow
Control Corp. v. Velan Inc., the court did not actually hold a patent invalid under § 112
¶ 4, but merely suggested it might be possible. 438 F.3d 1374, 1380, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1988, 1993 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Note: Two of the authors were counsel to
Pfizer, Inc. in this case.
701. Pfizer, 457 F.3d at 1291, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589.
702. Id. at 1292, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590 (quoting Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Arm Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1368, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1458, 1461 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
703. Id. at 1292, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590. The court also cited to 35 U.S.C.
§ 282(3), noting that “‘[i]nvalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to
comply with any requirement of sections 112 or 251 of this title’ is expressly included
among the available defenses to an infringement suit.” Id. at 1292, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1589-90 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 282(3) (2000)).
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L. Patent Ownership
704

An issue of standing to sue in a patent case is a jurisdictional one,
705
and one that the Federal Circuit reviews de novo. “A patentee shall
706
The
have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.”
term “patentee encompasses not only the patentee to whom the
707
patent was issued but also to the successors in title to the patentee.”
A patentee may transfer title to a patent by assignment, and the
assignee may be deemed the effective patentee under § 285 for
708
purposes of standing to sue another for patent infringement.
While a licensee normally does not have standing to sue without
joinder of the patentee, an exclusive license may amount to an
assignment if it conveys to the licensee all substantial rights to the
709
patent at issue. As the Federal Circuit stated in Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v.
710
Miracle Optics, Inc., “the essential issue regarding the right to sue on
711
a patent is who owns the patent.”
In Aspex Eyewear, the Federal Circuit found that Contour (the
licensor) transferred to Chic (the licensee) certain rights with respect
712
to a patented eyeglass frame. Chic, the licensee, received: (1) the
exclusive right to make, use, and sell products covered by the patent,
(2) the right to sue for infringement of the patent, and (3) a virtually
713
unrestricted authority to sublicense its rights under the agreement.
Despite the transfer of these rights, the court held that the agreement
“did not constitute a transfer of all substantial rights to the
714
715
[patent]” and hence it was not an assignment.
The Federal
Circuit held that the licensee’s rights, “however substantial in other
respects, were unquestionably valid for only a limited period of time”
716
pursuant to the licensing agreement.
Because the licensor would
regain all of the rights under the patent as of a specific date, it
remained the “unquestioned owner of the patent”—it had conferred
717
a limited license, not an assignment, of the patent.
704. See also supra notes 172-83, and accompanying text..
705. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1339, 77
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
706. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2000)).
707. Id. at 1340, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 100(d)
(2000)).
708. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
709. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
710. 434 F.3d 1336, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456.
711. Id. at 1341, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.
712. Id. at 1342, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.
713. Id. at 1338, 1341, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457, 1460.
714. Id. at 1341, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.
715. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.
716. Id. at 1342, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.
717. Id. at 1342-43, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460-61.
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Aspex Eyewear distinguished the license agreement from an
exclusive license with all substantial rights that was only defeasible in
the event of a default or bankruptcy, or some other condition
718
subsequent.
In holding that the licensee, Chic, did not have
standing to sue for patent infringement despite the clear wording of
the contract, the Federal Circuit referred to its decision in Vaupel
Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., stating that “while
considering the importance of an agreement’s right to sue provision,
we noted the public policy in favor of preventing multiple lawsuits on
719
the same patent against the same accused infringer.”
The court
expressed concern that if it considered Chic an assignee instead of a
licensee, Chic could assert that patent against an accused infringer
during the term of the agreement without Contour’s (the
licensor/assignor) participation in the lawsuit, leaving Contour
unconstrained by principles of collateral estoppel or res judicata to
later assert the patent against the same accused infringer once the
720
agreement expired. Conversely, the court undertook to prevent, as
a matter of policy, a party with lesser rights from bringing a lawsuit
that may put the licensed patent at risk of being held invalid or
721
unenforceable without the involvement of the patentee. Citing its
722
opinion in Evident Corp. v. Church & Dwight Co., the Federal Circuit
stated that “policy counsels against allowing Chic, who only putatively
had rights under the patent for a limited time, to bring a patent
infringement action without Contour, who would own the patent
rights for a much longer period of time, and thereby unilaterally
723
jeopardize Contour’s future enjoyment of the [patent].”
M. Inequitable Conduct
Patent applicants have a duty of candor and good faith when
making disclosures to the PTO, “including a duty to disclose
information known to the applicants to be material to
724
patentability.” If an application contains a false material fact or an
affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact (or omits a material
718. Id. at 1342, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
719. Id. at 1343, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461 (citing Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG
v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875-76, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1045,
1048-49 (Fed. Cir. (1991)).
720. Id. at 1343, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
721. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461 (citing Evident Corp. v. Church & Dwight
Co., 399 F.3d 1310, 1314, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910, 1912-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
722. 399 F.3d 1310, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910.
723. Id. at 1343, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
724. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm., L.P., 438 F.3d 1123, 1128, 77
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1771 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
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fact), and if this defective disclosure is made with an intent to deceive
or mislead the PTO, a court may set aside the application or find the
725
patent invalid on the grounds of inequitable conduct.
A threshold showing of inequitable conduct must be made by clear
and convincing evidence, both as to the materiality and intent
726
requirements.
Once this threshold is satisfied, the court must
weigh the evidence “to determine whether the equities warrant a
727
conclusion that inequitable conduct occurred.” The inquiries into
materiality and intent are not independent; that is, when a
misrepresentation or omission is highly material, less evidence of
728
intent is required. Likewise, “the less material the information, the
729
If the district court makes findings
greater the proof must be.”
after a trial, factual findings regarding materiality and intent are
reviewed for clear error, while the overall finding of inequitable
730
conduct is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
At the summary
731
judgment stage, all rulings on the issue of inequitable conduct are
732
reviewed de novo.
The standard for the materiality of a misrepresentation or omission
733
is set forth in PTO rule 56. Under this rule, a misrepresentation or
omission is material when it is not cumulative of information already
given, and it “establishes, by itself or in combination with other
information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim, . . . [or]
refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes
in . . . [o]pposing an argument of unpatentability relied upon by the
734
[PTO], . . . or [when] asserting an argument of patentability.”
As for the intent requirement, “the involved conduct, viewed in the
light of all the evidence, including evidence of good faith, must
indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to
735
deceive.”
Although a finding of intent does not require direct

725. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
726. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
727. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
728. Id. at 1128-29, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
729. Id. at 1129, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
730. Digital Control Inc. v. The Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313, 77
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1826 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
731. See also supra notes 291-316, and accompanying text.
732. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826.
733. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2006). This rule was amended on January 17, 1992, and
the current discussion reflects the amended standard. See Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed.
Reg. 2,021 (Jan. 17, 1992) (incorporating the prima facie elements of unpatentability
into the section 1.56(b) standard).
734. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b).
735. M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., Inc., 439 F.3d 1335,
1341, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1229, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
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736

evidence, and may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of
the patent application, there still must be a factual basis for a finding
737
of intent. Thus, “intent to deceive cannot be inferred simply from
the decision to withhold the reference where the reasons given for
738
the withholding are plausible.”
739
In Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Federal
Circuit considered whether the patentee of OxyContin® pain
medication had engaged in inequitable conduct when it represented
to the PTO that it had “surprisingly discovered” that its medication
was effective over a four-fold dosage range instead of an eight-fold
dosage range, without disclosing that it based this discovery on
740
insight rather than scientific proof. The Federal Circuit declined to
disturb the district court’s finding of materiality, given the applicant’s
use of language that “suggested the existence of clinical results
741
supporting the reduced dosage range.”
However, the Federal
Circuit vacated the district court’s finding of intent because it had
considered documents prepared in the course of the FDA approval
process (and not designated for the patent application), and because
it failed to properly balance the low level of materiality of this
742
evidence in its intent calculus.
743
In Digital Control Inc. v. The Charles Machine Works, an applicant
was found guilty of inequitable conduct by virtue of misstatements
744
made in his rule 131 declaration, and a failure to appropriately

736. Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm. Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1375, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1001, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
737. L & W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc., 471 F.3d 1311, 1321, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1198
(Fed. Cir. 2006); M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, 439 F.3d at 1341, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1234.
738. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1382, 81
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
739. 438 F.3d 1123, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
740. Id. at 1130, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
741. Id. at 1133, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774; see id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1774 (noting that the level of materiality was not especially high, in that the applicant
had not expressly misrepresented that it had obtained experimental results supporting
the claims but merely “impl[ied] that an empirical basis existed for its discovery”).
742. See id. at 1134-35, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775 (“In a case such as this, when
the materiality of the undisclosed information is relatively low, there is less basis for
inferring intent from materiality alone.”). The district court was directed to
reconsider its intent finding, and if a threshold showing of intent were to be found
on remand, to reweigh the factors of materiality and intent in determining whether
the sanction of inequitable conduct was appropriate. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1775.
743. 437 F.3d 1309, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
744. A declaration under PTO Rule 131 is a sworn statement that an invention
predates a prior art reference. 37 C.F.R. § 1.131; see Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1312,
77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826 (affirming a district court determination of inequitable
conduct predicated upon material misstatements made in a rule 131 declaration).
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745

disclose prior art.
Although the Federal Circuit agreed that the
applicant had made material misrepresentations in connection with
his rule 131 declaration, in that it contained a number of false
statements (such as a demonstration of the invention which did not
occur), it vacated the district court’s finding of inequitable conduct
because it was based both on the rule 131 declaration and non746
disclosure of prior art. With regard to the latter issue, the Federal
Circuit held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether
the applicant’s disclosures cumulated the allegedly omitted prior art,
such that the lower court improperly decided the issue on a summary
747
judgment motion.
748
In M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., the Federal
Circuit considered whether a district court appropriately found an
intent to deceive when no direct or circumstantial evidence indicated
that the applicants had intentionally withheld prior art, and when the
749
applicants insisted they had been unaware of its relevance.
The
district court found inequitable conduct because the applicants had
not shown that their failure to disclose the prior art was inadvertent,
750
and did not proffer a good faith explanation for their failure.
However, the Federal Circuit ruled that the patentee’s lack of a good
faith explanation did not rise to the level of an intent to deceive the
751
PTO, and vacated the lower court’s finding.
752
In Kao Corp. v. Unilever United States, Inc., the district court found
that although the inventing entity had made material omissions when
753
it “selectively disclosed only the most positive available data,” the
applicant lacked the intent to deceive because it eventually supplied
the omitted data to the PTO—even though the supplemental
745. Id. at 1319, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831.
746. Id. at 1318-19, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833.
747. See id. at 1317, 1319, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826, 1829 (stating generally
that it is difficult to decide the scope of prior art at the summary-judgment stage in
that it is an inherently fact-intensive inquiry).
748. 439 F.3d 1335, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
749. See id. at 1340-41, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
750. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
751. See id. at 1343, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236 (reiterating that there must be a
factual basis for a finding of intent, whether direct or circumstantial). The Federal
Circuit observed that “[t]he district court’s finding of inequitable conduct based on
the non-disclosure of the Model 220 essentially amounted to a finding of strict
liability for nondisclosure . . . [s]uch is not the law.” Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1236.
752. 441 F.3d 963, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
753. Id. at 971, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263. The inventors failed to disclose that
they had also tested a product variant, and did not reveal their margin for testing
error, while affirmatively (and untruthfully) asserting that “there is no reason to
expect any significant difference . . . for other polymers within the claimed genus.”
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
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754

disclosure occurred over one year after the original application.
The Federal Circuit ruled that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in making this determination, stating that “although there
certainly was evidence from which the trial court could have
concluded that [the applicant] acted with intent to deceive, we are
755
very reluctant to question the judgment of the finder of fact.”
756
In Atofina v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., the Federal Circuit
reviewed a district court finding that a patent for the manufacture of
757
The
difluoromethane was invalid due to inequitable conduct.
district court found that the patent applicants had an English
translation of a Japanese publication that included every limitation of
758
the claims contained in the patent, and that the applicants had
misrepresented and mischaracterized the Japanese publication to the
759
PTO.
However, the Federal Circuit held that the district court
clearly erred in its findings and therefore abused its discretion when
760
it found inequitable conduct. Noting parenthetically that “the duty
at issue in this case is the duty of candor, not the duty of
761
translation,” the court ruled that the disclosures actually made to
the PTO were consistent with the full translation of the Japanese
documents, noting only minor and immaterial discrepancies (such as
the use of the descriptor “mainly” versus the undisclosed term
762
“chiefly”).
763
the
In Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp.,
challenging party alleged that a patent applicant’s usage of a
technique for manufacturing canoes before filing for patent
protection constituted inequitable conduct, and also demonstrated a
failure to disclose the “best mode” of practicing the manufacture
764
technique.
In rejecting this argument and affirming the district
court, the Federal Circuit stated that “since the failure to disclose the
754. See id. at 972, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
755. Id. at 971-71, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263. The Federal Circuit noted in
dicta that “[g]iven a blank slate, we might weigh the evidence differently [than did
the district court].” Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
756. 441 F.3d 991, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
757. Id. at 992, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418.
758. Id. at 995, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420. According to the district court, that
the publication anticipated every claim satisfied the materiality requirement. Id., 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420.
759. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420. According to the district court, this
misrepresentation and mischaracterization amply demonstrated the required intent.
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420.
760. Id. at 1003, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426.
761. Id. at 1001, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425 (citation omitted).
762. Id. at 1002, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1417.
763. 448 F.3d 1309, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
764. Id. at 1321-22, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714-15.
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best mode is not excused even if unintentional, but inequitable
conduct requires a ‘threshold’ level of intent, the failure to disclose
the best mode will not constitute inequitable conduct in every
765
case.” In this case, since no evidence of intent to deceive the PTO
766
was alleged, the claim of inequitable conduct necessarily failed.
767
In Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., the analysis again turned
on intent to deceive, and the court again decided in favor of the party
seeking to defend the validity of a patent from allegations of
inequitable conduct. Although the Federal Circuit disagreed with
768
the district court’s reasoning on the materiality issue, it ruled that
the district court did not commit reversible error in finding that the
769
patentee did not act with an intent to deceive.
However, the court found an intent to deceive and upheld a
determination of inequitable conduct in Agfa Corp. v. Creo Products,
770
Inc.
Specifically, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s
finding that there were numerous instances of intentionally
undisclosed prior art and the patent applicant’s position was
771
inconsistent with the undisclosed prior art.
Additional evidence
supported that determination, including that the applicant had
submitted misleading answers to direct queries by the patent
examiner, and had “admitted that he could not have made the
arguments he did make in response to the Examiner’s request if he
772
had disclosed the [prior art].”
773
In Kemin Foods L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales Del Centro S.A. de C.V., a
patent challenger argued that an article in a trade journal constituted
prior art in that it “[taught] all the limitations of claim [one] of the
765. Id. at 1322, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715.
766. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714-15.
767. 449 F.3d 1209, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 75
U.S.L.W. 3263 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2006).
768. Id. at 1226-27, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106 (noting that the inventor had
used previous iterations of a design for pumps in storage tanks, before seeking to
patent the design). The challenging party alleged that these iterations constituted
prior art which were required to have been disclosed. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1106. The Federal Circuit stated that “[t]he [district] court focused on whether the
prior installations actually embody the invention, when the correct analysis asks
whether a reasonable examiner would find it important”. Id. at 1226-27, 79
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.
769. See id. at 1227, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106 (declining to reweigh the
credibility of testimony from the patent applicant on the issue of intent to deceive,
and reminding that the applicant asserted that he lacked awareness of the need to
disclose the prior iterations because they were not “embodiments of the invention
and were similar to other disclosures”).
770. 451 F.3d 1366, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
771. Id. at 1377, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392.
772. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393.
773. 464 F.3d 1339, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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774

[patent].” The challenger further argued that the patent applicant
knew of this article and of its materiality to the patent prosecution,
775
and withheld the article from the PTO with deceptive intent. The
district court found that the article was not “highly” material, because
there was “little persuasive . . . evidence [that] the method disclosed
776
[in the article] actually produces the composition disclosed.”
On
the issue of intent, the district court found credible the patent
applicant’s testimony that he believed the trade journal article to be
merely another paper that was irrelevant to the prosecution of the
777
patent.
The Federal Circuit declined to disturb these findings on
778
appeal.
779
Lastly, in Eli Lilly and Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit reviewed a finding by the district court that
inequitable conduct had not occurred. The challenger argued that
the patent applicant had made different (but not inconsistent)
statements to Swedish authorities and to the PTO, in response to
780
questions regarding the effects of a pharmaceutical.
These
statements and other alleged non-disclosures were not deemed
“material omission[s] nor done with an intent to deceive,” because
781
the PTO had received all of the information it had requested.
N. Inventorship
The Federal Circuit adheres to the principle that one must
“contribute to the conception of an invention” to be considered an
782
inventor for purposes of a patent claim. “Conception is defined as
‘the formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and
permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it [will]
783
be applied in practice.’” Furthermore, the process of conception is
only “complete when ‘the idea is so clearly defined in the inventor’s
mind that only ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the
774. Id. at 1344, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388.
775. Id. at 1345, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
776. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
777. Id. at 1346, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390.
778. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390.
779. 471 F.3d 1369, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
780. Id. at 1382, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333 (detailing that while the Swedish
Board had inquired about idiosyncratic blood toxicity as the inventor sought to
conduct human clinical studies in Scandinavia, the PTO had inquired only about
blood cholesterol levels).
781. Id. at 1383, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334.
782. Stern v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 434 F.3d 1375, 1378, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1702, 1704 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating further that “conception is the touchstone of
inventorship”).
783. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (internal citations omitted).
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invention
to
practice,
without
extensive
research
or
784
A putative joint inventor must have
experimentation.’”
corroborating evidence of his alleged contribution to the conception
785
of an invention.
Inventorship itself is “a question of law that is
reviewed de novo,” but factual findings made in connection with an
analysis of an inventorship claim are reviewed for clear error if made
786
after a trial.
787
In Stern v. Trustees of Columbia University, a Columbia professor
employed a research assistant to investigate the effects of
prostaglandins on the intraocular pressure of various animals. The
research assistant’s efforts helped establish that topical application of
prostaglandins reduced intraocular pressure (“IOP”) in rhesus
788
monkeys and cats.
After the assistant’s departure from the
university, the professor’s work eventually led to the issuance of a
patent for glaucoma treatment, and the assistant challenged the
789
patent on the basis of joint inventorship.
The research assistant’s claim of co-ownership failed for several
790
First, his experiments were duplicative of the professor’s
reasons.
791
earlier work.
In addition, the court found that the assistant “did
not have an understanding of the claimed invention,” that he “did
not conceive of the idea of the use of prostaglandins to reduce IOP in
primates,” and that “there was no collaboration between [the
792
assistant and the professor] in developing a glaucoma treatment.”
The claimant also proffered no corroborated evidence of co793
ownership.
794
In Cook Biotech Inc. v. Acell, Inc., the district court found that the
named inventor had already completed his invention by the time he
had engaged in discussions with the purported joint inventor on the
topic, and that those discussions had not “contributed in [a]
795
significant manner” to the invention—thus necessarily precluding a
784. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (internal citations omitted).
785. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (explaining that unwitnessed laboratory
books and journals are insufficient on their own to corroborate a claim of
inventorship).
786. Cook Biotech Inc. v. Acell, Inc., 460 F.3d 1365, 1373, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865, 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
787. 434 F.3d at 1377, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703.
788. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703.
789. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703.
790. Id. at 1378, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
791. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
792. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
793. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
794. See Cook Biotech Inc. v. Acell, Inc., 460 F.3d 1365, 1381, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1876 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
795. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
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796

finding of joint inventorship.
The district court’s rulings on these
797
issues were affirmed by the Federal Circuit.
O. Double Patenting
798

In Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., Sanofi successfully obtained a
preliminary injunction against Apotex on the basis of an
infringement of its patent for clopidogrel bisulfate, a pharmaceutical
designed to inhibit blood platelet aggregation and reduce the risk of
799
heart attack or stroke. Apotex appealed the district court’s grant of
a preliminary injunction, alleging that the patent was invalid on a
number of grounds, including obviousness and obviousness-type
800
double patenting.
In considering Apotex’s claim that the district
court had “committed clear error in concluding that the double
patenting inquiry was subsumed by the broader obviousness
801
inquiry,” the Federal Circuit pointed out that Apotex had “fail[ed]
to set forth any arguments on appeal that raise[d] a substantial
question with respect to the validity of claim 3 based on that defense,”
802
and declined to reverse the grant of the preliminary injunction.
Due to this infirmity on appeal, the court did not address Apotex’s
contention that “an obviousness inquiry is distinct from the double
803
patenting inquiry and should have been independently analyzed.”
P. Recapture Doctrine
804

In Medtronic, Inc. v. Guidant Corp., the Federal Circuit considered
whether certain claims of a reissue patent were “invalid by reason of
violation of the rule against recapturing surrendered subject
805
matter.”
The court explained that 35 U.S.C. § 251 permits a
patentee to broaden the scope of an existing patent to include
806
subject matter that had been erroneously excluded from the patent.
796. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
797. Id. at 1382, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
798. 470 F.3d 1368, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
799. Id. at 1372, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099.
800. Id. at 1374, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100.
801. Id. at 1380, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104.
802. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105.
803. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104.
804. 465 F.3d 1360, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1558 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
805. Id. at 1364, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560. The court also considered the
issue in Kim v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 465 F.3d 1312, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495 (Fed.
Cir. 2006), and Medrad, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Group L.P., 466 F.3d 1047, 80
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526 (Fed. Cir. 2006), which are discussed below.
806. See 465 F.3d at 1372, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 251)
(finding the reissue of a patent permissible where “the patent is, through error
‘without any deceptive intention, deemed wholly or partly inoperative or
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The Federal Circuit recognized that this rule “is ‘based on
fundamental principles of equity and fairness, and should be
807
construed liberally.’” The court further recognized that “attorney[]
failure to appreciate the full scope of [an] invention” is one of the
most common sources of patent defect and that such error is
808
generally sufficient to justify reissue.
Reissue proceedings, however, cannot be used to obtain subject
matter that could not have been included in the original patent.
Under the “recapture” rule, the deliberate surrender of a claim to
certain subject matter during the original prosecution of the
application for the patent “made in an effort to overcome a prior art
rejection” is not such “error” as will allow the patentee to recapture
809
that subject matter in a reissue. The court explained that surrender
810
can occur by argument or amendment.
The Federal Circuit applied the three-step analysis for the
recapture rule: (1) “whether, and in what respect, the reissue claims
are broader in scope than the original patent claims;” (2) “whether
the broader aspects of the reissue claims relate to subject matter
surrendered in the original prosecution;” and (3) “whether the
reissue claims were materially narrowed in other respects . . . [to]
811
avoid the recapture rule.” The court noted that whether the claims
of a reissued patent violate § 251 is a question of law, however, the
legal conclusion of whether a particular applicant has met the
statutory requirements of § 251 is based on underlying findings of
fact, which the court will sustain unless they are shown to be clearly
812
erroneous.
In Medtronic, the challenger argued that the reissue patent
improperly recaptured two subject matters covered in the claims at
813
issue.
The Federal Circuit recognized that the first subject matter
was disclosed in the initial patent application, but was removed
814
before filing.
The court explained that cancellation “alone does
invalid, . . . by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to
claim in the patent. . . .’”).
807. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (quoting Hester Indus., Inc. v. Stein,
Inc., 142 F.3d 1472, 1479, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1647 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
808. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (quoting In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516,
1519, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 369, 371 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (other citations omitted)).
809. See id. at 1372-73, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (quoting In re Clement, 131
F.3d 1464, 1468-69, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
810. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
811. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (quoting N. Am. Container, Inc. v.
Plastipak Packaging, Inc., 415 F.3d 1335, 1349, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1556
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
812. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (citations omitted).
813. See id. at 1370, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564.
814. See id. at 1375, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
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815

not mean that the [subject matter] was surrendered.”
Whether
recapture applies is fact-specific and depends “particularly on the
816
The Federal Circuit concluded that
reasons for the cancellation.”
“no deliberate surrender of subject matter to obtain allowance of the
claims” occurred, because the prosecution history made clear that
neither the examiner nor the prosecuting attorney considered the
817
subject matter a part of the invention.
The court agreed with the
district court that, because the claims at issue were not amended over
prior art and because the amendments were clarifying amendments,
there was no clear admission that the amended claims were not
818
patentable.
On the second issue, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district
court that the amendment was never disclosed in the original
application, and that it thus it could not have been surrendered by
819
amendment. The Federal Circuit noted that during prosecution of
the original claim, the patentee’s attorney argued that the art at issue
820
was distinguishable and more narrow from prior art.
“[W]hen a
reissue claim, while broader in certain respects than the original
patent claim, is materially narrowed in other respects, the recapture
821
rule does not apply.”
The court affirmed the district court’s
determination and held that the reissue patent was not invalid,
because the subject matter of the claims at issue was not surrendered
by amendment or by argument during the prosecution of the original
822
patent application.
823
In another case, Kim v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed, in pertinent part, the district court’s determination that
824
The court held that the
certain patent claims were not invalid.
patentee’s amending limitations were not added to overcome
825
rejection. In so holding, the court applied only the second step of
the three-step recapture rule, because the patentee conceded that the
815. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
816. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
817. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568 (“This is the kind of inadvertence that the
reissue doctrine was meant to remedy.”). The Federal Circuit also agreed with the
district court that the patentee’s attorney did not surrender the subject matter by
argument. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1568.
818. Id. at 1375-76, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
819. Id. at 1377, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569.
820. Id. at 1378, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
821. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570 (citing N. Am. Container, 415 F.3d 1335,
1349, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (BNA) 1556 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
822. Id. at 1379, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571.
823. 465 F.3d 1312, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
824. Id. at 1316, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496.
825. Id. at 1323-24, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
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reissue claims were broader than the original patented claims.
Thus, the Federal Circuit considered only whether the broader
827
aspects of the claims concerned surrendered subject matter.
Notably, the court rejected the patentee’s argument for increased
deference due to her pro se status during some parts of the
prosecution and her argument “that she was not responsible for the
828
original amendment made with her acquiescence by the examiner.”
The Federal Circuit reiterated the well-established rule that the
challenger to a reissue patent must establish surrender “by clear and
829
convincing evidence.”
The court, however, rejected the district
court’s suggestion that the patentee’s subjective intent bears on the
surrender determination. The Federal Circuit noted:
Some of our recapture decisions explain that “error under the
reissue statute does not include a deliberate decision to surrender
specific subject matter in order to overcome prior art,” and that the
prerequisite error for a reissue can exist if “there is no evidence
that the applicant intentionally omitted or abandoned the claimed
830
subject matter.”

The court, however, made it clear that “these cases do not suggest
that the patentee’s subjective intent is pertinent to the question of
surrender,” but rather “simply distinguish between a patentee’s
inadvertent ‘error’ (for which the reissue statute provides a remedy),
and a patentee’s ‘surrender’ (for which the recapture rule prevents a
831
reissue).”
832
Finally, in Medrad, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Group LP, the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of
833
In Medrad, the patentee filed an application for reissue
invalidity.
stating that it had claimed less than it had a right to claim in the
834
original application (an “underclaiming” error).
“During
prosecution of the reissue, [the patentee] narrowed the scope of
various claims (correcting an ‘overclaiming’ error) and corrected
835
inventorship in addition to correcting the underclaiming error.”
826. Id. at 1322, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
827. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
828. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
829. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
830. Id. at 1322, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501 (quoting, respectively, Mentor
Corp. v. Coloplast, Inc., 998 F.2d 992, 996, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1521, 1525 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) and Ball Corp. v. United States, 729 F.2d 1429, 1435, 221 U.S.P.Q. 289,
294 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
831. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501-02 (citation omitted).
832. 466 F.3d 1047, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
833. Id. at 1049, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526-27.
834. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
835. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
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The patentee, however, failed to “submit supplemental reissue
declarations regarding the overclaiming or inventorship errors as
836
required by 37 C.F.R. § 1.175.”
The district court ruled that the reissue patent was invalid because
the error that the patentee corrected was “procedural,” and not one
837
of the four errors statutorily defined by § 251.
At issue on appeal
was whether the language of § 251 limits corrections to the
specifications, drawings, or claims; or whether the statute permits the
838
correction of any defect that results in invalidity.
The Federal
Circuit stressed that § 251 “is remedial in nature, based on
fundamental principles of equity and fairness, and should be
839
construed liberally.”
The court then ruled that § 251 provides for
the correction of all errors made without deceptive intent.
Although such an error may result from the language used in a
claim, the express terms of the statute do not refer only to errors in
the claim language itself . . . . Rather, the highlighted language in
section 251 can be read to encompass any error that causes a
840
patentee to claim more or less than he had a right to claim.

The Federal Circuit held that the language in § 251—“by reason of
the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to claim in the
patent”—does not require that the error occur in the actual language
841
of the claims.

836. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
837. See id. at 1049-50, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527. On motion for summary
judgment, the patent challenger argued that the reissue was defective pursuant to
§ 251 because it did not correct one of four statutorily defined errors: (1) a defect in
the specification; (2) a defect in the drawings; (3) an overclaiming error; or (4) an
underclaiming error. Id. at 1049, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525. The district “court
construed section 251 as requiring ‘that some error in the specification, drawings, or
a claim of the patent be corrected as a result of the reissue process.’” Id., 80
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525 (citing Medrad Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Group LP, 391 F.
Supp. 2d 374, 378 (W.D. Pa. 2005)).
838. See id. at 1050-51, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528. Specifically, at issue was the
phrase “by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to claim
in the patent.” Id. at 1051, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528.
839. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528 (citing In re Weiler, 790 F.2d 1576, 1579,
229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
840. Id. at 1052, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529.
841. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529. The Federal Circuit refused to consider
additional arguments raised by the challenger concerning compliance with reissue
regulations 37 C.F.R. § 1.171-.179, which require an applicant to file an oath or
declaration with an application for reissue. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529.
Because the district court did not reach this issue, the Federal Circuit declined to
consider it in the first instance and noted that it would be more appropriately
addressed by the district court on remand. See id. at 1052-53, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1530.
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IV. INFRINGEMENT
“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention, within the United States . . . during the term of
842
the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”
“[P]atent infringement
843
First, the claim must be properly
analysis involves two steps.”
844
interpreted or “construed” to determine its meaning and scope.
Second, a court should compare the properly construed claim to the
accused product to determine whether the accused product contains
845
every element of the properly construed claim.
There were several iterative but still notable developments this past
year with respect to infringement analysis. In July 2005, the Federal
846
Circuit issued its en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp., which
comprehensively summarized and clarified its law on claim
construction, focusing on the proper role, in claim construction, of a
patent’s specification and prosecution history in relation to general
847
or field specific dictionaries. This year, the Federal Circuit further
848
refined and applied the teachings of Phillips.
Another important development in infringement law over the past
849
several years has been the prevalence of summary judgment rulings.
This year, the Federal Circuit again addressed numerous cases where
district courts had granted summary judgment as to infringement or
850
non-infringement.
The past year also occasioned further
consideration and refinement of the limitations on the doctrine of
equivalents as set forth in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
851
Kabushiki Co.
And among the more notable developments in the
area of infringement was the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in
852
DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., which clarified that a party can be held
842. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (defining infringement).
843. See, e.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d
1322, 1326, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)).
844. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385.
845. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385; see also Flex-Rest, LLC v. Steelcase, Inc.,
455 F.3d 1351, 1361-62, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1620, 1627 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(explaining that every element of a claim is material for this analysis).
846. 415 F.3d 1303, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
847. Id. at 1319-24, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331-35.
848. See infra notes 864-873 and accompanying text.
849. See, e.g., Adamo et al., supra note 14, at 1609-12.
850. See infra notes 291-325 and accompanying text.
851. 535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002) (noting that “[a] patentee’s decision to narrow his
claims through amendment may be presumed to be a general disclaimer of the
territory between the original claim and the amended claim,” and holding “that the
patentee should bear the burden of showing that the amendment does not
surrender the particular equivalent in question”).
852. 471 F.3d 1293, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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liable for inducing infringement only upon a determination that it
853
specifically intended that another party infringe a patent.
A. Claim Construction
Prior to 2005, there had been some confusion as to the hierarchy
of tools that may be used to construe or interpret a patent claim. It
had long been settled that “[i]t is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law
that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the
854
patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” And the Federal Circuit
has “frequently stated that the words of a claim ‘are generally given
their ordinary and customary meaning,’” which is “the meaning that
the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing
855
date of the patent application.” Difficulties arise, however, because
it is not always easy to ascertain the “ordinary and customary
856
Thus, it has also been well
meaning” of a particular claim term.
accepted that “the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to
read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in
which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire
857
patent, including the specification.” Accordingly, “‘the best source
for understanding a technical term is the specification from which it
858
The
arose, informed, as needed, by the prosecution history.’”
Federal Circuit has also noted that “[c]onsistent with that general
principle, our cases recognize that the specification may reveal a
special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs
from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the
859
inventor’s lexicography governs.”

853. See id. at 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247 (stating that “inducement
requires evidence of culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another’s
infringement, not merely that the inducer had knowledge of the direct infringer’s
activities”).
854. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1325
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems,
Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
855. Id. at 1312-13, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326 (citing numerous cases).
856. Id. at 1313, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
857. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
858. Id. at 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328 (quoting Multiform Desiccants, Inc.
v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429, 1433 (Fed. Cir.
1998)) (citing several additional cases).
859. Id. at 1316, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v.
Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658, 1662-63 (Fed. Cir.
2002)).
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Notwithstanding these basic principles, there had been confusion
regarding the role in claim construction of general-purpose or field860
specific dictionaries. The court explained:
In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as
understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent
even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves
little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of
commonly understood words. In such circumstances, general
purpose dictionaries may be helpful. In many cases that give rise to
litigation, however, determining the ordinary and customary
meaning of the claim requires examination of terms that have a
861
particular meaning in a field of art.

The court also noted:
Within the class of extrinsic evidence, the court has observed that
dictionaries and treatises can be useful in claim construction. We
have especially noted the help that technical dictionaries may
provide to a court “to better understand the underlying
technology” and the way in which one of skill in the art might use
the claim terms. Because dictionaries, and especially technical
dictionaries, endeavor to collect the accepted meanings of terms
used in various fields of science and technology, those resources
have been properly recognized as among the many tools that can
assist the court in determining the meaning of particular
terminology to those of skill in the art of the invention. Such
evidence, we have held, may be considered if the court deems it
helpful in determining “the true meaning of language used in the
862
patent claims.”

The main source of difficulty had been in reconciling the role of
dictionaries with the role of the specification and prosecution history:
The main problem with elevating the dictionary to [excessive]
prominence is that it focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning
of words rather than on the meaning of claim terms within the
context of the patent. Properly viewed, the “ordinary meaning” of
a claim term is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the
entire patent. Yet heavy reliance on the dictionary divorced from
the intrinsic evidence risks transforming the meaning of the claim
term to the artisan into the meaning of the term in the abstract,
863
out of its particular context, which is the specification.

860. See id. at 1312, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325 (noting that court’s previous
discussions of “the use of dictionaries in claim construction . . require[]
clarification”).
861. Id. at 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (internal citation omitted).
862. Id. at 1318, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (internal citations omitted).
863. Id. at 1321, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
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Therefore, the court held in Phillips that a court may consult
dictionaries as part of construing patent claims, but must “attach the
appropriate weight” to the specification and the prosecution history
864
in its analysis. The court explained:
A claim should not rise or fall based upon the preferences of a
particular dictionary editor, or the court’s independent decision,
uninformed by the specification, to rely on one dictionary rather
than another. Finally, the authors of dictionaries or treatises may
simplify ideas to communicate them most effectively to the public
and may thus choose a meaning that is not pertinent to the
865
understanding of particular claim language.

While this guidance is certainly helpful, it is also exceedingly
general. The court made clear that it was “not attempt[ing] to
866
provide a rigid algorithm for claim construction.” As a result of this
limited guidance, as well as the belief of some of the court’s judges
that claim construction is not the purely legal endeavor that the
867
court’s majority has described,
Judges Mayer and Newman
dissented, urging that:
[w]hat we have wrought . . . is the substitution of a black box, as it
so pejoratively has been said of the jury, with the black hole of this
court. Out of this void we emit “legal” pronouncements by way of
“interpretive necromancy”; these rulings resemble reality, if at all,
only by chance.
Regardless, and with a blind eye to the
consequences, we continue to struggle under this irrational and
reckless regime, trying every alternative—dictionaries first,
868
dictionaries second, never dictionaries, etc., etc., etc.

The dissent construed the majority opinion as stating nothing
more than a rule “that [the court] will decide cases according to
whatever mode or method results in the outcome we desire, or at
869
least allows us a seemingly plausible way out of the case.”
The
dissent concluded by warning that “[e]loquent words can mask much
mischief. The court’s opinion today is akin to rearranging the deck
chairs on the Titanic—the orchestra is playing as if nothing is amiss,
870
but the ship is still heading for Davey Jones’ locker.” It is too soon
to tell if the dissenters’ concerns will continue to manifest themselves
864. See id. at 1324, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
865. Id. at 1322, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333 (citation omitted).
866. Id. at 1324, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
867. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (clarifying that
claim construction is a legal issue reserved exclusively for the court).
868. 415 F.3d at 1330, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339 (Mayer & Newman, JJ.,
dissenting).
869. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339.
870. Id. at 1334-35, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342.
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in the court’s decisions, but this year’s decisions do provide
significant guidance as to the principles set forth in Phillips.
1.

Claim language
As noted above, claim construction starts with examining the words
of the patent claim, and ascertaining the “ordinary and customary
meaning” of those words to “a person of ordinary skill in the art in
871
question at the time of the invention.” The court in Phillips noted
that in some circumstances the claim language is easily interpreted,
particularly with the aid of dictionaries:
In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as
understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent
even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves
little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of
commonly understood words. In such circumstances, general
872
purpose dictionaries may be helpful.

The court also recognized, however, that “in many cases that give
rise to litigation, . . . determining the ordinary and customary
meaning of the claim requires examination of terms that have a
873
particular meaning in a field of art.” This year’s cases demonstrate
several principles relevant to construing claim terms that lack
obvious, facially plain meanings.
All words in a claim must be given effect. “[C]laims are interpreted
874
with an eye toward giving effect to all terms in the claim.” In Bicon,
Inc. v. Straumann Co., the court explained the rationale for this
principle:
The purpose of a patent claim is to define the precise scope of a
claimed invention, thereby ‘giving notice both to the examiner at
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office during prosecution, and to
the public at large, including potential competitors after the patent
has issued. Allowing a patentee to argue that physical structures
and characteristics specifically described in a claim are merely
superfluous would render the scope of the patent ambiguous,
leaving examiners and the public to guess about which claim
language the drafter deems necessary to his claimed invention and
875
which language is merely superfluous, nonlimiting elaboration.

871. Id. at 1313, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326 (majority opinion) (citations
omitted).
872. Id. at 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
873. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
874. Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 950, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1267,
1272 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
875. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1272.
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Thus, in Bicon, the court held that a claim for a dental implant that
included language describing an abutment that lays above the
gumline to which a crown can be attached was limited to implants
876
that contain such an abutment.
Similarly, in Flex-Rest, LLC v.
877
Steelcase, Inc., the court determined that it had to give effect to the
term “sidewall” in a claim for a computer keyboard positioning
878
system. The court rejected the patentee’s argument that the term
was “‘minor,’ ‘inconsequential,’ and ‘unimportant,’” because that
argument “disregards the basic patent law doctrine that every
879
limitation of a claim is material.”
Likewise, in Aero Products
880
International, Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp., the court refused to read
the term “substantially hermetic seal” in a claim for an inflatable
support system, such as an air mattress, to require a “complete
hermetic seal,” because doing so would “render the term
881
‘substantially’ illusory.”
Separate claims should not be read to be redundant. A corollary to the
principle that all words in a claim should be given effect is that
separate claims in a patent should each be given separate effect. In
882
nCube Corp. v. SeaChange International, Inc., the Federal Circuit
construed the term “upstream manager” in a claim for storage of
883
The court rejected the
multimedia sources over a network.
construction put forth by SeaChange that the upstream manager
term requires routing of information by using “only logical,” virtual
addresses assigned by the storage apparatus, rather than “physical”
addresses that reflect the information’s actual location in the
884
connection manager. The court reasoned that “[t]he creation of a
virtual circuit, or ‘virtual connection,’ appears only in dependent
885
claim 2 as a ‘further’ function of the connection service.”
The
claim at issue (claim 1), however, “does not describe an upstream
886
manager that requires routing only with logical addresses.”
Accordingly, the court concluded that “[t]o read a requirement for
use of logical addresses into claim 1 would impermissibly read the

876.
877.
878.
879.
880.
881.
882.
883.
884.
885.
886.

See id. at 946-52, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269-74.
455 F.3d 1351, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1620 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1361-62, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627.
Id. at 1361, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626-27.
466 F.3d 1000, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1012-13, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488-89.
436 F.3d 1317, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1321-22, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484-85.
See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484-85.
Id. at 1321, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484-85.
Id. at 1321-22, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
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‘virtual connection’ limitation of claim 2 into claim 1, making these
887
claims redundant.”
The same words generally have the same meaning throughout the patent
claims. A complementary principle is that the same words in a patent
generally should be construed to have the same meaning even where
the words are contained in different claims. In Schoenhaus v. Genesco,
888
Inc., the court examined two possible constructions of the term
“orthotic device” in a patent for a portion of, or insert into, certain
889
The court noted that both claims 1 and 2 of the patent
shoes.
included the “orthotic device” term, and referred to the
“‘presumption that the same terms appearing in different portions of
the claims should be given the same meaning unless it is clear from the
specification and prosecution history that the terms have different meanings at
890
different portions of the claims.’”
Even though only claim 1 was at
issue, the court examined whether a possible construction of
“orthotic device”—“a ‘shoe built to have the shape of the interior of
the insert’”—would make sense if applied to claim 2, which claims “a
footwear product having as an element thereof an orthotic device as
891
claimed in claim 1.”
The court concluded that the possible
construction of “‘orthotic device’ renders claim 2 nonsensical,”
because it would lead claim 2 to be construed to mean “‘a footwear
product having an element thereof a shoe built to have the shape of
the interior of the insert as claimed in claim 1,’” and thus “cannot be
892
correct.”
A similar analysis was undertaken in Semitool, Inc. v. Dynamic Micro
893
Systems Semiconductor Equipment GmbH, where the court addressed
the significance of a claim term in a prior, related patent
894
application. In that case, the claim term “processing chamber” had
been defined in a parent application, which had ultimately led to a
different patent, as “a processing vessel defining a process chamber
895
therewithin.”
Even though such a clear definition was lacking in
the patent at issue, the court reasoned that “the same definition of
the processing chamber” should likely apply to both the patent
887. Id. at 1322, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
888. 440 F.3d 1354, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
889. Id. at 1356-57, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253-54.
890. Id. at 1357, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254 (quoting Fin Control Sys. Pty., Ltd.
v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d 1311, 1318, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1203, 1208 (Fed. Cir.
2001)).
891. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254.
892. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254.
893. 444 F.3d 1337, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
894. Id. at 1345-48, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444-46.
895. Id. at 1346, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444-45.
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resulting from the “parent application” and that resulting from the
896
“continuation application,” which led to the patent at issue.
The context in which a claim term is placed may be critical. The
appropriate construction of a claim term may be informed by the
897
“context of the surrounding words of the claim.”
Thus, in Wilson
898
Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., the Federal Circuit
899
addressed the claim term “gap” in a patent for a softball bat. The
court noted the principle that claim terms should generally “have the
same meaning” in different claims of the same patent, but
emphasized that the term “gap” had been modified differently in
900
claim 1 and claim 15 of the patent. In claim 1, the term “gap” was
modified by the phrase, “forming at least part of an annular shape,”
whereas in claim 15 the term was modified by the preceding phrase,
901
“annular.” Since the term “annular” was construed to mean “of or
relating to an area formed by two concentric circular or curved
regions,” the court determined that claim 1 does not require
concentricity of the gap between the frame of the bat and an insert
into that frame, and permits “some contact between the insert and
902
frame.” In contrast, because it features an “annular gap,” claim 15
903
requires concentricity of both the frame and the insert.
The language of a preamble to a claim can be limiting. In Bicon, Inc. v.
904
Straumann, Co., the Federal Circuit addressed the effect of language
905
in the preamble to a claim. The court explained that, as a general
matter, “‘whether to treat a preamble as a claim limitation is
determined on the facts of each case in light of the claim as a whole
906
and the invention described in the patent.’”
“Preamble language
that merely states the purpose or intended use of an invention is
907
generally not treated as limiting the scope of the claim.” “However,
the preamble is regarded as limiting if it recites essential structure
896. Id. at 1346-47, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445.
897. ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 1088, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1516, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
898. 442 F.3d 1322, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
899. Id. at 1328-29, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
900. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
901. Id. at 1324-25, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
902. Id. at 1328, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
903. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387 (explaining that “a claim without the
‘annular’ requirement or with only a partial annular requirement . . . do[es] not
require concentricity”).
904. 441 F.3d 945, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
905. Id. at 948-53, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267-74.
906. Id. at 952, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1273 (quoting Storage Tech. Corp. v.
Cisco Sys., Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 831, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1550 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).
907. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1273 (citations omitted).
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that is important to the invention or necessary to give meaning to the
908
The court evaluated a preamble to a claim for a dental
claim.”
implant prosthesis providing that:
An emergence cuff member for use in preserving the interdental
papilla during the procedure of placing an abutment on a root
member implanted in the alveolar bone of a patient in which the
abutment has a frusto-spherical basal surface portion and a conical surface
909
portion having a selected height extending therefrom comprising . . . .

The court concluded that the emphasized language “recites essential
elements of the invention pertaining to the structure of the abutment
that is used with the claimed emergence cuff,” and thus limits the
910
patent claim.
911
Similarly, in On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Industries, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit addressed the effect of a claim preamble stating:
“A method of high speed manufacture of a single copy of a book
912
comprising the steps of . . . .”
The district court had determined
that the preamble did not limit the claim; on appeal, the Federal
Circuit reversed, and ruled that “the preamble in this case necessarily
limits the claims, in that it states the framework of the invention,
whose purpose is rapid single-copy printing of a customer’s selected
913
book . . . .”
Thus, the Federal Circuit held that a jury instruction
stating that the preamble did not limit the claim to the “high speed
914
manufacture of a single copy” of a book, was erroneous.
2.

Specification (written description)
A fundamental part of the intrinsic evidence critical to claim
construction is the patent specification or written description that
915
accompanies patent claims.
In Phillips v. AWH Corp., the court
explained that “the specification ‘is always highly relevant to the
claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single
916
best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Thus, a “person of
908. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1273 (citations omitted).
909. Id. at 948, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270 (emphasis added).
910. Id. at 952, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274.
911. 442 F.3d 1331, 1343-44, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1428, 1436-37 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
912. Id. at 1336, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431.
913. Id. at 1343, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437.
914. See id. at 1343-44, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437 (explaining that “[t]he
preamble embraces the totality of these limitations”).
915. Philips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (remarking that it is “entirely appropriate for a court, when conducting
claim construction, to rely heavily on the written description for guidance as to the
meaning of claims”).
916. Id. at 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
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ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in
the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term
appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the
917
specification.”
“The importance of the specification in claim
construction derives from its statutory role. The close kinship
between the written description and the claims is enforced by the
statutory requirement that the specification describe the claimed
918
invention in ‘full, clear, concise, and exact terms.’”
Ultimately,
“[t]he claims are directed to the invention that is described in the
specification; they do not have meaning removed from the context
919
from which they arose.”
Indeed, as noted above, an inventor may
craft in the specification a “special definition” given to a claim term,
920
which will govern.
Moreover, “the specification may reveal an
intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope by the inventor.
In that instance as well, the inventor has dictated the correct claim
scope, and the inventor’s intention, as expressed in the specification,
921
is regarded as dispositive.”
One of the greatest difficulties in properly using the specification
to construe a claim is adhering to the important principle that
limitations not present in the claims should not be read into the
922
claim terms.
[W]e recognize that the distinction between using the specification
to interpret the meaning of a claim and importing limitations from
the specification into the claim can be a difficult one to apply in
practice.
However, the line between construing terms and
importing limitations can be discerned with reasonable certainty
and predictability if the court’s focus remains on understanding
how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the
claim terms. For instance, although the specification often
describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have
repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those
embodiments. In particular, we have expressly rejected the
contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the

917. Id. at 1313, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
918. Id. at 1316, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000)).
919. Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1076, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
920. Philips, 415 F.3d at 1316, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
921. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (citing SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1343-44, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1064-65
(Fed. Cir. 2001)).
922. See id. at 1323-24, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334-35.
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claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that
923
embodiment.

In all events, the Federal Circuit has acknowledged that
“interpretation of descriptive statements in a patent’s written
description is a difficult task, as an inherent tension exists as to
whether a statement is a clear lexicographic definition or a
924
description of a preferred embodiment.”
This year, the Federal Circuit has decided several cases in which
the district courts have grappled with the appropriate use of the
specification in interpreting patent claims.
Using the specification to clarify ambiguous claim language.
In
925
Schoenhaus v. Genesco, Inc., the court ruled that the specification
926
There, the
cannot trump the clear meaning of claim language.
court addressed the construction of the term “rigid” in a claim for a
927
shoe insert. The patentee argued that “rigid” is properly construed
to encompass material that is “semi-rigid,” and pointed to language in
the specification stating that the “insert . . . is formed by molding
928
semi-rigid material.” The district court had rejected this argument,
and the Federal Circuit affirmed, reasoning that while “[t]he
patentee is free to act as his own lexicographer,” the reference in the
written description to “semi-rigid material” that is “to be used in the
manufacture of the orthotic device generally” is insufficient to
overcome the claim language that requires the portion of the insert
929
to itself be “rigid.”
930
In Semitool, Inc. v. Dynamic Micro Systems, the court looked to the
patent’s specification to verify its conclusion that the claim term
“processing chamber” is coextensive with the term “processing
931
vessel,” also present in the claim.
The court emphasized several
statements in the specification that supported its conclusion, noting
that “the specification treats the three terms processing bowl,
932
processing chamber, and processing vessel synonymously.”
Ultimately, the court concluded that “[t]he specification makes no
923. Id. at 1323, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334 (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
924. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1374, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1443, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343
F.3d 1364, 1369, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947, 1950 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
925. 440 F.3d 1354, 1357-58, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1252, 1254-55 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
926. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254-55.
927. Id. at 1358, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
928. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255 (ellipses in original).
929. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
930. 444 F.3d 1337, 1347, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
931. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445.
932. Id. 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445.

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

2007]

4/7/2007 11:15:24 AM

2006 PATENT SUMMARY

905

meaningful distinction between the vessel, bowl, or the chamber and
therefore reinforces that the entire interior of the processing vessel
and the processing chamber should be interpreted to be
933
934
coextensive.”
Similarly, in Panduit Corp. v. Hellermanntyton Corp.,
the court relied on the specification to verify its construction of the
term “opening” in a claim for a power box. The court tentatively
concluded from the claim language that the opening must descend
935
from the “abutment portion” described in the claim.
The
specification more completely described “‘an opening formed in the
abutment portion of the projection which is in communication with
an aperture formed in a side wall’ and an abutment portion ‘which
936
depends from the furthest extent of the top portion.’”
Since the
“abutment portion” is “described consistently” in “the written
description as depending—i.e., extending downward—from a top
portion of the projection” the court concluded that the “opening”
937
must descend as well.
938
In Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., the Federal
Circuit looked to the specification to clarify whether the term
“completion of coalescence” in a claim for a method for making
plastic laminate boat hulls required that the plastic particulate reach
939
its “optimum state.” Although it found the claim language itself to
be ambiguous, the court emphasized that the written description
described the method as involving “coalescence” that “continues”
beyond the point at which the molding process is completed and
describes the invention as an improvement over a prior art patent
that resulted in coalescence without reaching the particulate’s
940
optimum state. The court therefore concluded that the term does
941
require the plastic particulate to reach its optimum state. Similarly,
942
in Planet Bingo, LLC v. GameTech International, Inc., the court found
that the specification clarified the meaning of the term
“progressive . . . predetermined winning combination” in a claim for
943
a bingo machine.
The court emphasized that the specification
repeatedly explains that “the game determines a ‘winning
933.
934.
935.
936.
937.
938.
939.
940.
941.
942.
943.

Id. at 1347-48, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446.
451 F.3d 819, 829, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1053, 1059-60 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
448 F.3d 1309, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See id. at 1316-17, 1321, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710-11,1714.
See id. at 1316-17, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710-11.
See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710-11.
472 F.3d 1338, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See id. at 1342-43, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

906

4/7/2007 11:15:24 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:4

combination’ before the first bingo ball is drawn, thus making it
944
As such, the claim would not encompass a
‘predetermined.’”
machine that determines the winning combination after the first
945
bingo ball is drawn.
As noted above, a special definition set forth in the specification
946
will govern the patent claims. Thus, in Cook Biotech Inc. v. Acell, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit held that the term “urinary bladder submucosa”
in a claim for a tissue composition used for tissue reconstruction was
947
limited by a definition in the specification.
The specification
defined the term as “‘urinary bladder submucosa delaminated from
abluminal muscle cell layers and at least the luminal portion of the
tunica mucosa of the urinary bladder tissue,’” and the court therefore
held that it could not include what the definition specifically
excluded—the delaminated “abluminal muscle cell layers and at least
the luminal portion of the tunica mucosa” of the urinary bladder
948
tissue.
949
also involved the related principle that the
Cook Biotech
specification may specifically incorporate by reference limiting
950
language from a different patent.
“‘To incorporate material by
reference, the host document must identify with detailed particularity
what specific material it incorporates and clearly indicate where that
951
material is found in the various documents.’”
With respect to the
claim term “the luminal portion of the tunica mucosa,” the
specification specifically incorporated the method for preparing
952
intestinal submucosa detailed in a prior art patent. Therefore, the
court held that the mucosa defined in the prior art patent was an
953
equivalent structure to the tissue claimed by the patent at issue.
It is notable that the members of a particular panel often strongly
disagree as to the appropriate consideration to be afforded
statements in a patent’s specification. In Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion
954
Roussel, Inc.,
the court addressed the meaning of the term
“therapeutically effective amount” in a claim for an erythropoietin
944. See id. at 1343, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
945. See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
946. 460 F.3d 1365, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
947. See id. at 1373-75, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870-71.
948. Id. at 1374, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
949. 460 F.3d 1365, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865.
950. See id. at 1376, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
951. Id. at 1376, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (quoting Advanced Display Sys.,
Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1679 (Fed.
Cir. 2000)).
952. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
953. See id. at 1377, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.
954. 457 F.3d 1293, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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955

(“EPO”) synthetic hormone.
The district court had held that the
term requires one of four biological effects and also an increase in
956
Determining that the claim language itself was
hematocrit levels.
unclear, the majority looked to the specification for guidance and
noted that a passage in the specification indicated that the synthetic
hormone when effective would produce “any or all” of certain
biological effects:
“e.g., stimulation of reticulocyte response,
development of ferrokinetic effects (such as plasma from iron
turnover effects and marrow transmit time effects), erythrocyte mass
changes, stimulation of hemoglobin C synthesis . . . and, as indicated
957
in Example 10, increasing hematocrit levels in mammals.”
The
majority determined that the phrase regarding hematocrit levels was
merely one of the effects listed that would be therapeutically
effective, but that increased hematocrit levels were not an absolute
958
requirement for effectiveness.
Chief Judge Michel dissented, contending that the term
“therapeutically effective” requires more than merely the trigger of
certain biological effects, but instead requires an effect that will
959
actually “heal” or “cure” patients who need the synthetic hormone.
Looking to other passages in the specification, Chief Judge Michel
reasoned that the purpose of the synthetic hormone was to increase
960
red blood cells and thus requires that the hematocrit level increase.
Accordingly, this case illustrates a pronounced difficulty with relying
on a patent’s specification—it is often unclear which part of the
specification is the most probative of the meaning of an ambiguous
claim term.
961
Similarly, in Kim v. Conagra Foods, Inc., the court addressed the
meaning of the term “potassium bromate replacer” in a claim for an
962
oxidizing agent used to strengthen bread dough. The district court
had held that the term required that the replacer must be effective
and “perform essentially the same function in the production of that
963
bread as would potassium bromate.”
The Federal Circuit panel
majority affirmed, emphasizing that a passage in the specification
explained that the claimed potassium bromate replacer is an
“oxidizing agent” that is “effective and functional throughout the entire
955.
956.
957.
958.
959.
960.
961.
962.
963.

See id. at 1296-97, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707.
See id. at 1301, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710.
Id. at 1302, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
See id. at 1318, 1319, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1724 (Michel, C.J. dissenting).
See id. at 1318-19, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1724.
465 F.3d 1312, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See id. at 1316, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496.
Id. at 1317, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498 (emphasis ommitted).
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964

manufacturing process.”
Thus, the majority held that the claim
965
does not encompass an ineffective or inert compound.
Judge Schall dissented, urging that the majority had read the
966
specification too narrowly. Judge Schall looked to other portions of
the specification that indicate that the “potassium bromate replacer”
is “a slow acting oxidant that is functional throughout the entire
967
manufacturing process.” Because the majority had relied on other
language in the specification that did not mention the “slow acting”
quality of the compound, Judge Schall contended that it had
968
overlooked a critical part of the appropriate claim construction.
Accordingly, Judge Schall would have vacated the district court’s
969
Again, this
claim construction and remanded for further analysis.
case demonstrates the difficulty of selecting the appropriate portion
of the specification upon which to rely for assistance in claim
construction.
Likewise, in Ventana Medical Systems, Inc. v. Biogenex Laboratories,
970
Inc., the court did not agree on what portion of the specification
was most probative in construing the term “dispensing” in a claim for
971
a biological assay method.
The district court had ruled that the
972
Reviewing the
term was limited only to “direct dispensing.”
specification, the majority concluded that the district court’s
construction was erroneous because the specification included
descriptions of multiple dispensing methods, some direct and some
973
indirect.
The majority also noted that while the preferred
embodiments did contain a “direct dispensing feature,” other
portions of the specification indicated that the claims were not
974
limited only to direct dispensing.
Judge Lourie dissented, urging that when properly read, the
specification made clear that the term is limited to “direct
975
dispensing.” He emphasized that language other than the language
relied upon by the majority describes a process that could only be
976
completed through direct dispensing.
964.
965.
966.
967.
968.
969.
970.
971.
972.
973.
974.
975.
976.

See id. at 1318, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498 (emphasis added).
See id. at 1318-19, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498-99.
See id. at 1326-28, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504-06.
See id. at 1326-27, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505.
See id. at 1327-28, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505-06.
See id. at 1329, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1506.
473 F.3d 1173, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See id. at 1176, 1177, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315, 1316.
See id. at 1178, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317.
See id. at 1180, 1183, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318, 1320.
See id. at 1182, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1320.
See id. at 1185, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322.
See id. at 1185-86, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322-23 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
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These cases suggest that the meaning one derives from the
specification may be different depending upon how one approaches
977
978
979
evaluating the specification. In Cook Biotech, Kim, and Ventana,
the majorities looked to specific language of the specifications that in
their view provided an express “definition” of the ambiguous claim
language. In each of the dissents in those cases, however, the
dissenting judge looked more broadly at the specification to
determine whether the majority’s construction would allow the
invention to realize the advantages and benefits described in the
specification. It is noteworthy that the “specific definition” approach
carried the day in all three cases.
The binding effect of specific definitions in the specification. While it is a
basic principle of claim construction that a specific definition
contained in the specification will control the claim language, it is
not always easy to determine whether language in the specification
constitutes such a definition. In Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v.
980
Velan, Inc., the district court had construed the term “adjustable” as
having its ordinary meaning of “capable of making a change to
981
something or capable of being changed.”
The Federal Circuit
vacated and remanded, emphasizing that the specification made
clear that the “adjustment” called for by the invention occurs only
982
“during operation and without removal of the head unit.”
The
court noted that the district court’s construction effectively rendered
the “adjustable” claim term “meaningless” because every mechanical
device would be “adjustable” under the district court’s definition; the
court therefore held that the more limited definition set forth in the
983
specification had to control.
984
In On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Industries, Inc., the district
court had construed the term “sales information” in a claim for a
method of manufacturing a book copy to generally mean “‘data
stored in a computer which is involved in the promoting and selling
of a book,’” including purely descriptive information like a book’s
985
The Federal Circuit reversed this claim
title or ISBN number.
977. Cook Biotech Inc. v. Acell, Inc., 460 F.3d 1365, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
978. Kim v. ConAgra Foods Inc., 465 F.3d 1312, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
979. 473 F.3d 1173, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314.
980. 438 F.3d 1374, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1988 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
981. See id. at 1378, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1992.
982. See id. at 1379, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1992.
983. See id. at 1379-80, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1993.
984. 442 F.3d 1331, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1428 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
985. See id. at 1338, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432.
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construction, emphasizing that the specification identified
promotional information as “descriptive material such as a synopsis,
plot outline, author’s biographical summary, etc.,” which “sales
information” necessarily required be “stored in the computer that is
986
made available to the customer.”
The court held that identifying
data such as a book’s title and ISBN number were not promotional
987
information.
988
In Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., the district
court had construed the term “edetate” in a claim for an anesthetic
compound as “EDTA as well as compounds structurally related to
989
EDTA regardless of how they are synthesized.” The Federal Circuit
reversed, emphasizing that the specification described an “edetate” as
990
EDTA and “derivatives” of EDTA, rather that structural analogs.
The court also noted several statements in the specification that
indicated that the advantages of the invention are unique to EDTA
991
and its derivatives or salts, rather than structural analogs. The court
thus held that the term “edetate” could not encompass structural
992
analogs to EDTA.
993
In SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Engineering, Inc., the district court had
construed the term “shift actuator” as requiring “precision indexed
994
The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the
downshifting.”
district court had improperly applied a limitation from the
specification that was relevant to patent claims other than the one at
995
issue. This case demonstrates the importance of linking statements
in the specification to the specific claim (indeed, the specific claim
limitation) one is attempting to construe.
Non-limitation to preferred embodiments. A fundamental principle of
claim construction maintains that it is improper to limit “the claimed
invention to preferred embodiments or specific examples in the
996
specification.”
In practice, however, it is often difficult to

986. See id. at 1338, 1339, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433.
987. See id. at 1339, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433.
988. 467 F.3d 1370, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
989. See id. at 1375, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708 (quoting Astrazeneca Pharms.,
LP v. Mayne Pharma (USA), Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 403, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
990. See id. at 1378, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710.
991. See id. at 1377-78, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709-10.
992. See id. at 1378, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710.
993. 465 F.3d 1351, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
994. See id. at 1357, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367.
995. See id. at 1358-59, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368-69.
996. Varco, L.P. v. Pason Sys. USA Corp., 436 F.3d 1368, 1375, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1948, 1954 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1980)).

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

2007]

4/7/2007 11:15:24 AM

2006 PATENT SUMMARY

911

determine whether particular language in a specification describes a
claim term in general or merely a preferred embodiment.
997
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
In nCube,
construction of the “upstream manager” claim term as not limited by
an embodiment that routed messages only using logical, rather than
998
999
physical addresses.
In Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s construction of the term
“structural formula I” as not limited by specific examples of
compounds of that formula, particularly because the specification
stated that “‘[t]hese examples are illustrative and are not to be read
as limiting the scope of the invention as it is defined by the appended
1000
claims.’”
And in Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Abacus
1001
Software, the Federal Circuit considered the term “scanner” as not
being limited by the preferred embodiment that includes a “close
1002
proximity” requirement.
1003
In contrast, in Varco,
the Federal Circuit reversed the district
court’s construction of the term “relay” because the district court had
improperly limited that term to its description in a preferred
1004
embodiment as requiring the use of pneumatically operated valves.
1005
the court reversed the district court’s
In Wilson Sporting Goods,
construction of the term “insert” as “hollow” because the district
court had improperly limited that term to the preferred embodiment
and because the term “insert” could encompass both hollow and solid
inserts and have a consistent meaning in all the claims of the
1006
1007
patent.
And in LG Electronics, the Federal Circuit reversed the
district court’s construction of the term “requesting agent” as limited
to the definition in an industry standard incorporated into the
specification because the district court had failed to appreciate that
the industry standard was incorporated only “as a preferred
1008
embodiment” and not to limit the claims.
997. nCube Corp. v. SeaChange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1481 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
998. See id. at 1321-22, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484-85.
999. 457 F.3d 1284, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1583 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1000. See id. at 1290, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
1001. 462 F.3d 1344, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1002. See id. at 1352-53, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230-31.
1003. Varco, L.P. v. Pason Sys. USA Corp., 436 F.3d 1368, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1948 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1004. See id. at 1375-76, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.
1005. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442
F.3d 1322, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1006. See id. at 1329, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388.
1007. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs, Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1443 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1008. See id. at 1374-75, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451-52.
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A related principle is that claim language should virtually never be
1009
Thus, in Primos, Inc. v.
read to exclude the preferred embodiment.
1010
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
Hunter’s Specialties, Inc.,
court’s construction of the term “engaging” to mean “to come into
1011
contact with.”
The court rejected the construction urged by one of
the parties that the term had to mean “interlocking” because such a
construction was not supported by the specification and in fact would
1012
have excluded a preferred embodiment.
Conversely, in Lava
1013
Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Management, LLC, the Federal Circuit
disagreed with the district court’s construction of the term
“distributing and displaying” in a claim for software for securities
trading as meaning “distribution of the whole combined order book
1014
to the trader.”
The court emphasized that “the specification
discloses embodiments that distribute and display information for
only a subset of the combined order book” and concluded that the
1015
claims should be read to cover those embodiments.
Specific disavowals or disclaimers of claim coverage. A final principle
that frequently arises when using the specification to aid in claim
construction is that specific statements disclaiming coverage will be
1016
binding. Thus, in Honeywell International, Inc. v. ITT Industries, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the
claim term “‘fuel injection system component’ is limited to a fuel
1017
filter.”
The court emphasized that the specification several times
1018
In
described “the present invention” as comprising “a fuel filter.”
light of these repeated statements, the court concluded that “[t]he
public is entitled to take the patentee at his word and the word was
that the invention is a fuel filter,” notwithstanding that the court’s
1019
construction limited the claim term to the preferred embodiment.
1009. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 USPQ2d (BNA)
1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Such an interpretation is rarely, if ever, correct and
would require highly persuasive evidentiary support.”). But see Elekta Instrument
S.A. v. O.U.R. Sci. Int’l Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (holding that overwhelming evidence demonstrated that claim term could not
encompass preferred embodiment).
1010. 451 F.3d 841, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1011. See id. at 847, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1134.
1012. See id. at 848, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135.
1013. 445 F.3d 1348, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1624 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1014. See id. at 1353-54, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627-28.
1015. See id. at 1354, 1355, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628-29.
1016. 452 F.3d 1312, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1017. See id. at 1318, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299.
1018. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299.
1019. See id. at 1318-19, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299-1300.
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1020

In LG Electronics, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s
construction of the term “cache memory” as requiring “at least two
1021
The court noted that “the specification may reveal an
caches.”
intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope by an inventor.
In that instance, . . . the inventor has dictated the correct claim scope,
and the inventor’s intention, as expressed in the specification, is
1022
regarded as dispositive.”
Nevertheless, the court held that there
had been no specific disavowal of a cache memory with a single
cache, noting that the portion of the specification that the district
court had relied upon related to multi-cache systems that were
1023
severed from the patent at issue during its prosecution history.
This case again demonstrates that it is critical to match statements
relied upon in the specification with the specific claim at issue.
3.

Prosecution history
“In addition to consulting the specification, we [the Federal
Circuit] have held that a court ‘should also consider the patent’s
1024
prosecution history, if it is in evidence.’”
“‘[A]n invention is
construed not only in the light of the claims, but also with reference
1025
to the file wrapper or prosecution history in the Patent Office.’”
“[T]he prosecution history can often inform the meaning of the
claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the
invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the
course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it
1026
In 2006, the Federal Circuit decided several
would otherwise be.”
cases in which the prosecution history played a significant role in
claim construction.
Use of prosecution history in construing ambiguous terms. Prosecution
history can often be helpful in construing unclear claim terms. For
1027
instance, in Amgen, the court turned to the prosecution history to
confirm its construction that the term “therapeutically effective” did
1020. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs, Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1443 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1021. See id. at 1377, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
1022. Id. at 1378, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
1023. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
1024. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980
(Fed. Cir. 1995)).
1025. Id. at 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (quoting Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 33 (1966)).
1026. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
1027. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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1028

not require an increase in hematocrit.
The court noted that
during prosecution of the patent, the patentee stated that the
claimed invention had several uses relating to low red-blood-cell
counts, but there was no indication that the scope of the invention
1029
should be limited only to such uses.
Likewise, in Aero Products
1030
the Federal Circuit
International, Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp.,
examined the prosecution history to aid in its construction of the
1031
claim term “substantially hermetic seal.”
The court affirmed the
district court’s construction that the term did not require a
“complete hermetic seal,” based in part upon the prosecution history
which showed that language in the claim suggesting that the
invention provides “a complete hermetic seal” when a valve is in
closed position was added without regard to the “quality of the
1032
seal.”
Therefore, the court concluded that the “complete hermetic
seal” language did not limit the “substantially hermetic seal” claim
1033
term.
1034
In Old Town Canoe, the court relied on the prosecution history to
support its conclusion that the term “completion of coalescence
1035
means progress of coalescence to the optimum state.”
The court
noted that the claim had been amended to make clear that
coalescence is completed such that it produces a “coherent fused
1036
layer” of material.
Indeed, the claim had originally been rejected
because it had not made clear whether the “cooling” part of the claim
method was concurrent with the “completion” of coalescence—
1037
“whether coalescence would reach a point of completion.”
Accordingly, the court found that this prosecution history compelled
such a construction.
Role of the prosecution history of other patent applications. In certain
circumstances, like in Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA,
1038
Inc., the prosecution history of related patent applications may be
useful in construing patent claims. In that case, the court examined
the prosecution history of the first application in a series of

1028. See id. at 1303, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
1029. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
1030. 466 F.3d 1000, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1031. See id. at 1012-15, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1488-90.
1032. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488-90.
1033. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488-90.
1034. Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1035. See id. at 1317, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
1036. See id. at 1317-18, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
1037. See id. at 1317, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
1038. 450 F.3d 1350, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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1039

applications, one of which led to the patent at issue.
In a claim for
PDA devices, the court affirmed the district court’s construction of
1040
the term “host interface” to mean “a direct parallel bus interface.”
The prosecution history of the first application made clear that one
of the key innovations of the invention was to create a “direct” bus
1041
connection.
Therefore, the court concluded:
Although arguments in the prosecution of related applications
should not receive undue weight, for claims and issues and
inventions vary from case to case, here the applicant was describing
the broad technologic basis of these related applications; the usage
in each application is consistent with the district court’s view of
“host interface” as requiring “a direct parallel bus interface.” That
interface excludes the serial connection of the prior art, and
requires direct parallel connection.
The district court’s
1042
interpretation of this term is correct, and is affirmed.
1043

In contrast, the court in Pfizer
affirmed the district court’s
conclusion that the prosecution histories of several foreign
counterpart patents and a later, unrelated U.S. patent, were
1044
irrelevant to claim construction in that case.
The court noted that
the statements at issue were irrelevant because they “were made in
response to patentability requirements unique to Danish and
1045
European law.”
Further, statements made in the prosecution of an
unrelated U.S. patent were “irrelevant to claim construction ‘absent a
formal relationship or incorporation during prosecution’ of the
1046
patent at issue.”
Thus, just as it is important to match language in
the specification with the relevant patent claim or claim term, it is
also critical to match statements in prosecution histories with the
correct patent or patents to which they are relevant.
Amendments overcoming a rejection or distinguishing prior art. Where a
patentee has amended a claim to overcome a rejection or distinguish
the prior art, any limitation imposed by that amendment is binding
1047
and will control construction of the claim. Thus, in Schoenhaus, the
court relied on the prosecution history to confirm its conclusion that
1039. See id. at 1356, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1789-90.
1040. See id. at 1353, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
1041. See id. at 1356-57, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789-90.
1042. Id. at 1357, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1790.
1043. Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Labs Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1583
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
1044. See id. at 1290, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
1045. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1588.
1046. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588 (quoting Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc.,
373 F.3d 1158, 1167-68 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
1047. Schoenhaus v. Genesco, Inc., 440 F.3d 1354, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1252 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
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the term “rigid” in a claim for a portion of an orthotic shoe insert
1048
The court
could not be construed to include a “semi-rigid” insert.
noted that the claim had been rejected as obvious in light of the prior
art; to overcome this rejection, the applicants were required to use
1049
the term “rigid” as part of the claim language.
Even though the
patent examiner did not specifically explain why he insisted on the
inclusion of the term “rigid,” the court reasoned that there was a
presumption that “the PTO had a substantial reason related to
patentability for including the limiting element added by
amendment,” and that this presumption had not been overcome by
1050
the patentee.
The court concluded that the term “rigid” was
necessary to secure patentability and could not encompass an insert
1051
that was only “semi-rigid.”
1052
the court examined
In DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd.,
whether an amendment to avoid a prior patent limited the scope of
1053
the term “slot” in a claim for a medical needle guard.
The court
emphasized that the amendments did not “limit the size of the slot”
but “concerned only the orientation of the needle wings that moved
1054
back and forth through the slot.”
Therefore, the court concluded
that “[t]o distinguish the Hughes patent, the patentee did not have
to, and did not actually, limit the width of the slot. Thus, the trial
court correctly construed ‘slot’ as not requiring a defined
1055
width . . . .”
As with the other intrinsic evidence of claim meaning, these cases
demonstrate that there must be a specific match between a claim
amendment and the supposedly limiting language that the
amendment required. If in fact the amendment did limit the
relevant language, that limitation should be given effect in claim
construction. However, if the amendment did not limit the specific
language at issue, the claim term should not be limited by the
amendment.
Express disavowals or disclaimers in the prosecution history. Just as an
express disclaimer in the language of the specification will limit the
claim term, such an express disclaimer in the prosecution history will
generally have a similar effect. In Purdue Pharma, L.P. v. Endo
1048. See id. at 1358, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
1049. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
1050. See id. at 1359, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255-56 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 32-33 (1997)).
1051. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256.
1052. 471 F.3d 1293, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1053. See id. at 1301, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
1054. See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
1055. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
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1056

Pharmaceuticals Inc., the court examined whether statements in the
prosecution history had expressly limited the scope of the term
“controlled release oxycodone formulation” such that it was limited
to “a four-fold dosage range that controls pain for 90% of
1057
patients.”
The district court had required such a limitation based
on statements in the prosecution history that the “four-fold dosage
1058
range” was an improvement over the prior art.
The Federal Circuit
held that the term should not be so limited because the statements in
the prosecution history did not present the four-fold dosage range as
1059
“a necessary feature of the claimed oxycodone formulations.”
Therefore, the court concluded that the district court had
“impermissibly imported a limitation into the claims” from the
1060
prosecution history.
Whether the prosecution history expressly disclaims certain subject
1061
In that case,
matter was an issue that divided the court in Ventana.
the majority held that the district court had erroneously ruled that
various statements in the prosecution history related to the claim
term “dispensing” had disclaimed coverage of all types of dispensing
1062
except “direct dispensing.”
The court reasoned that the allegedly
disclaiming language was not directly relevant because it related to
claims of an ancestor application that used different claim language
than the claims at issue; indeed, “the allegedly disclaiming statements
were made with respect to claim language that expressly required
reagent in the reagent container to be ‘dispensable directly to a
1063
sample.’”
The court also held that statements made in the
prosecution of two subsequent patent applications were made with
respect to claim language critically different from that in the claims at
1064
issue.
Judge Lourie took a different view in his dissent, as he urged that
the relevant language in the prosecution history of the ancestor
1065
application did disclaim all dispensing that is not “direct.”
Judge
Lourie did not, however, explain why that prosecution history should

1056. 438 F.3d 1123, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1057. See id. at 1135, 1136-37, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776, 1777.
1058. See id. at 1135, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
1059. See id. at 1136, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777.
1060. See id. at 1136-37, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777.
1061. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biogenex Labs., Inc., 473 F.3d 1173, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1062. See id. at 1182-83, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1320.
1063. See id. at 1182, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1320.
1064. See id. at 1183, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1321.
1065. See id. at 1186, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323 (Lourie, J., dissenting).

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

918

4/7/2007 11:15:24 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:4

govern when applied to claims with different language from that in
1066
the claims at issue.
4.

Extrinsic evidence
All materials other than the claim terms, specification, written
description, and prosecution history are “extrinsic evidence” for the
purposes of claim construction, and generally carry less weight than
evidence in the intrinsic record.
1067
1068
in Phillips
the Federal Circuit
Dictionaries. As noted above,
addressed the role of general purpose and field specific dictionaries
1069
as part of claim construction.
In 2006, several decisions attempted
to apply the guidance set forth in that case.
1070
In Atofina v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., the court ruled that the
district court had properly consulted “scientific and technical
dictionaries” to construe the term “catalyst” as “a substance that alters
1071
the velocity of a chemical reaction without being consumed.”
In
doing so, the Federal Circuit emphasized that there was “no
1072
suggestion that the intrinsic evidence defines the term ‘catalyst.’”
1073
the court indicated that is it appropriate to use
In On Demand,
general-purpose dictionaries for definitions of terms such as
“information” and “sales” so long as the definitions are consistent
1074
with the intrinsic record.
Ultimately, however, the court held that
the intrinsic record precluded the district court’s construction that it
1075
had based on general dictionaries.
Thus, these cases suggest that
use of general dictionaries may be appropriate and useful but only if
there is no conflict with evidence from the intrinsic record.
1076
In Old Town Canoe, the court relied heavily on the specification
and prosecution history to reject one party’s argument that the term
“completion of coalescence” could refer to bringing the chemical
1077
process at issue “to a halt.”
The party had relied on a dictionary
definition that included the term “brought to an end” as a definition
1066. See id. at 1186-87, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
1067. See supra Part IV.A.
1068. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
1069. See supra Part IV.A.
1070. 441 F. 3d 991, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1071. See id. at 996, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421.
1072. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421.
1073. On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1428 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1074. See id. at 1338, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432-33.
1075. See id. at 1344, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437.
1076. Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1077. See id. at 1315, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
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for “complete”; the court reasoned, however, that the dictionary
definition could not trump the strong contrary evidence in the
1078
written description and prosecution history.
1079
In Cook Biotech, the Federal Circuit evaluated the district court’s
use of a medical dictionary to help define the term “tunica
1080
The court determined that the district court had
mucosa.”
misunderstood the medical dictionary’s definition, which listed
several layers that comprised the tunica mucosa, in a manner that
would not permit the definition to encompass all of the constituent
1081
layers.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s
1082
construction in favor of that put forth by the appellant.
1083
In Abacus Software, the court approved of the district court’s use
of dictionary definitions for the terms “scan” and “scanner” as of the
1084
time the relevant patent application was filed in 1982.
The court
reasoned that contemporary dictionary definitions were useful to
determine how “a person of ordinary skill in 1982” would understand
1085
what the patent claims as a scanner.
Notably, the intrinsic evidence
confirmed the dictionary definitions, further indicating that this was
1086
the appropriate construction of the terms at issue.
Other extrinsic evidence. There was very little consideration in 2006
1087
of other sources of extrinsic evidence. In Inpro, the court affirmed
the district court’s decision to exclude expert testimony relevant to
1088
claim construction.
The court noted that a trial court has broad
discretion in determining whether to admit expert testimony
regarding claim construction, and it found there was no abuse of
1089
discretion in the district court’s decision.

1078. See id. at 1315, 1317-18, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709, 1711-12.
1079. Cook Biotech Inc. v. Acell, Inc., 460 F.3d 1365, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
1080. See id. at 1377-78, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873-74.
1081. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873-74.
1082. See id. at 1378, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
1083. Mass. Inst. of Tech. & Elecs. For Imaging, Inc. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d
1344, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1084. See id. at 1351-52, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
1085. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
1086. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229-30.
1087. Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 450 F.3d 1350, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1088. See id. at 1357, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791.
1089. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791.

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

920

4/7/2007 11:15:24 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:4

5.

Canons of construction
There are several canons or rules of construction that courts
sometimes employ as an aid to claim construction. In 2006, the
Federal Circuit addressed only a few of these.
Claim Differentiation.
In the most specific sense, “claim differentiation” refers to the
presumption that an independent claim should not be construed
as requiring a limitation added by a dependent claim. . . . Beyond
the independent/dependent claim scenario, this court has
characterized claim differentiation more generally, i.e., as the
“presumption that each claim in a patent has a different scope.”
Different claims with different words can, of course, define
different subject matter within the ambit of the invention. On the
other hand, claim drafters can also use different terms to define
the exact same subject matter. Indeed this court has acknowledged
that two claims with different terminology can define the exact
1090
same subject matter.

Like any other general rule or principle, this canon of construction
should be applied only where it makes sense in the context of a
1091
particular case.
In Curtiss-Wright,
the court rejected claim
differentiation as controlling with respect to the appropriate
construction of the term “adjustable” in a claim for a device used in
1092
oil refining.
The district court had held that the term “adjustable”
had to mean “capable of making a change to something or capable of
being changed” because a narrower construction of “adjustable”
1093
would be inconsistent with other claims in the patent.
The Federal
Circuit relied on the specification to conclude that “adjustable”
should in fact have a narrower meaning than that construed by the
1094
district court.
The court also found that the district court had
misapplied the doctrine of claim differentiation because the
narrower construction would not have rendered superfluous any of
1095
the other claims of the patent.
Furthermore, the court emphasized
that claim differentiation does not control when it would contradict
1096
the construction of a term compelled by the specification.
1090. Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380, 77
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1988, 1993-94 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Versa Corp. v. Ag-Bag
Int’l Ltd., 392 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
1091. Id. at 1380, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1988.
1092. See id. at 1379-81, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1992-94.
1093. See id. at 1378, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1992.
1094. See id. at 1379-81, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1992-94.
1095. See id. at 1381, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994.
1096. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994.
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1097

Similarly, in SRAM,
the court rejected the appellant’s claim
differentiation argument with respect to the term “precision index
1098
The appellant had argued that the district court’s
downshifting.”
construction would render superfluous a different claim in the
1099
patent.
However, the Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that
the two claims had different scopes, with one reciting a “series of
1100
shifts” and the other reciting a single “down-shifting event.”
The
court thus concluded that the district court’s construction would not
1101
render the other claim superfluous.
1102
In Inpro,
the Federal Circuit likewise concluded that claim
differentiation did not prescribe a definition of the term “host
1103
The court maintained that
interface” in a claim for a PDA module.
even though different claims of the patent had used the terms “host
interface,” “parallel bus interface,” and “direct access” parallel bus,
the use of those terms did not prevent the term “host interface” from
requiring a “direct” interface; instead, the specification and
prosecution history compelled a construction requiring a “direct”
1104
interface.
1105
In LG Electronics, the Federal Circuit agreed with the appellant
that the district court’s construction of a claim for a microprocessor
component was incorrect because it violated the canon of claim
1106
differentiation.
The court explained that requiring the limitation
of “at least two high speed memories” for claims 1 and 14 of the
patent could not be reconciled with claim 5 which expressly required
1107
“at least two cache memory means.”
Thus, the court held that
1108
claim differentiation precluded the district court’s construction.
Role of the accused device in claim construction. One long-standing
canon of claim construction is that “construction of the claim is
1109
independent of the device charged with infringement.”
1097. SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Eng’g, Inc., 465 F.3d 1351, 80
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1098. See id. at 1357-58, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367-68.
1099. See id. at 1358, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368.
1100. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368.
1101. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368.
1102. Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 450 F.3d 1350, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1103. See id. at 1353-54, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
1104. See id. at 1353-57, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788-90.
1105. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1443 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1106. See id. at 1377, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
1107. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
1108. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
1109. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 1327,
78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Pall Corp. v. Hemasure
Inc., 181 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
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Nevertheless, in several recent decisions, most of them authored by
Judge Rader, the Federal Circuit has stated that knowledge of the
accused device may be helpful as part of the claim construction
1110
analysis:
“While a trial court should certainly not prejudge the
ultimate infringement analysis by construing claims with an aim to
include or exclude an accused product or process, knowledge of that
product or process provides meaningful context for the first step of
1111
the infringement analysis, claim construction.”
1112
Thus, in Wilson Sporting Goods, the court criticized the state of the
record, in which, based upon a disputed claim construction, there
was entered a stipulated final judgment of non-infringement:
In this case, despite entry of a final judgment, neither the trial
court nor the parties supplied this court with any information
about the accused products. Thus, this record affords this court no
opportunity to compare the accused products to the asserted
claims. Accordingly, this court cannot assess the accuracy of any
infringement or validity determination. Furthermore, this sparse
record lacks the complete context for accurate claim
1113
construction.

In Lava Trading,

1114

the court echoed such sentiments:

Without knowledge of the accused products, this court cannot
assess the accuracy of the infringement judgment under review and
lacks a proper context for an accurate claim construction. . . .
Without the vital contextual knowledge of the accused products or
processes, this appeal takes on the attributes of something akin to
1115
an advisory opinion on the scope of the ‘982 patent.
1116

It is therefore unsurprising that in Aero Products,
the court
rejected the defendants’ argument that the district court had “erred
by construing the term ‘inflation input’ in light of the accused
1117
device.”
The court insisted that the district court’s awareness was
permissible and explained that “[o]f course the particular accused
product (or process) is kept in mind, for it is efficient to focus on the

1110. See supra notes 355-63 and accompanying text.
1111. 442 F.3d at 1326-27, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386.
1112. 442 F.3d 1322, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382.
1113. See id. at 1327, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386.
1114. Lava Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Mgmt., LLC, 445 F.3d 1348, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1624 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1115. Id. at 1350, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625.
1116. Aero Products Int’l, Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp., 466 F.3d 1000, 80
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1117. See id. at 1012 n.6, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488 n.6.
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construction of only the disputed elements or limitations of the
1118
claims.”
6.

Means-plus-function claim limitations
An area of claim construction that is often thorny is that involving
so-called “means-plus-function” or “step-plus-function” claim
1119
“Claim construction of a means-plus-function limitation
elements.
includes two steps. First, the court must determine the claimed
function. Second, the court must identify the corresponding
1120
structure in the written description that performs that function.”
It
can be difficult, however, both to determine whether a term written
without the traditional “means” or “step” language can be construed
as such a claim element and to identify the “corresponding structure”
the performs the claimed function.
1121
In Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., the Federal
Circuit adopted the district court’s constructions of means-plusfunction claim elements that were mostly undisputed by the parties
1122
below.
In doing so, the court noted several relevant principles for
construing such claim elements. First, the court criticized the parties’
apparent view that a district court’s construction of a means-plusfunction claim could be binding under collateral estoppel when the
parties disputed the meaning of the function in that clause:
“Construction of a means-plus-function term requires first identifying
the function and then determining the structure disclosed for
performing that function. Thus, an attempt to reargue the scope of
the function would inherently require a new analysis to determine
1123
the structures disclosed to permit the function.”
Second, the court
noted that the use of different words in a claim creates a presumption
that those claims have different “meanings,” but in a means-plusfunction claim, it does not create a presumption that those words
implicate different structures; in other words, where a means-plusfunction claim has more than one “means” clause, those means

1118. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488 n.6 (quoting Scripps Clinic & Research
Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
1119. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“An element in a claim for a combination may be
expressed as a means or a step for performing a specified function without the recital
of structure, material, or acts in support thereof . . . .”).
1120. Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1332, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1807, 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
1121. 448 F.3d 1324, 78 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1807 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1122. See id. at 1332-33, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812-13.
1123. Id. at 1332 n.2, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812 n.2.
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clauses could all refer to the same corresponding structure in the
1124
specification.
1125
the court
In LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc.,
addressed whether a claim term that does not use the “means”
language could nevertheless be construed as a means-plus-function
claim: “[A] claim term that does not use ‘means’ will trigger the
1126
rebuttable presumption that § 112 ¶ 6 does not apply.”
The court
held that the trial court had erroneously construed the term “control
unit” as a means-plus-function limitation, noting that the
presumption against construing such a term as a means-plus-function
claim “is a strong one” that can only be rebutted “‘by showing that
the claim element recites a function without reciting sufficient
1127
structure for performing that function.’”
The court concluded
that the “control unit” element referred to a “sufficient structure”
that was contained within the claim itself, namely “a CPU and a
partition memory system” for performing the stated function of
1128
“controlling the communication unit.”
Conversely, in Abacus Software, the Federal Circuit agreed with the
district court’s conclusion that the term “colorant selection
mechanism” was properly construed as a means-plus-function
1129
limitation, even though it did not contain the term “means.”
After
noting the presumption against such a construction, the court noted
that the term “mechanism” contained in the claim limitation did not
connote a “sufficiently definite structure” to avoid treatment as a
1130
means-plus-function element.
The court explained that where a
term like “mechanism” is further defined such that it refers to a
definite structure, treatment as a means-plus-function element may
be inappropriate, but the court reasoned that the term “mechanism”
in the patent at issue was not so modified; therefore, the court
affirmed the district court’s findings with respect to the functions of
the “colorant selection mechanism” element and the corresponding
structures in the specification as components of an “ink correction
1131
module (ICM).”
1124. See id. at 1333 n.3, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813 n.3.
1125. 453 F.3d 1364, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1126. Id. at 1372, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449 (quoting Lighting World, Inc. v.
Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344, 1348
(Fed. Cir. 2004)).
1127. Id. at 1372, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449 (quoting Watts v. XL Sys., 232 F.3d
877, 880, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1838 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
1128. See id. at 1372, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449.
1129. See Mass. Inst. of Tech. & Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d
1344, 1353-55, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1230-32 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1130. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230-32.
1131. Id. at 1355, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
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Finally, in DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., the
Federal Circuit ruled that the district court had properly refused to
construe the term “compression member” as a means-plus-function
1133
limitation.
After noting the presumption against construing such a
term as a means-plus-function element, the court determined that the
claim language and specification make clear “that the term
‘compression member’ refers to a particular cylindrical insert and is
not simply a general reference to any structure that will perform a
1134
Accordingly, the court concluded that one of
particular function.”
ordinary skill in the art would have understood that “compression
1135
member” referred to a definite structure.
Nonetheless, there is room for further clarity with respect to the
application of the “‘means’ presumption.” The Federal Circuit’s case
law speaks in terms of “presumptions”—which are primarily thought
of as legal constructs that organize the presentation of factual
1136
evidence —yet the court’s precedents treat construction of means1137
Thus, there is
plus-function claim elements as a question of law.
no case law that sets forth any explication of the quantum of
“evidence” necessary to overcome this “presumption,” which leaves it
to the judges in a given case to decide, as a matter of law, whether the
“presumption” has been overcome.
7.

Other issues
In 2006, the Federal Circuit addressed a handful of other issues
related to claim construction. First, the court noted that a party can
waive appellate review of a claim construction by proposing a
construction on appeal different from the construction that the party
had proposed in the trial court. In Exigent Technology, Inc. v. Atrana
1138
Solutions, Inc., the Federal Circuit noted that the claim construction
one of the parties had asserted on appeal was not made “to the
district court”; “as a result,” the court stated that it would “not
1139
disturb” the district court’s construction at issue.
In Lava Trading,
1132. 469 F.3d 1005, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1133. See id. at 1023-24, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877-78. One of the authors was
counsel to the DePuy Spine parties in this case.
1134. Id. at 1023, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
1135. See id. at 1024, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
1136. See, e.g., IX WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2491, at 304 (James H. Chadborn rev.
1981) (“A presumption . . . is in its characteristic feature a rule of law laid down by
the judge and attaching to one evidentiary fact certain procedural consequences as to the
duty of production of other evidence by the opponent.”).
1137. See, e.g., Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1332,
78 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1807, 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1138. 442 F.3d 1301, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1139. See id. at 1306-07, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324-25.

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

926

4/7/2007 11:15:24 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:4

however, the court refused to find that a party had waived the claim
construction it asserted on appeal where that party’s original counsel
had proposed one claim construction before the district court but
where the party had obtained new counsel in the district court who
had asserted in a motion for reconsideration in the district court the
1140
same construction argued on appeal.
1141
Second, the Federal Circuit noted in Kim v. Conagra Foods, Inc.,
that it is “hesitant” to adopt a claim construction that was not asserted
1142
The panel
by either party in the district court or on appeal.
majority acknowledged its authority to “adopt claim constructions
which have not been proposed by either party,” but determined that
it would be inappropriate to do so with respect to the term
“potassium bromate replacer” in light of the claim language and
1143
specification.
Judge Schall dissented, urging that the court should
have adopted a construction not asserted by either of the parties that
he believed was compelled by explanations of the advantages of the
1144
invention that were disclosed in the specification.
Finally, the Federal Circuit has been involved in an internal debate
whether the court should evaluate the district court’s claim
constructions that are not necessary to resolve a pending appeal.
Judge Newman has urged that the court should review “all of the
claim terms whose construction was decided by the district court and
challenged on appeal,” even where it is not necessary to address some
1145
of those constructions to decide the appeal.
Judge Newman has
stated:
I believe we have the obligation to review the construction of the
three appealed terms, for the interests of the parties and the
public, as well as judicial economy, require final disposition of the
issues of claim construction that were decided by the district court,
and raised on appeal. This panel’s resolution of this infringement
action based solely on the construction of “host interface” does not
resolve, or render moot, the interpretation of the other disputed
terms. . . . My colleagues’ decision not to review the other disputed
issues of claim construction leaves unresolved the scope and

1140. Lava Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Mgmt., LLC, 445 F.3d 1348, 1352-53, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1624, 1626-27 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1141. 465 F.3d 1312, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1142. See id. at 1319, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499.
1143. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499.
1144. See id. at 1326-29, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504-06 (Schall, J., dissenting).
1145. See Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 450 F.3d 1350, 1358, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786, 1791 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J., dissenting).
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viability of the claims, for these aspects are relevant to the validity
1146
and further applicability of the patent in suit.

On the other hand, Judge Dyk has expressed the view that review
of claim constructions not necessary to decide an appeal is not
appropriate, at least where the claim construction did not directly
affect the final judgment in a district court:
This case once again involves an effort by parties to a patent
infringement case to have this court opine on a range of claim
construction issues even thought the judgment of the district court
is not based on the resolution of those issues. We decline that
invitation and limit our consideration to issues presented by the
judgment under review. An appeal is not an opportunity to bring
before the appellate court every ruling with which one of the
parties disagrees without regard to whether the ruling has in any
way impacted the final judgment. The fact that this is a patent case
1147
does not invoke a different legal regime.

It is difficult to tell precisely how divergent the views of Judge
Newman and Judge Dyk really are. It does seem that Judge Newman
would be much more likely than her colleagues to entertain claim
construction issues not necessary to resolving an appeal. It is less
clear under what circumstances, if any, Judge Dyk or the other
Federal Circuit judges would address such claim-construction issues.
At a minimum, however, reaching out to decide issues not germane
to the judgment under review would appear to raise case-orcontroversy issues under Article III of the Constitution.
B. Infringement
1.

Literal infringement
As noted above, a determination of literal infringement requires
two steps—legal claim construction, followed by factual comparison
of the accused device or method to the terms of the properly
1148
Resolution of questions of literal infringement
construed claim.
often follows from claim construction. Therefore, because literal
infringement is often determined on summary judgment, the Federal
Circuit’s disposition of claim construction issues will often lead to a
1149
corresponding resolution of literal-infringement questions.
Nevertheless, in 2006 there were several decisions in which fact issues
1146. Id. at 1358-59, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791.
1147. Mass. Inst. of Tech. and Elecs. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1350, 80
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1148. See supra note 932.
1149. See, e.g., Adamo, supra note 14, at 1608-09.
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precluded summary judgment as to literal infringement for
resolution of literal infringement solely as a matter of law.
Affirmance of summary judgment with respect to literal infringement. Not
surprisingly, in 2006 the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment
with respect to literal infringement in several cases in which it also
affirmed the district court’s claim constructions. Thus, in Bicon, the
court affirmed summary judgment of non-infringement after
determining that the district court had properly construed a claim for
1150
a dental implant prosthesis.
In Panduit, the court similarly
affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of non-infringement
1151
after affirming its construction of a claim for a power box.
Likewise, in Flex-Rest, the court affirmed summary judgment of noninfringement after affirming the district court’s construction of a
claim for a computer keyboard positioning system where there was
“no dispute” that the accused devices did not infringe under the
1152
district court’s construction.
And, in 02 Micro International, Ltd. v.
1153
Monolithic Power Systems, Inc., the court affirmed a grant of summary
judgment after determining that there was no evidence presented
that could support the only theory of literal infringement properly
1154
presented to the district court.
In Semitool, the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of noninfringement, but did so based on a claim construction different
1155
from that adopted by the district court.
The district court had
determined that it was not necessary to decide “whether the
condenser is part of the process chamber or a separate unit” in
construing the phrase “supplying drying gas to the process chamber”
1156
in a claim for a semiconductor wafer carrier cleaning system.
The
Federal Circuit, however, determined that it did need to decide that
issue to evaluate whether summary judgment was properly granted
because the specification compelled the conclusion that the
condenser must be outside the process chamber, and because the
1157
accused products had a condenser inside the process chamber.

1150. Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 953-56, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1267, 1274-77 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1151. Panduit Corp. v. HellermannTyton Corp., 451 F.3d 819, 829-30, 79
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1053, 1060-61 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1152. Flex-Rest, LLC v. Steelcase, Inc., 455 F.3d 1351, 1362, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1620, 1627 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1153. 467 F.3d 1335, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1154. See id. at 1369, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779.
1155. See Semitool, Inc. v. Dynamic Micro Sys. Semiconductor Equip. GmbH, 444
F.3d 1337, 1345-48, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438, 1444-46 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1156. See id. at 1345, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444.
1157. See id. at 1347-48, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446.
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Reversal of judgment based upon reversed claim constructions. Just as the
Federal Circuit has affirmed summary judgments as to literal
infringement where it has affirmed the district court’s underlying
claim constructions, it has also reversed outright and granted
judgment to the losing party below where it has reversed the district
court’s claim constructions. Thus, in On Demand, the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s construction of the term “sales
information” and determined that under the correct claim
construction “no reasonable jury could find infringement”;
accordingly, the court reversed a jury verdict of infringement and
1158
ordered judgment of non-infringement.
Similarly, in Cook Biotech, the court reversed the district court’s
construction of the term “urinary bladder submucosa” in a patent for
a biological tissue composition and held that under the correct
1159
construction there could be no literal infringement.
Therefore,
1160
the court reversed the judgment of literal infringement.
In Abraxis
Bioscience, the court reversed the district court’s judgment of literal
infringement after determining that its construction of the claim
term “edetate” was incorrect and that under the correct construction
1161
there could be no literal infringement.
Affirmance of judgments as to literal infringement after trial. In a
number of cases, the Federal Circuit affirmed judgments as to literal
infringement after a jury or bench trial. In nCube, the court affirmed
the district court’s construction of the term “upstream manager” in a
computer system and then affirmed the jury verdict of infringement
based upon substantial record evidence that the accused product
1162
1163
infringed.
In Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., the Federal
Circuit affirmed a jury verdict of infringement based upon substantial
1164
evidence including significant expert testimony as to infringement.
1165
And in Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales Del Centro S.A., the
Federal Circuit affirmed a jury verdict of literal infringement based
1166
upon substantial evidence of literal infringement.
1158. See On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1344-45,
78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1428, 1437-38 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1159. See Cook Biotech, Inc. v. Acell, Inc., 460 F.3d 1365, 1378-79, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1874-75 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1160. See id. at 1382, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
1161. See Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 467 F.3d 1370,
1378, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1710 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1162. See nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1323, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1486 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1163. 449 F.3d 1209, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1164. See id. at 1219-23, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100-04.
1165. 464 F.3d 1339, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed Cir. 2006).
1166. See id. at 1348-50, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391-93.
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1167

In Alza Corp. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit
1168
The court
affirmed a judgment of infringement after a bench trial.
determined that the district court had properly evaluated the
evidence presented of non-infringement and thus there was no basis
1169
to overturn the court’s judgment.
Reversal of summary judgment because of disputed issues of fact. In a few
cases in 2006, the Federal Circuit reversed or vacated grants of
summary judgment because of disputed issues of fact. Thus, in LG
Electronics, after having determined that the district court’s claim
constructions as to certain claim terms was incorrect, the Federal
Circuit determined that the record was incomplete as to evidence
that would establish or disprove literal infringement under the
1170
correct claim constructions.
The court therefore remanded for
1171
Similarly, in L
further evaluation of those claims of infringement.
1172
& W, Inc. v. Schertech, Inc., the court determined that issues of fact
precluded summary judgment as to literal infringement and that the
record needed to be more fully developed to determine whether L &
1173
W’s products in fact met all of the limitations of the claim at issue.
Literal infringement of a means-plus-function claim. In Applied Medical,
the Federal Circuit discussed and applied the requirements for literal
infringement of a means-plus-function claim:
Literal infringement of a means-plus-function claim limitation
requires that the relevant structure in the accused device perform
the identical function recited in the claim and be identical or
equivalent to the corresponding structure in the specification.
Once the relevant structure in the accused device has been
identified, a party may prove it is equivalent to the disclosed
structure by showing that the two perform the identical function in
1174
substantially the same way, with substantially the same result.

The court proceeded to analyze both the supporting function and
relevant structure of the accused device, finding that the district
court had erroneously determined “the way in which the disclosed
structure” performed the defined function because the district court
had determined that the relevant “ring-levers-teeth structure” was
1167. 464 F.3d 1286, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1168. See id. at 1297, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
1169. See id. at 1295-97, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007-09.
1170. See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1376, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1443, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1171. See id. at 1381, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
1172. 471 F.3d 1311, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1198 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1173. See id. at 1318, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203.
1174. Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1333, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1807, 1813 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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required to perform functions in addition to “holding the valve
1175
The court also found that
portions” function of the claim term.
the district court had erroneously imported extraneous functions
when it determined how the disclosed embodiment performed the
1176
claimed “permit to float” function.
Judge Dyk dissented, urging
that the accused device did in fact perform the required function in
1177
substantially the same way as the patented device.
He disagreed
with the majority’s interpretation of the functions that the district
court had required for the relevant ring-levers-teeth structure, urging
that the supposedly extraneous functions defined by the majority
were really just explanations as to how the relevant structure
1178
performed the different, required functions.
Given the differences between the majority and the dissent as to
how one defines the “function” associated with a means-plus-function
claim element, Applied Medical demonstrates the difficulties in
resolving issues of infringement of such claims. It is difficult to
determine both what the precise functions are and exactly how the
structures in the patented and accused devices perform those
functions.
Design patent infringement. In 2006, the court also addressed the
less-commonly confronted doctrine of design patent infringement. A
design-patent-infringement claim requires a different procedure for
comparing the patent claim to the accused design than that used in
utility-patent infringement:
In comparing a design patent claim to the accused design to
determine infringement, a court must apply “two distinct tests,
both of which must be satisfied in order to find infringement:
(a) the ‘ordinary observer’ test, and (b) the ‘point of novelty’ test.”
The “ordinary observer” test requires comparison of the two
designs from the viewpoint of the ordinary observer to “determine
whether the patented design as a whole is substantially the same as
the accused design.” Under the “point of novelty” test, a court
must determine whether “the accused device . . . appropriates the
novelty in the patented device which distinguishes it from the prior
1179
art.”

In Lawman Armor, the court affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment ruling of non-infringement under the “point of novelty”
1175. See id. at 1334-35, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814.
1176. See id. at 1336-37, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815-16.
1177. See id. at 1337-40, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816-19 (Dyk, J.,
dissenting).
1178. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816-19 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
1179. Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner Int’l, LLC, 437 F.3d 1383, 1384-85, 77
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2017, 2018 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citations and quotations omitted).
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test, rejecting the patentee’s argument that, even though all of the
“points of novelty” proffered by the patentee were encompassed by
the prior art, the combination of those elements created an
1180
additional point of novelty.
The court explained:
“The purpose of the ‘points of novelty’ approach . . . is to focus on
those aspects of a design which render the design different from
prior art designs.” “New” designs frequently involve only relatively
small changes in the shape, size, placement, or color of elements of
old designs. It is those changes in and departures from the old
designs that constitute the “points of novelty” in the patented new
design.
If the combination of old elements shown in the prior art is itself
sufficient to constitute a “point of novelty” of a new design, it would
be the rare design that would not have a point of novelty. The
practical effect of Lawman’s theory would be virtually to eliminate
the significance of the “points of novelty” test in determining
infringement of design patents, and to provide patent protection
for designs that in fact involve no significant changes from the
1181
prior art.
1182

In Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony California, Inc.,
the court
reversed a grant of summary judgment of non-infringement of a
1183
design patent because there were genuine issues of material fact.
The court reasoned that the district court had misapplied the
“ordinary observer” test because it had “perhaps focused too
narrowly” on “isolated ornamental features” of a claimed design for a
carved, ornamental woodwork for furniture; the court stated that the
patent claims are directed to the use of the furniture “as a whole” and
that the appropriate infringement inquiry would examine how an
1184
ordinary observer would view the “design as a whole.”
Therefore,
the court remanded for a reexamination of the design patent
1185
infringement claims.
Infringement by offering to sell. In 1994, 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) was
amended to include “offer to sell” as a ground of infringement in
order to harmonize that aspect of United States law with that of other
1186
1187
nations.
In FieldTurf Int’l, Inc. v. Sprinturf, Inc.,
the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the accused infringer’s
1180. See id. at 1384-86, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2018-20.
1181. Id. at 1385-86, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2019.
1182. 439 F.3d 1365, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1183. Id. at 1371-72, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150-52.
1184. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151-52.
1185. Id. at 1372, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152.
1186. See, e.g., FieldTurf Int’l, Inc. v. Sprinturf, Inc., 433 F.3d 1366, 1369, 77
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1468, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1187. 433 F.3d 1366, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1468 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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response to a request for proposal (“RFP”) that had specified features
that characterized a patented product by offering its own
1188
The
noninfringing product was not an infringing “offer to sell.”
court rejected the patentee’s argument that by responding to an RFP
that specifically requested its patented product “or approved equal”
and described its patented features, the defendant had necessarily
infringed; the court emphasized that the requester was “aware” of the
differences between the patented product and the defendant’s
1189
product and chose to purchase the noninfringing product.
“Joint Infringement.”
The Federal Circuit addressed, without
extended discussion, the issue of “joint” or “divided infringement,”
which implicates possible joint liability for infringement of a method
claim, where multiple entities perform different steps of a claimed
1190
method.
In On Demand, the court addressed the argument that
Amazon, which interfaced directly with consumers, and Lightning
Source, which took orders for books from Amazon, could be liable
for “joint infringement,” even though neither, by itself, completed all
of the steps required to infringe a claim for a high-speed process to
1191
create a single copy of a book.
The court examined the following
jury instruction:
It is not necessary for the acts that constitute infringement to be
performed by one person or entity. When infringement results
from the participation and combined action(s) of more than one
person or entity, they are all joint infringers and jointly liable for
patent infringement. Infringement of a patented process or
method cannot be avoided by having another perform one step of
the process or method. Where the infringement is the result of the
participation and combined action(s) of one or more persons or
entities, they are joint infringers and are jointly liable for the
1192
infringement.

The court stated that it discerned “no flaw in this instruction as a
statement of law,” and went on to rule that neither Amazon nor
Lightning Source could be held liable for infringement under that
standard: “Each of these components of the claimed invention is in
the prior art; their combination is the patentable invention, and it is
1193
the practice of the combination that is essential to infringement.”

1188. See id. at 1369-70, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470-71.
1189. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470-71.
1190. On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1344-45, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1428, 1437-38.
1191. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437-38.
1192. See id. at 1344-45, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437-38.
1193. See id. at 1345, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438.
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Decisional law from district courts provides some support for
aggregation in the performance of steps of a method claim among
different parties, and those cases have generally agreed that
aggregation is permissible when there is a sufficient connection
1194
between or among the entities whose conduct is aggregated.
District court cases have explicated this “connection” requirement in
1195
different ways.
Nonetheless, it was not until On Demand that the
Federal Circuit took up this theory of infringement, albeit without
discussing the governing standards.
Taken at face value, On Demand suggests a general acceptance of
the joint-infringement theory. But litigation will continue on the
issue, as the jury instruction endorsed by the Federal Circuit can be
argued as support for a nearly indiscriminate aggregation of steps
performed by different parties, so long as “the infringement is the
result of the participation and combined action(s) of one or more
1196
persons or entities.”
The paucity of analysis and brief treatment of
the issue might also lessen the likelihood that panels in future cases
will uncritically adopt the most expansive reading of the case.
The court’s treatment of this issue in On Demand (and the
controversy the issue generated with respect to that case, and with
respect to another notable case raising joint-infringement issues that
1197
was settled in 2006) leaves several questions unanswered. Is the
“connection” standard the appropriate standard? If it is, what sort of
“connection” should be required? When can the steps practiced by
others, whether or not defendants, be imputed to a single defendant?
It is possible that a pending case presenting issues of “joint
1198
infringement” will provide some of the answers to these questions.

1194. See, e.g., Faroudja Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., No. 97-20010 SW, 1999 WL
111788, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999) (summarizing case law as requiring that there
be “some connection between the different entities” in order to support
aggregation).
1195. Compare, e.g., Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave., Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 323, 34950 (D. Del.) (finding connection standard satisfied based upon facts such as a
“relationship between [the defendant] and the medical community”), modified on
rehearing in other respects, 2002 WL 1022509 (D. Del. May 15, 2002), rev’d on other
grounds, 339 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003), with Marley Mouldings Ltd. v. Mikron Indus.,
Inc., No. 02 C 2855, 2003 WL 1989640, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2003).
1196. On Demand, 432 F.3d at 1344-45, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437-38.
1197. See Freedom Wireless, Inc. v. Boston Commc’ns Group, Inc., No. 2006-1237,
2006 WL 3358367, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 2006) (noting dismissal of appeal because
of “[t]he parties having so agreed”).
1198. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., No. 06-1503 (Fed. Cir., scheduled for
argument Apr. 5, 2007).
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2.

Infringement by equivalents
The doctrine of equivalents (sometimes abbreviated as the “DOE”)
prevents an accused infringer from avoiding liability for patent
infringement by making only minor or insubstantial changes to an
invention covered by the claims of the patent, thereby avoiding literal
1199
infringement while retaining the invention’s “essential identity.”
The doctrine recognizes that “[t]he language in the patent claims
may not capture every nuance of the invention or describe with
complete precision the range of its novelty. If patents were always
interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be greatly
diminished. Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain
elements could defeat the patent, and its value to inventors could
1200
be destroyed by simple acts of copying.”
“Infringement may be found under the doctrine of equivalents if
every limitation of the asserted claim, or its ‘equivalent,’ is found in
the accused subject matter, where an ‘equivalent’ differs from the
claimed limitation only insubstantially.” An accused device that
“performs substantially the same function in substantially the same
way to obtain the same result” as the patented invention may
1201
infringe under this doctrine.

The test quoted above is often referred to as the “function-wayresult” test. In Abraxis Bioscience, the district court had applied that
test
to
hold
that
the
accused
product’s
use
of
diethylenetriaminepentaacetic acid (“DTPA”) rather than the
claimed compound ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid (“EDTA”)
infringed a claim for a pharmaceutical composition under the
1202
doctrine of equivalents.
Although the Federal Circuit had reversed
the district court’s finding of literal infringement based on its
disagreement with the district court’s claim construction, it affirmed
the finding of infringement by equivalents; the Federal Circuit
reasoned that DTPA and EDTA are structurally analogous
polyaminocarboxylic acids that both work in the same way to retard
1203
microbial growth.
The court held that the record supported the
1199. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d
558, 564, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1868 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1200. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1016, 80
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1873 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002)).
1201. Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 467 F.3d at 1370, 1379,
80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1710-11 (Fed Cir. 2006) (quoting Ethicon Endo-Surgery,
Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 149 F. 3d 1309, 1315, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1276
(Fed. Cir. 1998), and Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
608 (1950)).
1202. See id. at 1379-83, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710-13.
1203. See id. at 1380-82, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711-13.
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finding of infringement and emphasized that the patentee had not
surrendered coverage of DTPA in the specification, “particularly in
light of the unforseeability of calcium trisodium DTPA as an
1204
equivalent” at the time the patent was issued.
Although the court in Abraxis Biochemical had reversed the district
court’s claim construction and literal-infringement rulings, but
affirmed its finding of infringement by equivalents, it did so in light
of specific and independent arguments in favor of infringement
1205
That is important because the
under the doctrine of equivalents.
Federal Circuit has warned that “[t]he party asserting infringement
must present ‘evidence and argument concerning the doctrine [of
equivalents] and each of its elements.’ The evidence and argument on
the doctrine of equivalents cannot merely be subsumed in plaintiff’s
1206
case of literal infringement.”
Thus, in nCube, the court affirmed
the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law of noninfringement under the doctrine of equivalents notwithstanding the
jury’s contrary verdict, because the patentee had not presented any
1207
evidence of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents at trial.
It should also be noted that, just as one can disavow in the
specification literal coverage of a patent claim, it is also possible to
disavow equivalents in the specification. “The scope of equivalents
may [ ] be limited by statements in the specification that disclaim
1208
certain subject matter.”
Thus, in Honeywell, the court affirmed the
district court’s conclusion that the use of “carbon fibers” had been
specifically disavowed from the scope of the “electrically conductive
1209
fibers” claim limitation at issue.
There are several legal limitations upon application of the doctrine
of equivalents that the Federal Circuit addressed in 2006.
a.

Prosecution-history estoppel

The doctrine of prosecution-history estoppel (archaically known as
“file-wrapper estoppel”) precludes a patentee from using the doctrine
of equivalents to obtain coverage of subject matter that the patentee
1210
has relinquished during the prosecution of the patent application.
1204. See id. at 1380-81, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711-13.
1205. See id. at 1381-82, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
1206. nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1325, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1207. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.
1208. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 452 F.3d 1312, 1321, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1294, 1301-02 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
1209. See id. at 1320-21, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301-02.
1210. See, e.g., Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373,
1376, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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Prosecution-history estoppel is a purely legal issue and is based on the
logic that “the patentee, during prosecution, has created a record
that fairly notifies the public that the patentee has surrendered the
1211
right to claim particular matter as within the reach of the patent.”
There are two varieties of prosecution-history estoppel: estoppel by
argument and estoppel by amendment.
“Arguments made
voluntarily during prosecution may give rise to prosecution history
1212
estoppel if they evidence a surrender of subject matter.”
The
Supreme Court addressed estoppel by amendment in its decision in
Festo:
“A patentee’s decision to narrow his claims through
amendment may be presumed to be a general disclaimer of a
1213
territory of the original claim and the amended claim.”
In 2006, the Federal Circuit addressed a handful of cases involving
estoppel by amendment. In Old Town Canoe, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s ruling of no infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents; the court found that the relevant patent
claims were “narrowed, triggering a presumption that subject matter
was surrendered” in light of an amendment in response to a rejection
1214
by the examiner.
The court reasoned that the amendment
disclaimed the methods for “coalescence” as part of a chemical
process for which coverage was sought under the doctrine of
1215
equivalents.
In Primos, the court affirmed a jury verdict of infringement by
equivalents, rejecting the argument that amendments to the term
“plate” in a claim for a device that simulates animal sounds narrowed
the scope of the claim and were made for reasons relating to
1216
The Federal Circuit noted that the Supreme Court
patentability.
in Festo held that “when a patent claim is amended during
prosecution for reasons relating to patentability, there is a
presumption that the patentee surrendered all the territory between
the original claim limitation and the amended claim limitation,” but
acknowledged that the presumption may be overcome when the
“rationale underlying the amendment may bear no more than a

1211. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558,
564-65, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1869 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1212. Id. at 568, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
1213. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740
(2002).
1214. Old Town Canoe Co. v. Conflunece Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 1314-15,
78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1709 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1215. See id. at 1315, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
1216. See Primos, Inc. v. Hunter’s Specialities, Inc., 451 F.3d 841, 848-50, 79
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1134-36 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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tangential relation to the equivalent in question.”
The court
reasoned that the amendments to the term “plate” did not surrender
the equivalent of a “dome” that functions identically to the “plate”
literally claimed; the relevant amendments addressed the “length” of
the “plate” and its relationship to a different portion of the device,
but did not relate to its shape, i.e., whether it is a flat plate or dome
1218
shaped.
The Festo presumption and the situations where it may be rebutted
were the focus of analysis in Amgen, where the Federal Circuit
evaluated the district court’s ruling that the Festo presumption did not
apply to a claim amendment because the presumption had been
1219
The district court had determined that an amendment
rebutted.
limiting the claims of a patent for an erythropoietin (“EPO”) product
that limited the EPO to one with a particular amino acid sequence
was “tangential” and did not prevent an equivalent having a 1651220
amino acid sequence.
The Federal Circuit had previously
determined that the amendment at issue was related to patentability,
1221
The court then
and thus that the Festo presumption was triggered.
noted that “[t]he burden of rebutting the Festo presumption lies with
the patentee” and that “[t]he presumption that equivalents are
surrendered may be rebutted if a patentee shows that ‘one skilled in
the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that
1222
would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.’”
The
court further explained:
[I]n Festo II, the Supreme Court listed three ways in which a
patentee may make this showing.
First, the patentee may
demonstrate that “the equivalent would have been unforeseeable
at the time of the amendment.” Second, the patentee may show
that “the rationale underlying the amendment bears no more than
a tangential relation to the equivalent in question.” Third, a
patentee may demonstrate that “there [is] some other reason
suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to
1223
have described the insubstantial substitute in question.

1217. Id. at 849, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135 (quoting Festo, 535 U.S. at 740-41).
1218. See id. at 849-50, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135-36.
1219. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1308-16, 79
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1716-22 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1220. See id. at 1311, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719.
1221. See id. at 1310-12, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717-19.
1222. Id. at 1312, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719 (quoting Festo, 535 U.S. at 741)
(other citations omitted).
1223. Id. at 1312-13, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719 (quoting Festo, 535 U.S. at 74041).
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The court then summarized the guidance it had previously had
given in its decision on remand in Festo as to the showings necessary
to rebut the Festo presumption:
We suggested that after-arising technology is more likely to be
unforeseeable than old technology, but did not set forth any hard
or fast rule on foreseeability. We stated that “if the alleged
equivalent were known in the prior art in the field of the invention,
it certainly should have been foreseeable at the time of the
amendment.” With regard to the tangentiality of an amendment to
an equivalent, we did not set forth any concrete definition, but we
did note that an amendment “made to avoid prior art that contains
the equivalent in question is not tangential; it is central to
allowance of the claim.” Thus, an amendment is tangential when
the “reason for it was peripheral, or not directly relevant, to the
alleged equivalent.” The determination of whether or not an
amendment is merely tangential to the equivalent is based on the
“patentee’s objectively apparent reason for the narrowing
amendment.” Thus, the inquiry must be based on the intrinsic
record alone and, if necessary, expert testimony to aid in
interpretation of that record. Finally, we noted that the third way
to rebut the Festo presumption, the “some other reason” route, is a
narrow one. We stated that “the third criterion may be satisfied
when there was some reason, such as the shortcomings of
language, why the patentee was prevented from describing the
1224
alleged equivalent when it narrowed the claim.”

Applying this guidance, the court in Amgen reasoned that an EPO
with 165 amino acids was a foreseeable equivalent and that the
addition of the reference to the different amino acids sequence “was
1225
not merely tangential” to the alleged equivalent.
The court
emphasized that the sequence amendment appeared to have been
“central to overcoming a double patenting rejection” in light of a
1226
prior patent with a different amino acid sequence.
Finally, the
court examined whether there was “some other reason” or
“shortcoming of language” that prevented the patentee from
describing the 165-amino acid sequence when it narrowed the claim,
1227
the court found that no such reason or short coming existed.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court had erred in

1224. Id. at 1313, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719-20 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1372, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc)).
1225. Id. at 1313-15, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720-21.
1226. See id. at 1314-15, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720-21.
1227. See id. at 1316, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722.
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finding that the Festo presumption had been overcome and reversed
1228
the judgment of infringement by equivalents.
b.

The all-elements/anti-vitiation rule

“Application of the doctrine of equivalents is limited by the ‘allelements rule,’ which provides that ‘the doctrine of equivalents does
not apply if applying the doctrine would vitiate an entire claim
1229
limitation.’”
Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to
defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine
of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim,
not to the invention as a whole. It is important to ensure that the
application of the doctrine, even as to an individual element, is not
allowed such broad play as to effectively eliminate that element in
1230
its entirety.

Application of this rule, however, can be difficult.
In Panduit, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
determination that application of the doctrine of equivalents was
forbidden because the claim required wires to pass through “an
opening in an abutment portion” in a wire box, but the accused
1231
The
device had wires that did not go through such an opening.
court concluded that “[t]o extend the scope of the claim to
encompass an accused device in which wires bypass the abutment
portion all together would necessarily read the ‘opening’ limitation
1232
out of the claim.”
In Primos, the court rejected the argument that application of the
doctrine of equivalents would have vitiated the limitation “plate” in
1233
the relevant claim.
The court reasoned that it would not vitiate the
“plate” limitation to permit a dome-shaped equivalent because the
term “plate” does not necessarily convey a definitive, geometric shape
or structure; thus, the court concluded that permitting the claimed
equivalent would not “effectively eliminate” the plate limitation in its
1234
entirety.
1228. See id. at 1316, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722.
1229. Panduit Corp. v. HellermannTyton Corp., 451 F.3d 819, 830, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1053, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc., 402
F.3d 1188, 1195, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
1230. DePuy Spine v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1016-17, 80
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1873 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. Inc. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997)).
1231. Panduit, 451 F.3d at 830, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060-61.
1232. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060-61.
1233. See Primos, Inc. v. Hunter’s Specialties, Inc., 451 F.3d 841, 849-50, 79
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1135-36 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1234. See id. at 850, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
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Conversely, in Planet Bingo, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s conclusion that the doctrine of equivalents could not apply to
a device that performs the critical calculation “after” the first bingo
ball is drawn, where the claim requires that calculation “before” the
1235
first bingo ball is drawn.
The court reasoned that the “before”
limitation was critical to the invention, and thus that the doctrine of
equivalents could not apply without entirely vitiating that claim
limitation: “Here, the patents contain a distinct limitation, which was
part of the bargain when the patent issued. This court cannot
overlook that limitation or expand the doctrine of equivalents
beyond its purpose to allow recapture of subject matter excluded by a
1236
deliberate and foreseeable claim drafting decision.”
In DePuy Spine, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s
determination that applying the doctrine of equivalents would vitiate
the limitation “spherically-shaped” in a patent for a surgical screw if a
1237
“cylindrical-conical” equivalent were permitted.
The court
emphasized that “DePuy’s expert presented particularized” evidence
that the claimed equivalent was “insubstantially different from the
1238
corresponding ‘spherically-shaped’ limitation.”
Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit held that the district court had erred by granting
1239
summary judgment of non-infringement, and remanded for a trial.
While these cases can be rationalized as situation-specific
determinations of whether a particular claim term would be read out
of the claim by application of the doctrine of equivalents, it could
also be argued that these cases show how arbitrary the anti-vitiation
rule can appear. It does not necessarily follow that, if “before” can
not equal “after,” that “plate” can equal “dome” and that “spherical”
can equal “conical.” Of course, the devil is always in the details, and
the Federal Circuit claims to make such distinctions based on the
precise language of the claims, specification and prosecution history.
But at a more basic level, these decisions are best understood as caseby-case applications of an extremely general rule.

1235. Planet Bingo, LLC v. GameTech Int’l, Inc., 472 F.3d 1338, 1345, 81
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1236. Id. at 1344, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
1237. See DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 101920, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1874-75 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1238. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874-75.
1239. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874-75.
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Specific exclusion of equivalents

The doctrine of equivalents may not apply where a claim recites
detailed structure and thus implicitly disclaims arguably equivalent
structures.
A claim that contains a detailed recitation of structure is properly
accorded correspondingly limited recourse to the doctrine of
equivalents. . . . “[B]y defining the claim in a way that clearly
excluded certain subject matter, the patent implicitly disclaimed
the subject matter that was excluded and thereby barred the
patentee from asserting infringement under the doctrine of
1240
equivalents.”

Thus, in Bicon, the court held that a claim reciting a very detailed
“convex” structure excluded an equivalent with a correspondingly
1241
“concave” structure.
The court emphasized that permitting the
claimed equivalent would be “clearly contrary to, and thus excluded
1242
by” the relevant patent claim.
Similarly, in Cook Biotech, the court concluded that the claimed
equivalent could not be permitted because it contained a structure
“specifically excluded” from the composition covered by the patent
1243
claim.
The court noted that it is a “‘corollary to the ‘all limitations
rule’” that “‘the concept of equivalency cannot embrace a structure
1244
that is specifically excluded from the scope of the claims.’”
d.

Other issues

In 2006, the Federal Circuit addressed a handful of other
significant issues with respect to the doctrine of equivalents. First, the
court emphasized that after-arising technology may be particularly
appropriate for analysis under the doctrine of equivalents. “An
appropriate range of equivalents may extend to post-invention
1245
advances . . . in an appropriate case.”
Second, the Federal Circuit made clear that summary judgment
under the doctrine of equivalents is inappropriate where there are
material questions of fact with respect to whether an accused product
1240. Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 955, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1267,
1276 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular
Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1346, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
1241. See id. at 955-56, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276-77.
1242. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276.
1243. See Cook Biotech Inc. v. Acell, Inc., 460 F.3d 1365, 1379, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1874-75 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1244. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875 (quoting Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince
Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1582, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
1245. Varco, L.P. v. Pason Sys. USA Corp., 436 F.3d 1368, 1376, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1948, 1955 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Travenol
Labs., Inc., 745 F.2d 1, 9, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
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is an appropriate equivalent. Thus, in LG Electronics, the court ruled
that the district court had inappropriately granted summary
judgment of no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
where there was a genuine issue of material fact “as to whether the
accused device can function within the narrow range of equivalents”
1246
that the court ruled would be permissible.
3.

Other infringement doctrines
a.

Inducing infringement

In one of the more significant infringement rulings of 2006, the
Federal Circuit issued its en banc decision in DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS
1247
Co.,
clarifying the level of intent necessary for inducing
1248
Inducing infringement requires “both an
infringement.
underlying instance of direct infringement and a requisite showing of
1249
intent.”
Thus, the court must determine whether the party
accused of inducing infringement acted with the requisite intent.
Prior to the decision in DSU Medical, there was some question
whether the accused inducer merely had to intend to commit certain
acts that in fact would infringe a patent or whether the accused
inducer had to actually know of a patent and intend that it be
infringed. In DSU Medical, the court explained that it was clarifying
the
intent requirement by holding en banc that, as was stated in
Mansville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 554
(Fed. Cir. 1990), “[t]he plaintiff has the burden of showing that the
alleged infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and that he
knew or should have known his actions would induce actual
infringements.” The requirement that the alleged infringer knew
or should have known his actions would induce actual
infringement necessarily includes the requirement that he or she
1250
knew of the patent.

Therefore, the court emphasized that
the intent requirement for inducement requires more than just
intent to cause the acts that produce direct infringement. Beyond
that threshold knowledge, the inducement must have an
1246. See LG Elecs., Inc., v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1380-81, 79
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1247. 471 F.3d 1293, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1248. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1249. Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., Inc., 449 F.3d 1209, 1222, 79
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation omitted).
1250. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1238, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (other citations omitted).

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

944

4/7/2007 11:15:24 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:4

affirmative intent to cause direct infringement. In the words of a
recent decision, inducement requires “‘that the alleged infringer
knowingly induced infringement and possessed specific intent to
encourage another’s infringement.’” Accordingly, inducement
requires evidence of culpable conduct, directed to encouraging
another’s infringement, not merely that the inducer had
1251
knowledge of the direct infringer’s activities.

Applying this standard, the court affirmed the jury’s determination
that the accused inducer had not “purposefully and culpably”
1252
induced infringement.
The court noted that the record contained
substantial evidence that the accused inducer did not believe that the
1253
device at issue infringed the patent.
The court’s holding in DSU Medical is quite significant. Earlier in
2006, the court in nCube had affirmed a jury verdict of induced
infringement based upon a jury instruction that merely stated that
the accused inducer would be liable if it “actively and knowingly
aided or abetted someone to make, use, sell, or offer to sell the entire
1254
product covered by the claims of the patent in suit.”
That
instruction did not include the requirement that the accused inducer
specifically know of and intend to infringe the patent. Accordingly,
under the law clarified in DSU Medical, it appears that it would have
been harder to affirm the verdict in nCube under the Manville
Sales/DSU Medical standard.
On the other hand, the court in Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H.
1255
Peterson Co.,
noted that the intent requirement had not been
clarified by the court, and emphasized that even if specific intent to
cause infringement were necessary to holding a party liable for
inducing infringement, such specific intent was evident in the case
1256
before it.
The court emphasized that the accused inducer “had
notice of the patent” and that he had provided instructions to
customers “directing them to perform specific acts leading to the
assembly of infringing devices, from which the district court could
1257
draw an inference of [specific] intent . . . .”
In Liquid Dynamics, the court addressed inducement of
infringement by foreign purchasers. Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), a
party may be an infringer if it:
1251. Id. at 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247 (citations omitted).
1252. See id. at 1307, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248.
1253. See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248.
1254. nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1324-25, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1487 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1255. 438 F.3d 1354, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1256. See id. at 1364-65, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012.
1257. Id. at 1364 n.4, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012 n.4.
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“supplies . . . in or from the United States all or a substantial
portion of the components of a patented invention, where such
components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner
as to actively induce the combination of such components outside
of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if
1258
such combination occurred within the United States . . . .”

The court upheld a jury verdict of inducement because there was
substantial evidence in the record that the accused inducer knew
about the ‘414 patent at issue and “intended for its . . . design to
1259
infringe the claims of the ‘414 patent.”
An issue related to that addressed in Liquid Dynamics is whether
§ 271(f) applies to process inventions. That issue is apparently
unresolved. In Union Carbide Chemicals and Plastics Technology Corp. v.
1260
Shell Oil Co., Judge Lourie, joined by Chief Judge Michel and Judge
Linn, dissented from the court’s denial of rehearing en banc because,
1261
in his view, § 271(f) cannot apply to process inventions.
Judge
Lourie’s dissent emphasized that the statute “speaks of supplying
‘components of a patented invention, where such components are
uncombined . . . in such manner as to actively induce the
combination of such components outside of the United States.’ 35
U.S.C. § 271(f). The whole tenor of that provision relates to physical
1262
inventions, i.e., apparatus or compositions, not methods.”
The
majority, of course, had held that § 271(f) did in fact apply to method
claims and thus, until and unless the Federal Circuit addresses that
issue en banc, or the Supreme Court takes up the issue, § 271(f) does
apply to method claims.
In Kim, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment of
no inducing infringement on the ground that the plaintiff had failed
1263
to prove underlying infringement.
The court emphasized that the
plaintiff had presented “no testimony based on the accused products
themselves that supported a finding of infringement,” and thus found
1264
no reason to disturb the district court’s ruling.

1258. See Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., Inc., 449 F.3d 1209, 1222, 79
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1259. See id. at 1222-23, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103.
1260. 434 F.3d 1357, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1634 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1261. See id. at 1358-59, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635-36 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
1262. See id. at 1358, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
1263. See Yoon Ja Kim v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 465 F.3d 1312, 1319-20, 80
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495, 1499-1500 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1264. See id. at 1320, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500.
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Contributory infringement

The court in DSU Medical also addressed the related doctrine of
contributory infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Under that
section:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States . . . a
component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition . . . constituting a material part of the invention,
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for
use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use,
1265
shall be liable as a contributory infringer.

Thus, to prevail on contributory infringement, the plaintiff must
show that the accused infringer knew that the component it sold
would be used in an infringing product, was not suitable for
substantial non-infringing uses and that the component was sold
within the United States. The court in DSU Medical determined that
the district court had correctly refused to grant a new trial as to
contributory infringement because the jury verdict of no contributory
infringement could be sustained on the basis that there was no
1266
underlying infringement that occurred within the United States.
The court found that substantial evidence showed that components
that were shipped into the United States were already in an
infringing configuration; thus, the court concluded that it was
reasonable for the jury to determine that any infringing acts took
1267
place outside of the United States.
c.

Willful infringement

“The extent to which the infringer disregarded the property rights
of the patentee, the deliberateness of tortious acts, or other
manifestations of unethical or injurious commercial conduct, may
1268
provide grounds for a finding of willful infringement.”
“A patentee
bears the burden of persuasion and must prove willful infringement
1269
by clear and convincing evidence.”
A finding of willful
infringement will permit the assessment of enhanced damages for
1270
infringement.
1265. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000) (quoted with emphasis in DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS
Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1303, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1244-45 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1266. See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1303, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1238, 1244-45 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1267. See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
1268. Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1367-68, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1004, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted).
1269. Id. at 1368, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015 (citation omitted).
1270. See infra notes 1366-1377.
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In nCube, the Federal Circuit affirmed a jury verdict of willful
infringement where the accused infringer claimed that it relied on an
1271
The court concluded
opinion of counsel of non-infringement.
that the opinion-of-counsel defense was defective because the record
showed “that at least one important technical document was not
supplied to [the defendant’s] opinion counsel. Thus, ‘the best
information was intentionally not made available to counsel during
the preparation of the opinion, so that the opinion can no longer
serve its prophylactic purpose of negating a finding of willful
1272
infringement.”
Similarly, in Liquid Dynamics, the Federal Circuit affirmed the jury’s
verdict of willful infringement where the accused infringer argued
1273
that it had relied on an opinion of counsel of non-infringement.
The court held that the jury verdict was sustainable because patent
counsel “was not given” complete versions of necessary documents,
and thus his opinion was flawed and was not a proper basis to avoid a
1274
finding of willful infringement.
Likewise, the court in Applied Medical upheld a jury verdict of
willfulness notwithstanding the accused infringer’s argument that it
1275
had relied on several opinions of counsel.
The court emphasized
that there was substantial evidence that each of those opinions was
defective and that the accused infringer “did not rely on the legal
opinions as legitimate advice as to whether Versaport II infringed, but
rather sought legal opinions for their potential evidentiary value on
1276
the issue of willful infringement in future litigation.”
On a related issue, the court in Golden Blount addressed the effect
on willfulness analysis of a failure to seek an opinion of counsel. In
1277
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.,
the
Federal Circuit had ruled that it is inappropriate to draw an inference
that any opinion of counsel would have been unfavorable from the
fact that a party did not seek an opinion of counsel as to
1278
In Golden Blount, the accused infringer urged that
infringement.

1271. See nCube Corp v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1324, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1486-87 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1272. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487 (quoting Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris
Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1191, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
1273. See Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., Inc., 449 F.3d 1209, 1225, 79
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094, 1105-06 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1274. See id. at 1225-26, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105.
1275. See Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp, 435 F.3d 1356, 1365, 77
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666, 1672-73 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1276. Id. at 1365, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673.
1277. 383 F.3d 1337, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1560 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
1278. See id. at 1344, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565.
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1279

the district court had in fact drawn such an adverse inference.
The
Federal Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that the district
court had “considered all of the facts presented in assessing whether
Peterson acted in reckless disregard of Golden Blount’s patent
rights”; those facts included substantial evidence that Peterson had
obtained several incomplete and plainly insufficient oral opinions as
1280
to infringement.
The court accordingly concluded that the district
1281
court had not drawn any improper inferences.
V. REMEDIES AND LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY
A. Damages
In 2006, the Federal Circuit handed down a number of significant
damages decisions. It decided several cases clarifying plaintiffs’
ability to recover two separate damages awards based on putatively
separate infringements or legal theories. It also issued decisions
reviewing district courts’ applications of the Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin
1282
lost-profits test, as well as reviewing an
Brothers Fibre Works, Inc.
award of enhanced damages premised upon willful patent
infringement.
1.

General Damages
The Federal Circuit decided three cases in 2006 relating to the
effect of an initial reasonable-royalty, patent-infringement damages
award upon the plaintiff’s ability to obtain a second damages award
under a different theory. In this regard, the panel considered the
collateral estoppel effect of rulings relating to a previous damages
award upon a subsequent damages award relating to additional
accused products, the interaction between an award of damages for
direct infringement and a subsequent attempt to receive an award for
indirect infringement for the same conduct, and the effect of a
patent-damages award upon a plaintiff’s ability to obtain trademarkinfringement damages based upon conduct forming the basis of the
patent-damages award.
1283
In Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., Applied
sued U.S. Surgical for infringement of a patent relating to surgical

1279. See Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1367-69, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1004, 1014-16 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1280. See id. at 1369, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016.
1281. See id. at 1369-70, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016.
1282. 575 F.2d 1152, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726 (6th Cir. 1978).
1283. 435 F.3d 1356, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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devices used in abdominal surgery.
A jury had found in a previous
action that U.S. Surgical had willfully infringed the patent, and had
1285
After that verdict,
awarded Applied a reasonable royalty of 7%.
U.S. Surgical began selling a redesigned device, and Applied brought
this second lawsuit accusing the redesigned product of patent
1286
infringement.
The district court granted summary judgment of
infringement in favor of Applied, and the Federal Circuit affirmed
1287
that liability ruling on appeal.
The parties then tried damages in the second case involving the
1288
redesigned accused products.
U.S. Surgical argued that principles
of collateral estoppel required that the seven percent royalty from the
1289
The district court
first lawsuit also be used in the second case.
rejected this argument, and imposed a different and higher royalty
1290
amount. U.S. Surgical appealed to the Federal Circuit.
Applying the regional law of the Ninth Circuit to the collateral
estoppel issue, the panel affirmed the district court’s rejection of U.S.
Surgical’s claim that the original royalty percentage was binding in
1291
the second case.
The panel observed that collateral estoppel
applies only where an issue is “identical” between two cases, and held
that the doctrine was “not appropriate because the necessary
reasonable royalty determination in [the second case wa]s not
1292
identical to that decided in [the first case].”
The panel noted that
a reasonable royalty is based upon a hypothetical negotiation
between the parties regarding terms of a license, and that this
counterfactual analysis “must relate to the time infringement
1293
occurred.”
The panel rejected U.S. Surgical’s contention that the
infringement in the two cases could be treated as a single,
undifferentiated and ongoing infringement, holding instead that
“the infringements requiring compensation began at separate and
1294
distinct times” in the two cases.
“Because [the first case] and [the
second] caused two separate infringements, and each infringement
commenced on a different date, it follows that the reasonable

1284.
1285.
1286.
1287.
1288.
1289.
1290.
1291.
1292.
1293.
1294.

See id. at 1357-58, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
See id. at 1358, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
See id. at 1358-59, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
See id. at 1359, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668-69.
See id. at 1360, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669.
Id. at 1361, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
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royalties may well be different from each other,” thus precluding
1295
application of collateral estoppel.
Moreover, the panel observed that, in defending against
infringement in the second action, “U.S. Surgical ha[d] asserted that
[the redesigned product at issue in that case wa]s a different product
1296
from the” accused product in the first case.
“Having conceded that
[the two products] were different infringements, U.S. Surgical’s
attempt to conflate the two products for purposes of damages
1297
fails.”
The panel further held that, “simply because the same
company sold two different products which infringed a patent does not
prevent the patentee from litigating and collecting separate damages
1298
for each infringement.”
The panel cautioned, however, that despite its ruling in the case at
hand, “there may be instances, which we do not address here, in
which two products, even if not identical, may present the same
1299
damages analysis.”
Because “[t]he two infringements caused by
[the products at issue in the two cases] began at different times, and
require two different hypothetical negotiation dates,” the panel held
that such a case of identical damages analyses was “not the case
1300
here.”
1301
Jackson, a patent holder,
In Glenayre Electronics, Inc. v. Jackson,
claimed that Glenayre had infringed a patent relating to an apparatus
1302
for making certain control signals over telephone lines.
Glenayre
brought the lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment of non1303
infringement.
Jackson counterclaimed against Glenayre for
indirect infringement based upon Glenayre’s sales of the accused
1304
The district court stayed the
products to Glenayre’s customers.
1305
counterclaims, and held a jury trial on direct infringement.
The
jury returned a verdict of infringement and awarded reasonable
1306
The
royalty damages to Jackson in the amount of $12,000,000.
district court granted Glenayre’s motion for remittitur, finding that
the evidence did not support a royalty in that amount, and reducing

1295.
1296.
1297.
1298.
1299.
1300.
1301.
1302.
1303.
1304.
1305.
1306.

Id. at 1361-62, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
Id. at 1362, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
Id. at 1363, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
443 F.3d 851, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See id. at 853, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642.
See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642.
See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642-43.
See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
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1307

the damages award to $2,650,000 plus prejudgment interest.
“Jackson accepted the district court’s decision to award him the
1308
but later
remitted damages award plus prejudgment interest,”
“filed a motion to set trial on the stayed counterclaims of indirect
1309
infringement by Glenayre.”
The district court denied the motion,
holding “that the judgment completely compensated Jackson for
direct infringement and therefore there was nothing else owed to
1310
Jackson,” and Jackson appealed.
In the Federal Circuit, the panel majority affirmed, rejecting
Jackson’s arguments that he was entitled to a new trial on reasonable
royalty damages for indirect infringement by Glenayre. Jackson first
argued “that various statements and conduct of the district court and
Glenayre require[d] that a second trial be held to address his claims
1311
of indirect infringement by Glenayre.”
The panel majority rejected
this argument, concluding that “none of these statements or conduct
constitute[d] a guarantee or promise by the district court that
1312
entitle[d] Jackson to a second trial as a matter of right.”
Jackson next challenged the district court’s conclusion that he had
been fully compensated for any indirect infringement by the original
damages award. The panel majority rejected this argument, too,
noting that “Jackson’s allegations of indirect infringement [we]re
based solely on Glenayre’s sales of infringing products to its
1313
customers followed by those customers’ use of the same products.”
The panel majority held that,
at least in cases like this one, where a patentee alleges that a
manufacturer contributes to and induces infringement by its
customers simply because it sells infringing products to its
customers, damages assessed for indirect infringement normally
will be the same as damages that would be assessed had the
1314
patentee sued and obtained a judgment against the customers.

Moreover, the panel majority concluded that “in most cases
damages assessed for indirect infringement will be equal to damages
1315
The panel
assessed for the underlying direct infringement.”
majority found that general rule applicable and emphasized that
Jackson had “presented evidence and arguments regarding customer
1307.
1308.
1309.
1310.
1311.
1312.
1313.
1314.
1315.

See id. at 854, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
Id. at 856, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
Id. at 856-57, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
Id. at 858, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
Id. at 858-59, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
Id. at 859, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
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use to the jury and judge during and after the first trial.”
It thus
concluded that Jackson’s attempt to get damages for indirect
infringement amounted to an attempt to re-litigate the district court’s
remittitur from the first phase, which “ha[d] already been litigated to
1317
a final judgment.”
The panel majority next turned to considering three Supreme
1318
Court precedents in this area, Birdsell v. Shaliol, Union Tool Co. v.
1319
and Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Wilson,
1320
The panel majority found that Birdsell precluded Jackson “from
Co.
suing to collect damages for direct infringement by Glenayre’s
customers because actual damages ha[d] already been collected from
Glenayre and Glenayre’s customers simply use[d] infringing devices
1321
made and sold by Glenayre.”
Similarly, it found that Union Tool
applied the principle
that when a patentee receives full compensation for the wrongful
use of an invention in devices made and sold by a manufacturer,
the patentee effectively adopts the sales by the manufacturer such
that purchasers and users of the devices receive implied licenses
1322
that free them from liability for infringement of the patent.

Finally, the panel majority reasoned that Aro Manufacturing was
inapplicable because it related only to “the question of whether
Glenayre’s customers are liable for actions they took before Jackson
accepted the remittitur,” an issue that was “not before us in this
1323
appeal.”
Judge Newman dissented. She opined that “a damages award
against a manufacturer does not automatically include a paid-up
1324
license for infringing operations by the manufacturer’s customers.”
Further, she reasoned that “[w]hether users and resellers who
acquire the patented invention from an infringing manufacturer can
incur liability for infringement and additional damages, is
independent of whether the infringing manufacturer has already
1325
paid the judgment based on its own infringing manufacture.”
Because she believed that the original damages award did not fully

1316.
1317.
1318.
1319.
1320.
1321.
1322.
1323.
1324.
1325.

Id. at 860, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
Id. at 862, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
112 U.S. 485 (1884).
259 U.S. 107 (1922).
377 U.S. 476 (1964).
Glenayre, 443 F.3d at 864, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
Id. at 865, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id. at 871, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656.
Id. at 875, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 877, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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compensate Jackson for indirect infringement on the part of
1326
Glenayre, she dissented from the judgment.
1327
the
In Aero Products International, Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp.,
panel considered the circumstances under which an award of
trademark damages must be remitted as duplicative with a
concurrent award of damages for patent infringement. Aero sued
Intex for its sales of certain mattresses and asserted that, in doing so,
Intex had infringed a patent relating to inflatable support systems,
1328
and also a registered trademark on the phrase “ONE TOUCH.”
The district court entered a judgment of infringement under both
theories, and awarded patent-infringement damages in the amount of
$2.95 million (which it doubled based upon a jury finding of
willfulness) and, additionally, $1 million in trademark-infringement
1329
damages.
Intex appealed, arguing that “Aero’s recovery of both patent and
trademark infringement damages represent[ed] an impermissible
1330
double recovery.”
The panel noted that, “[g]enerally, the double
recovery of damages is impermissible,” and, in particular, “double
1331
recovery for the same injury is inappropriate.”
The panel reviewed
several precedents in this area, concluding that they “teach that, in
determining whether there has been an impermissible double
recovery of damages, the inquiry focuses on whether the damages
1332
issue arose from the same set of operative facts.”
Intex argued that
the damages awards did stem from the same set of operative facts,
1333
namely the sales of the same infringing mattresses.
Aero, on the
other hand, argued that the operative facts were different, because
the patent and trademark infringements constituted “two separate
1334
wrongs.”
The panel held that the two awards had stemmed from the same
set of operative facts and, therefore, were impermissibly duplicative.
The panel noted that the patent damages represented a reasonable
1335
and that the only
royalty on sales of the accused mattresses,
evidence supporting the trademark damages was the fact of the same

1326.
1327.
1328.
1329.
1330.
1331.
1332.
1333.
1334.
1335.

See id. at 878-79, 78 U.S.Q.P.2d (BNA) at 1662.
466 F.3d 1000, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See id. at 1003, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482.
See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482.
Id. at 1016, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
Id. at 1017, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
Id. at 1018, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492-93.
Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493.
See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493.
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1336

sales.
Thus, it found that “Aero based both its patent and
trademark damages solely on sales of the accused Intex mattresses.
Aero did not rely on any other evidence in support of its trademark
1337
damages.”
Because “all of the damages awarded to Aero flowed
from the same operative facts: sales of the infringing Intex
1338
it held that “Aero was fully compensated” by the
mattresses,”
reasonable royalty award,” and “could not also be awarded
defendants’ profits for trademark infringement based on the same
1339
sales of the same accused devices.”
2.

Lost-profits damages
In 2006, the Federal Circuit added little in the way of new analytical
development in the area of lost-profits damages. It issued decisions
applying the Panduit factors and evaluating the proper temporal
scope of lost-profits awards based upon the scope of a plaintiff’s
exclusive license to the patent in suit.
1340
In Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., the panel reviewed
an award of $429,256 (trebled to $1,287,766 for willfulness) in lostprofits damages, plus attorneys’ fees, based on Peterson’s
1341
infringement of Golden Blount’s patent.
The district court had
based the damages award on the Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Brothers Fibre
1342
Works, Inc. analysis, which looks to the demand for the patented
product, the absence of acceptable, non-infringing alternatives, the
capacity to exploit the demand, and the amount of profit lost by the
1343
plaintiff.
The district court found that there was effectively a two-supplier
market (with the parties before the court collectively controlling
1344
ninety-five percent of the market).
The court found, moreover,
that the accused ember burner was “the basis for the customer’s
demand” under the entire-market-value rule, and caused a loss to
Golden Blount of “the entire burner assembly, the grate, and a full
1345
set of artificial logs.”
The district court thus “found that 97.5% of
the time that Peterson sold [an infringing secondary burner], Golden
Blount lost the sale of its entire burner assembly and a full set of logs,
1336.
1337.
1338.
1339.
1340.
1341.
1342.
1343.
1344.
1345.

Id. at 1019, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493.
Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493.
Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493.
Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493.
438 F.3d 1354, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
See id. at 1357, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
575 F.2d 1152, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726 (6th Cir. 1978).
See Golden Blount, 438 F.3d at 1370, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016.
See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016.
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017.
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and that 2.5% of the time, Golden Blount lost the sale of its ember
1346
Peterson challenged the district court’s inclusion
burner alone.”
1347
of the entire burner assemblies in the lost-profits calculation.
The panel affirmed the basic approach of the district court, finding
that “Golden Blount proffered sufficient evidence from which the
district court could find that ‘but for’ Peterson’s sale of the [accused
burner], . . . the end-user would have turned to Golden Blount to
1348
satisfy its demand for the patented product.”
Because Peterson
“c[ame] forward with no quantitative evidence to rebut th[e]
testimony” of the retailer that full assemblies are ordinarily sold
together, it “left itself open to the inferences reasonably drawn by the
1349
district court.”
Nonetheless, the panel reduced the damages award
in light of “802 [burners] allegedly returned to Peterson before being
assembled into an infringing configuration,” which the district court
1350
had included in its damages calculation.
The panel noted that,
“[i]f the 802 [burners] were returned before having been sold to
retailers and thereafter assembled into an infringing configuration,
1351
they should not have been included in the damages calculus.”
The
court explained that “there can be no cognizable lost sale on which
to base a damages award under the patent laws without an act of
infringement to warrant it,” and the returned burners might never
1352
have been “assembl[ed] into an infringing configuration.”
1353
In DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., DePuy sued
Medtronic for infringement of a patent relating to pedicle screws
used in spinal surgery. The district court entered judgment that
certain Medtronic screws had infringed the patent under the
1354
doctrine of equivalents, and awarded lost-profits damages.
Medtronic appealed the damages award. Medtronic “d[id] not
contest that if DePuy Spine was an exclusive licensee during the
1355
relevant time period, it [wa]s entitled to the lost profits at issue.”
Instead, it argued that DePuy had not been an exclusive licensee until
August 31, 1999, and that the damages award had included profits
1356
allegedly lost from before that date.
The panel rejected this
1346.
1347.
1348.
1349.
1350.
1351.
1352.
1353.
1354.
1355.
1356.

Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017.
See id. at 1371, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017.
Id. at 1372, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018.
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018.
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018.
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018.
Id. at 1373, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018-19.
469 F.3d 1005, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See id. at 1009-10, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
Id. at 1025, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879.
See id. at 1024, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
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argument, and thus affirmed the full lost-profits award, finding that
the exclusive license with respect to the patent had “bec[o]me
operative . . . in January 1998” as the result of a 1993 Technology
1357
Agreement.
The panel held that the 1993 agreement expressly
“provide[d] an exclusive license for all of [the licensor’s] current and
1358
and that, “when [the licensor] acquired the
future . . . designs,”
[patent in question], it acquired the design of the products covered
1359
by that patent as well.”
The panel thus held that the 1993
agreement triggered an exclusive license as soon as the licensor
acquired the patent in suit, and that this “provide[d] a basis for the
1360
jury’s lost profit award.”
The panel rejected Medtronic’s argument
that a subsequent Exclusive License Agreement between DePuy and
the licensor affected this conclusion, holding that because it had
been entered into later, it was “not relevant to the rights that were
created by the parties by the 1993 Technology Agreement entered
1361
into on February 4, 1993.”
B. Enhanced Damages
1362

In nCube Corp. v. SeaChange International, Inc.,
the panel
addressed an award of enhanced damages. A jury found SeaChange
1363
liable for infringement of nCube’s patent.
Over a dissent by Judge
Dyk, the panel majority upheld the findings of literal infringement,
1364
willful infringement, and indirect infringement by inducement.
Affirming the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law
rejecting the jury’s finding of infringement under the doctrine of
1365
equivalents, the panel addressed the award of enhanced damages
and attorneys’ fees.
1366
a district court may award
Under Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.,
enhanced damages pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284 if “the infringement
is willful,” considering “the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct
1367
based on all the facts and circumstances.”
SeaChange challenged
the district court’s finding of willfulness and its discretionary
1368
enhancement of the damages award.
The panel majority rejected
1357.
1358.
1359.
1360.
1361.
1362.
1363.
1364.
1365.
1366.
1367.
1368.

Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879.
Id. at 1026, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
436 F.3d 1317, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See id. at 1319, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482.
See id. at 1319-25, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483-88.
Id. at 1325-26, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.
970 F.2d 816, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Id. at 826, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
See nCube, 436 F.3d at 1325, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487.
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this challenge with little analysis. The panel majority noted that the
district court had “awarded enhanced damages on the basis of the
jury’s willfulness finding and the Read factors for enhancing
1369
damages.”
The panel majority held that, “[m]ost importantly, the
1370
court found that the case for literal infringement was not close.”
The panel majority’s acceptance of this finding that the infringement
case “was not close” was striking in light of the fact that Judge Dyk
1371
dissented on that very infringement question.
Ruling that the
district court had permissibly determined that SeaChange had
“deliberately copied” the patented invention, the panel majority
“detect[ed] no clear error in any of the court’s subsidiary factual
findings leading to its conclusion that this was an exceptional
1372
case.”
On the same basis, the panel majority also held that there
was “no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of attorney
1373
fees.”
C. Attorneys’ Fees
The Federal Circuit reviewed a number of attorneys’ fee
determinations in 2006. In several of these cases, the court
explicated the standards for a case to be deemed exceptional for
purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 285. It reversed one fee award on the ground
that an objectively reasonable, but unsuccessful, litigation position
could not support a determination that the litigation had been
brought for improper purposes in the absence of evidence of bad
faith. In another case, the court applied the principle that the
mootness of the underlying dispute does not foreclose the district
court’s jurisdiction over a motion for attorneys’ fees. And in several
other cases, the court largely deferred to district courts’
determinations regarding whether cases were exceptional for feeaward purposes.
1374
FieldTurf International, Inc. v. Sprinturf, Inc., involved competitive
bidding on a project to construct a synthetic turf sports field for a
1375
school.
The school district’s initial Request for Proposal was based
on a similar installation previously constructed by one of the bidders,
FieldTurf. A FieldTurf competitor, SportFields, bid on the project,
1369. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487 (citing Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d
816, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1370. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487.
1371. See id. at 1326-30, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488-91 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
1372. Id. at 1325, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487.
1373. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487.
1374. 433 F.3d 1366, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1468 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1375. Id. at 1368, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469.
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and the school district ultimately awarded the project to
1376
Following the bidding process, FieldTurf sued
SportFields.
SportFields, alleging that SportFields’s bid had constituted an
unlawful offer to sell a product infringing a patent in violation of
§ 271(a), and SportFields counterclaimed on several state-law
1377
grounds.
The district court granted SportFields’s motion for summary
judgment of non-infringement, and also on its state-law
1378
counterclaims.
The district court awarded attorneys’ fees against
FieldTurf, finding, as a predicate, that the case was “exceptional” for
1379
purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 285, and thus proper for the fee award.
The district court based its finding that the case was “exceptional” on
its conclusion that FieldTurf had “manufactured” the lawsuit “by
seeking to include patented features in the bid specifications and
1380
then filing suit based on SportFields’ bid.”
The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment
1381
of non-infringement.
Nonetheless, it reversed the award of
attorneys’ fees. Reviewing the “exceptional” case determination for
clear error, the panel held that “FieldTurf’s patent position was not
1382
without support.”
Because an “exceptional” case determination
must involve “some finding by the trial judge of unfairness, bad faith,
inequitable conduct, vexatious litigation, or some similar exceptional
1383
circumstance,”
the panel did “not discern the egregious action
1384
In the absence of
required by precedent to support fee shifting.”
such evidence of baseless litigation or bad faith, the panel held that
the district court had clearly erred in relying upon the fact that
FieldTurf had brought the instant lawsuit as a “manufactured”
1385
case.
1386
the Federal Circuit
In Highway Equipment Co. v. FECO, Ltd.,
considered jurisdictional and merits issues relating to an attorneys’
fee decision.
Highway Equipment sued FECO for patent
infringement stemming from the sale of certain agricultural

1376. See id. at 1368-69, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469-70.
1377. See id. at 1369, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470.
1378. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470.
1379. See id. at 1373, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472.
1380. Id. at 1373, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472.
1381. See id. at 1369-70, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470-71.
1382. Id. at 1373, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
1383. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1384. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
1385. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472-73.
1386. 469 F.3d 1027, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2006). One of the
authors was counsel to the DePuy Spine parties in this case.
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equipment.
Shortly before trial was scheduled to begin, Highway
Equipment issued FECO a covenant not to sue on the patent, and the
district court dismissed the entire action, but retained jurisdiction
1388
over a motion by FECO for attorneys’ fees.
The district court
found that the case was not exceptional, and denied FECO’s fee
1389
request on the merits.
FECO appealed the denial of attorneys’ fees, and Highway
Equipment
cross-appealed
the
district
court’s
predicate
determination that it had jurisdiction to award fees in light of the
1390
mootness of the underlying dispute.
Addressing the jurisdictional
issue first, the panel held that “the district court correctly retained
1391
The court noted
jurisdiction over FECO’s claim for attorney fees.”
that its precedents permitted district courts to retain jurisdiction over
attorneys’ fee motions even after the underlying dispute had become
1392
moot.
On the merits, the panel rejected Highway Equipment’s argument
that attorneys’ fees were unavailable “because FECO did not receive
1393
judicial relief on the merits . . . .”
The panel agreed with Highway
Equipment that the fee statute, 35 U.S.C. § 285, “prohibit[s] an award
of fees to the plaintiff unless the court awards relief on the merits,
either through a judgment on the merits or through a settlement
1394
agreement enforced through a consent decree.”
The “dispositive
issue” was “whether the dismissal with prejudice had sufficient
judicial imprimatur to constitute a ‘judicially sanctioned change in
1395
the legal relationship of the parties.’”
It found that standard
satisfied, holding “that as a matter of patent law, the dismissal with
prejudice, based on the covenant and granted pursuant to the district
court’s discretion under Rule 41(a)(2), ha[d] the necessary judicial
imprimatur to constitute a judicially sanctioned change in the legal
1396
According to the court, a contrary
relationship of the parties.”
ruling “would imply that the only way for a defendant to obtain a
disposition on the merits would be to oppose a dismissal and proceed

1387.
1388.
1389.
1390.
1391.
1392.
1393.
1394.
1395.
1396.

See id. at 1029, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122.
See id. at 1030-31, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123.
See id. at 1031, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123.
See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123-24.
Id. at 1032, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124.
See id. at 1032-33, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124-25.
Id. at 1033, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
Id. at 1034, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
Id. at 1035, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
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to litigation on the merits, and would encourage the litigation of
1397
unreasonable and groundless claims.”
The panel also affirmed the district court’s determination that, on
the merits, the case was not exceptional, and its consequent denial of
attorneys’ fees. The panel affirmed the district court’s rejection of
FECO’s inequitable-conduct argument stemming from the
prosecution of the patent, which was based upon evidence that
Highway Equipment’s nondisclosure of certain alleged prior art had
followed investigation and discussion with patent counsel, and a
determination that the alleged prior art might not have “had a
1398
spreader” of the type “disclosed in [the patent].”
It also affirmed
the district court’s rejection of inequitable conduct premised on the
failure to list a joint inventor, noting that the party that FECO
claimed should have been listed had “indicated that he should not be
1399
named as an inventor.”
And it affirmed the district court’s
rejection of litigation misconduct as a basis for finding the case
exceptional with little analysis, in deference to the district court’s
1400
findings on these points.
1401
1402
In Golden Blount,
as discussed above,
the panel reviewed an
award of damages and attorneys’ fees resulting from Peterson’s
1403
The court briefly
infringement of Golden Blount’s patent.
addressed the fee award on appeal. The panel upheld the district
court’s designation of the case as “exceptional,” thus warranting a fee
award, based on the fact that the district court had permissibly found
1404
that Peterson’s infringement of the patent to have been willful.
1405
In Kao Corp. v. Unilever United States, Inc., the panel reviewed a
district court’s refusal to award attorneys’ fees in a patent1406
infringement action relating to cosmetic skin-care products.
The
district court had held the patent valid and enforceable, but that it
1407
The panel
was not infringed by the accused Unilever product.
affirmed the district court’s validity holdings, finding that the patent
1408
complied with the written description requirement,
and, over a

1397.
1398.
1399.
1400.
1401.
1402.
1403.
1404.
1405.
1406.
1407.
1408.

Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
Id. at 1037, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128.
See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128.
438 F.3d 1354, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See supra notes 1128-40 and accompanying text.
See Golden Blount, 438 F.3d at 1373, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1019.
See id. at 1373-74, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019.
441 F.3d 963, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See id. at 965, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258.
See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258.
See id. at 968, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
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1410

dissent by Judge Mayer, that it was not obvious, nor the product
1411
The panel majority
of inequitable conduct during its prosecution.
also affirmed the district court’s determination that Unilever had not
literally infringed the patent, and that the plaintiff had failed to raise
1412
a doctrine-of-equivalents argument in the case.
Judge Newman
1413
dissented on the infringement analysis.
Unilever appealed the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees.
Unilever challenged the district court’s finding that the case was not
exceptional, arguing that the plaintiff had “‘engaged in bad faith
litigation by pursuing its patent claim’ in the face of knowledge
1414
that . . . it could not possibly be infringed by Unilever’s product.”
The panel rejected this argument with little discussion, holding that,
“[a]lthough [the plaintiff’s] litigation position with respect to the
infringement issue did not prevail, it was not so lacking in merit as to
1415
warrant ‘exceptional’ status.”
The panel also rejected Unilever’s
argument that the plaintiff’s inequitable conduct during prosecution
made the case exception, because it had determined on the merits
1416
that no such inequitable conduct had occurred.
1417
In Serio-US Industries, Inc. v. Plastic Recovery Technologies Corp.,
Serio-US sued PRT for patent infringement, and the jury ruled that
PRT had not infringed the patent. The district court nonetheless
1418
denied PRT’s motion for attorneys’ fees.
PRT appealed the fee denial, and the panel affirmed the district
court’s denial of attorneys’ fees. It held that, “[a]bsent misconduct in
the litigation or in securing the patent, a trial court may only sanction
the patentee if both the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith
1419
The panel held that
and the litigation is objectively baseless.”
neither of those elements was satisfied, because Serio-US’s
1420
infringement allegation had been “objectively reasonable,”
and
1421
had been asserted in “reli[ance] on the opinion of patent counsel.”
The panel thus affirmed the district court’s determination the case
1409. See id. at 976-77, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267 (Mayer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
1410. See id. at 968-71, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260-62.
1411. See id. at 971-72, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262-63.
1412. See id. at 974, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.
1413. See id. at 975-76, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265-67 (Newman, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
1414. Id. at 974, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.
1415. Id. at 975, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.
1416. See id. at 974-75, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.
1417. 459 F.3d 1311, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1418. See id. at 1314, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066.
1419. Id. at 1322, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
1420. Id. at 1321, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
1421. Id. at 1320, 1322, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070, 1072.
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was not “exceptional” for purposes of the statute, and its denial of
1422
attorneys’ fees on that ground.
D. Permanent Injunctions
1423

As noted above, the issue of when permanent injunctions should
be granted in patent cases has percolated in the district courts since
1424
the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC.
Unsurprisingly in light of the apparent tension between the blocks of
concurring justices regarding how Justice Thomas’s unanimous
1425
decision for the Court should be construed and applied, district
courts considering motions for permanent injunctions after eBay have
1426
taken widely varying approaches.
The Federal Circuit has so far
simply remanded pre-eBay permanent injunction decisions for
1427
reconsideration in light of eBay,
or otherwise disposed of
1428
permanent injunction issues without reaching their merits.
VI. ALTERNATE SOURCES OF LIABILITY
A. Antitrust
Arguably, the most significant antitrust/patent development in
2006 was the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v.
1429
holding that the fact that a product is
Independent Ink, Inc.,
patented does not, in itself, support a presumption of market power
in that product. The Federal Circuit also issued several significant
decisions in 2006 relating to the antitrust laws as a source of liability
in the patent area. One case in particular revealed some internal
1422. See id. at 1322, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
1423. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
1424. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
1425. Compare id. at 1841-42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that the
historical trend of granting injunctions “in the vast majority of patent cases” might
likely continue despite absence of categorical rule), with id. at 1842-43 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that historical trend discussed by the Chief Justice “simply
illustrates the result of the four-factor test in the contexts then prevalent,” and
suggesting that recent changes could alter that trend in some kinds of cases).
1426. Compare, e.g., Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., No. CV-96-5658, 2006 WL
2844400, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006) (relying on language in pre-eBay Federal
Circuit decisions to suggest that permanent injunctions are generally preferred), with
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *4-6
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (denying permanent injunction and rejecting any
presumption in favor of such injunctions).
1427. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1341-42, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1813, 1822 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1428. See, e.g., Cook Biotech Inc. v. Acell, Inc., 460 F.3d 1365, 1379-80, 79
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1875 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that appeal of permanent
injunction denial was moot in light of reversal on merits).
1429. 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

2007]

4/7/2007 11:15:24 AM

2006 PATENT SUMMARY

963

divisions among the judges regarding the permissible scope of license
terms asserted to constitute an illegal tying arrangement.
1430
Monsanto sued Scruggs for
In Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,
infringement of patents relating to synthetic genes in agricultural
1431
products.
Scruggs counterclaimed, raising antitrust claims against
1432
The district court granted summary judgment in favor
Monsanto.
1433
of Monsanto on the antitrust counterclaims, and Scruggs appealed.
On appeal, Scruggs first argued that Monsanto had unlawfully
attempted to monopolize, in violation of section 2 of the Sherman
1434
Act, by engaging in anticompetitive conduct including Monsanto’s
inclusion of “no replant” provisions in its license agreements relating
to the patented biotechnology, and its imposition of technology fees
1435
1436
in those agreements.
The panel majority rejected this argument.
It held that Monsanto’s “no replant policy simply prevent[ed]
purchasers of the seeds from using the patented biotechnology when
that biotechnology makes a copy of itself,” and that such a limitation
1437
was “a valid exercise of its rights under the patent laws.”
Similarly,
the panel held that the “uniform technology fee [wa]s essentially a
royalty fee, the charging of which [wa]s also within the scope of the
1438
patent grant.”
Scruggs also argued that Monsanto had tied the purchase of its
seed to the purchase of Monsanto’s Roundup herbicide, in violation
1439
of the Sherman Act.
To support this theory, Scruggs relied upon a
grower incentive program that gave growers additional benefits if
they chose to use Roundup exclusively, as well as upon Monsanto
“seed partner agreements,” which required those customers who
1440
chose to use glyphosate herbicides to use Roundup.
The panel
1441
majority rejected Scruggs’s arguments.
It held that because “[t]he
grower incentive program was optional, not coerced,” it did not
1442
and that, similarly, “Monsanto’s seed
support a tying claim,
partners were not forced to buy Roundup under the seed partner

1430.
1431.
1432.
1433.
1434.
1435.
1436.
1437.
1438.
1439.
1440.
1441.
1442.

459 F.3d 1328, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See id. at 1333, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815.
See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815-16.
See id. at 1333-34, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
See Monsanto, 459 F.3d at 1340, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
See id. at 1340, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
See id. at 1339-40, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820-21.
See id. at 1340-41, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
Id. at 1340, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
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1443

agreements.”
The panel also rejected Monsanto’s argument that
Monsanto had tied the sale of cotton containing the patented gene to
1444
It held that “Monsanto
the sale of cotton containing another trait.
sells cotton without the [allegedly tied] trait and there [wa]s no
evidence that Monsanto engineered a shortage of [the tying]
1445
cotton.”
1446
Judge Dyk dissented from the panel majority’s antitrust holding.
Judge Dyk believed that Scruggs’s tying claim should have survived
summary judgment in light of the license restriction requiring the
1447
use of Roundup by customers selecting glyphosate herbicides.
Judge Dyk focused much of his argument on the district court’s
conclusion that the tying claim was precluded because the EPA had
approved only Roundup among this class of herbicides at that
1448
time.
He opined that, on the facts, despite the sole EPA approval
of Roundup at the time, Monsanto’s requirement constituted a tie
1449
and that Scruggs’s claim should have been allowed to proceed.
1450
In Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales Del Centro S.A., Kemin
sued Pigmentos for infringement of certain patents relating to
extracting lutein from plants, and Pigmentos counterclaimed for
1451
violations of the Lanham Act and the antitrust laws.
The district
court severed Pigmentos’ counterclaims and stayed them pending
1452
resolution of the plaintiff’s case.
Kemin ultimately prevailed in the
trial on certain patent claims, and subsequently moved to dismiss the
1453
Pigmentos responded by moving to amend and
counterclaims.
1454
supplement its counterclaims.
The district court denied

1443. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. The panel noted that the district court
had relied upon the fact that at the time that the seed partner agreements were in
effect, “Roundup was the only glyphosate herbicide approved by the [EPA] for use
with” the seeds, but the panel did not expressly adopt this rationale. Id. at 1339, 79
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820.
1444. See id. at 1340-41, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
1445. Id. at 1341, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
1446. See id. at 1342, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
1447. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
1448. See id. at 1342-44, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822-24 (Dyk, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
1449. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822-24 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
1450. 464 F.3d 1339, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1451. See id. at 1343, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
1452. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
1453. See id. at 1353, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394.
1454. See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394.
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Pigmentos’ leave to amend, and granted Kemin’s motion to dismiss
1455
the counterclaims.
On appeal, Pigmentos challenged the district court’s refusal to
1456
allow it to amend its counterclaims.
The panel affirmed the district
court’s determination that most of the proposed counterclaims
“hinge[d] to a large extent on [Pigmentos’s] assertion that Kemin’s
patents are invalid or unenforceable,” and were therefore “foreclosed
by the judgment as to invalidity and unenforceability” from the
1457
previous trial.
The panel, however, ruled that two aspects of Pigmentos’s antitrust
and Lanham Act claims were not precluded by the disposition of the
trial. First, Pigmentos claimed that Kemin had committed antitrust
and Lanham Act violations by “represent[ing] to the public and
competitors that its products [we]re covered by” the patent when, in
fact, “in light of the district court’s claim construction, Kemin’s own
1458
products [we]re not covered by” that patent.
Nevertheless, the
panel rejected this argument, holding that “Kemin ha[d] maintained
throughout the litigation” that the patent was “broad enough to
1459
encompass . . . its own commercial lutein products.”
There had
been no judicial determination “that Kemin’s products [we]re
outside the scope of” the patent, and the panel found Kemin’s
position to be “sufficiently plausible” to avoid the conclusion that
Kemin had “acted with the deceptive purpose necessary to trigger
liability under the false marketing statute (or, derivatively, to form
1460
the basis for an antitrust or Lanham Act claim).”
Pigmentos also argued that Kemin had “engaged in unfair
competition and antitrust violations by continuing to represent to the
public and competitors that [Pigmentos wa]s infringing” after Kemin
knew that Pigmentos had stopped using the infringing component in
1461
The panel rejected this argument as well, because the
its products.
district court properly found that Pigmentos had not demonstrated
that it had “modified its process in any significant way, much less that
1462
said modified process did not use” the infringing component.
The
panel held that “[a] patentee in Kemin’s position [wa]s entitled to

1455.
1456.
1457.
1458.
1459.
1460.
1461.
1462.

See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394.
See id. at 1344, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388.
Id. at 1353, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395.
Id. at 1354, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395.
Id. at 1355, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396.
Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396.
Id. at 1354, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395.
Id. at 1355, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396.
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assert that an accused product infringe[d] its patent unless an
1463
opponent c[ould] show that the patent holder acted in bad faith.”
B. Lanham Act
In 2006, the Federal Circuit decided a handful of important
Lanham Act issues in connection with decisions on patent issues.
1464
M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co.,
involved a
determination that the defendant had violated the Lanham Act based
upon “false representations concerning its eraser wheels by marking
them with [a] patent number and with the label ‘patent pending,’
1465
when the wheel itself was not protected by a patent.”
The district
court also relied upon the defendant’s “letters to [the plaintiff’s]
customers,” which it found had “deceived customers and diverted
1466
sales from [the plaintiff] to [the defendant].”
Following the
1467
Federal Circuit’s decision in Zenith Electronics Corp. v. Exzec Inc.,
which “require[s] a showing of bad faith for a Lanham Act
1468
violation,”
the district court found this requirement satisfied in
light of “clear and convincing evidence” that the defendant had
1469
engaged in inequitable conduct during the patent prosecution.
The district court thus adhered to its determination that the
1470
defendant had acted in bad faith and violated the Lanham Act.
The Federal Circuit reversed. Specifically, the panel determined
that this element no longer supported a determination of bad faith
because the panel had reversed the district court’s inequitable
conduct finding on which that court’s bad faith determination was
1471
“essentially based.”
Because “a Lanham Act violation requires a
finding of bad faith” and the district court had “decide[d] that its
finding of inequitable conduct constituted evidence of bad faith,” the
1472
panel “vacate[d] on the Lanham Act claim.”

1463. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396 (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).
1464. 439 F.3d 1335, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1465. Id. at 1338, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
1466. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
1467. 182 F.3d 1340, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
1468. M. Eagles Tool, 439 F.3d at 1335, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
1469. Id. at 1339, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
1470. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
1471. Id. at 1343, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236.
1472. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236. The district court also vacated an award of
attorneys’ fees, because the predicate “exceptional case” determination, too, had
been “based on the determination of inequitable conduct.” Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1236.
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1473

In Serio-US Indus., Inc. v. Plastic Recovery Techs. Corp.,
discussed
1474
Plastic Recovery (“PRT”) asserted Lanham Act violations
above,
against Serio-US in counterclaims to Serio-US’s patent-infringement
action. The panel affirmed the denial of Lanham Act liability on the
ground that such liability can be imposed “on a patentee for
marketplace statements only if the statements are proven to have
1475
been made in bad faith.”
PRT’s Lanham Act claim was predicated
solely on “Serio-US’s statements to the [relevant] industry and trade
generally and to its customers . . . that PRT’s product infringes” Serio1476
US’s patents.
Moreover, the panel agreed with the district court
that there was no evidence that those statements had been made in
bad faith, because the infringement allegation was “objectively
1477
reasonable,” and “Serio-US brought its action in reliance on the
1478
opinion of patent counsel.”
1479
In Optivus Technology, Inc. v. Ion Beam Applications S.A., Optivus, a
seller of proton-beam therapy systems, sued IBA, a competitor in that
market for, inter alia, violations of the Lanham Act in connection with
statements IBA had allegedly made in obtaining a contract with the
1480
University of Florida.
Optivus argued that several statements made
by IBA—most significantly, a statement that IBA “would finance $50
million of the technology component of the proposed system”—were
false and misleading, and had “caused Optivus not to be awarded the
1481
contract with Florida.”
The district court granted summary
judgment to IBA on the Lanham Act claim, holding that the
statements did not satisfy the materiality requirement for Lanham Act
1482
liability even if they were actually made.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed this part of the
1483
judgment.
It held that “an issue of fact exist[ed] as to the
1484
IBA relied upon a
materiality of the financing statement.”
workgroup rating that placed Optivus last, behind a third
1485
competitor.
But the panel observed that there was “no indication
that Florida adopted this ranking without consideration of other
1473.
1474.
1475.
1476.
1477.
1478.
1479.
1480.
1481.
1482.
1483.
1484.
1485.

459 F.3d 1311, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See supra notes 1405-1410 and accompanying text.
Serio-US, 459 F.3d at 1321, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
Id. at 1320, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1321, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
Id. at 1320, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
469 F.3d 978, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See id. at 980-81, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841-42.
Id. at 987, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846.
See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846.
See id. at 988 , 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
Id. at 987, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846.
See id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846.
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1486

factors.”
Because it concluded that a factfinder could have found
that IBA made the financing statement and that there was a genuine
question of fact as to its materiality, the panel reversed the grant of
1487
summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim and remanded.
C. Copyright
1488

In Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony California, Inc.,
the panel
reviewed a grant of summary judgment of non-infringement of
copyrights covering carved ornamental woodwork; the copyright
claim had been asserted by a seller of bedroom furniture against a
competing designer and manufacturer of bedroom furniture, and
1489
was coupled with a design-patent claim.
Applying Ninth Circuit
law, the panel held that under the “access”-plus-“substantial
similarity” test for copyright infringement, the “inverse-ratio rule”
permits a stronger showing of access to reduce the required degree of
1490
similarity.
Applying this sliding-scale approach, the panel held that “a strong
showing of substantial similarity [wa]s required to prove
infringement in this case, i.e., one approaching ‘striking’
1491
similarity.”
The panel noted that the only evidence of access was
deposition testimony of the defendant’s president “that neither he
nor [the company had] made any effort to determine if their designs
violated intellectual property rights,” along with “evidence that [the
plaintiff had] displayed its designs at furniture trade shows” that the
1492
The panel concluded that
defendant’s president had attended.
this evidence “d[id] not conclusively resolve the question of the
access of [the defendant’s] designer[] to the protected work before
1493
the creation of the” furniture at issue.
Turning to the similarity analysis, the panel held that “the trial
court [had] correctly accorded protection to the expressive
ornamental carvings on the furniture, but not the furniture pieces as
1494
a whole.”
Having thus correctly identified the relevant
1495
the panel addressed the trial court’s
“protectable features,”
application of the Ninth Circuit’s “two-part analysis” for evaluating
1486.
1487.
1488.
1489.
1490.
1491.
1492.
1493.
1494.
1495.

Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846.
See id. at 988, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
439 F.3d 1365, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See id. at 1367, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
Id. at 1368, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
Id. at 1369, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
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the similarity of the accused products to those features, which
includes “an ‘extrinsic test,’” i.e., “an objective comparison of specific
expressive elements,” and “an ‘intrinsic test,’” which “is a subjective
comparison that focuses on whether the ordinary reasonable
audience would find the works substantially similar in ‘the total
1496
concept and feel of the works.’”
The panel held that the district court had erred in its application
1497
of this two-part test.
The district court had relied upon the
extrinsic test, which the Ninth Circuit had held is better suited to
summary judgment than the more subjective intrinsic test, in
1498
granting summary judgment of non-infringement.
Specifically,
“the trial court erred in expanding its application of the ‘extrinsic’
part of the infringement test to encompass an examination of ‘the
total concept and feel of the works,’” which properly belongs to the
1499
intrinsic test.
In particular, the district court had held that the
ornamental features did not exhibit an original arrangement or
selection, a determination properly “within the district court’s role of
assessing the extrinsic prong of infringement on summary
1500
judgment.”
But, “the trial court then proceeded to examine, on
summary judgment, the fact intensive question of the total concept
and feel of the carvings in the furniture. The court’s conclusion
1501
appear[ed] to be based primarily on its own visual inspection.”
The panel held that this subjective determination impermissibly
1502
The panel
strayed into the territory of the intrinsic part of the test.
held that “a reasonable jury could [have] conclude[d] that at least
some of the accused designs satisf[ied] the heightened showing of
1503
substantial similarity thus far required in this case.”
For example,
the panel noted one “whimsical” feature with respect to which “the
1504
accused design incorporate[d] a near-copy.”
Therefore, the panel
1505
reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

1496.
1497.
1498.
1499.
1500.
1501.
1502.
1503.
1504.
1505.

Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149-50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 1370, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
See id. at 1372, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152.
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D. Takings
1506

In Zoltek Corp. v. U.S., the panel addressed the jurisdiction of the
Court of Federal Claims over Fifth Amendment takings claims
premised on allegations of patent infringement by the United States.
Zoltek brought a lawsuit, asserting that the government had infringed
its patent claiming methods of making carbon fiber sheets by
contracting with Lockheed Martin to purchase aircraft incorporating
1507
components made using infringing methods.
The relevant aircraft
components had been produced in Japan and then imported into the
1508
United States.
The Court of Federal Claims held that it lacked jurisdiction over
the claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), which confers jurisdiction over
claims for infringing patent use by the United States, because the
relevant claim arose in a foreign country, and was thus precluded
1509
from the scope of § 1498(a) under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c).
Nonetheless, the trial court held that it had jurisdiction over the
1510
It “directed
patent-infringement claims under a different theory.
Zoltek to amend its complaint to allege a taking under the Fifth
1511
Amendment,” and held that it could entertain the case under its
1512
Takings Clause jurisdiction.
On interlocutory appeal, the panel majority affirmed the denial of
1513
section 1498(a) jurisdiction.
Rather than relying upon the arising
in a foreign country limitation of subsection (c), the panel found
subsection (a) unavailable by its terms, because “direct infringement
under section 271(a) is a necessary predicate for government liability
1514
under section 1498.”
Because every step of a process must be
1515
performed in the United States to infringe a method claim,
the
panel held that, “where, as here, not all steps of a patented process
have been performed in the United States, government liability does
1516
not exist pursuant to section 1498(a).”

1506. 442 F.3d 1345, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (per curiam), reh’g denied, 464 F.3d
1335, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1507. See id. at 1349, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
1508. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
1509. See id. at 1349, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
1510. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
1511. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
1512. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006).
1513. See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1350, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
1514. Id. at 1350, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483-84 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
1515. See id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484 (citing NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion,
Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1763, 1789 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
1516. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
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The panel majority reversed the trial court’s exercise of Taking
Clause jurisdiction under section 1491(a)(1), relying on Schillinger v.
1517
which held that patent infringement cannot give rise
United States,
1518
to a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment.
The panel majority
also rejected the argument that Schillinger had been overruled by
1519
The majority concluded that
Crozier v. Fried Krupp Aktiengesellschaft.
Crozier merely addressed “whether the trial court had jurisdiction to
enjoin the government from alleged patent infringement,” and that
“[n]one of the relevant Schillinger issues were joined: Crozier was not
filed in the Court of Claims, had nothing to do with the Tucker Act,
1520
did not allege a taking, and was solely in equity.”
While Crozier and
other cases did “analyze the statute in terms of takings,” and
“analogized [patent infringement] to ‘taking’ a ‘compulsory
1521
license,’”
the panel majority held that this “cannot disturb the
1522
Supreme Court’s analysis of the Fifth Amendment in Schillinger.”
The panel majority held that “Congress provided a specific sovereign
immunity waiver for a patentee to recover for infringement by the
government” in section 1498(a), and that this balance should not be
upset by reading patent-infringement jurisdiction into the general
1523
taking jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.
Each judge on the panel wrote a separate opinion. Judge Gajarsa
wrote a concurring opinion criticizing NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion,
1524
Ltd.,
the decision that grounded the panel majority’s holding
under section 1498(a), and opining that “our decision today does not
depend for its validity on NTP, as it is also supported by an
1525
independent line of reasoning.”
Judge Gajarsa opined that the
trial court’s denial of jurisdiction under section 1498(a) was properly
grounded on the “arises in a foreign country” limitation of section
1526
1498(c).
Judge Dyk also concurred, responding to Judge Gajarsa’s
arguments against the NTP decision, and thus defending the panel
majority’s ruling regarding the jurisdiction of the trial court under
1527
section 1498(a).
1517. 155 U.S. 163 (1894).
1518. See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1350, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484 (citing Schillinger,
155 U.S. at 163).
1519. 224 U.S. 290 (1912).
1520. Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1351, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
1521. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
1522. Id. at 1352, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
1523. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
1524. 418 F.3d 1282, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1763 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1525. Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1353, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486 (Gajarsa, J.,
concurring).
1526. Id. at 1358, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
1527. See id. at 1367-70, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496-99.
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Judge Plager dissented as to both grounds of jurisdiction. He first
opined that the allegation that the government had taken the
plaintiff’s property presented a facially “straightforward” takings
1528
claim.
He emphasized that the Schillinger case on which the panel
majority relied “was decided in 1894,” and that at that time, “the
judicial treatment of the then-new Tucker Act provision . . . was still
1529
in its early stages of development.”
He argued “that the identity of
a separate, non-statutory, constitutional basis for takings remedies
under the Fifth Amendment emerged” only over the course of the
following decades, thus rendering the Schillinger decision of limited
1530
value in this area.
Turning to the section 1498(a) issue, Judge
Plager agreed with Judge Gajarsa that the infringement was
cognizable under section 1498(a), reasoning that “[n]othing in
§ 1498(a) speaks about performance in the United States; that notion
is come to only by incorporating into § 1498(a) the requirement for
1531
infringement by a private party under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).”
Nevertheless, Judge Plager opined that the case did not arise in a
foreign country for purposes of section 1498(c), at least as to some of
the products at issue, because “some of the steps of the method
1532
patent [we]re practiced abroad, and some in the United States.”
He concluded that “the Government is liable under § 1498(a) for an
unauthorized use of a method patent unless all steps of the method
1533
are practiced abroad.”
1534
The Federal Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc.
Judge Newman dissented from the denial, arguing that the panel
majority’s Taking Clause rationale was erroneous and warranted
1535
review by the full court.
Judge Dyk, joined by Judge Gajarsa, wrote
to concur in the denial, and stated that Judge Newman had misread
the majority opinion as “leav[ing] private parties without an effective
1536
remedy for patent misuse against the government.”
Judge Dyk
opined that the government would be put in the same position as “a
1537
private party under the circumstances of this case.”

1528. Id. at 1374, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501 (Plager, J., dissenting).
1529. Id. at 1376, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502 (Plager, J., dissenting).
1530. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502 (Plager, J., dissenting).
1531. Id. at 1379, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504 (Plager, J., dissenting).
1532. Id. at 1382, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507 (Plager, J., dissenting).
1533. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507 (Plager, J., dissenting).
1534. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1335, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1157
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
1535. See id. at 1336-39, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157-60.
1536. Id. at 1339, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1160 (Dyk, J., concurring).
1537. Id., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1160 (Dyk, J., concurring).
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E. Implied License
1538

In LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc., LG brought suit
for patent infringement against several defendants. The patents in
suit related to personal computers. The defendants purchased
components from Intel, who had been authorized by LG to sell
1539
them. Pursuant to their agreements, however, Intel informed the
purchasers that “they were not authorized under that agreement to
1540
Several plaintiffs
combine the products with non-Intel products.”
1541
counterclaimed, asserting an implied-license defense.
The district
court granted summary judgment of non-infringement, but denied
summary judgment to the defendants based on the implied-license
1542
defense.
On appeal, the panel affirmed the district court’s rejection of the
1543
The panel noted that, “[t]o prevail,
implied-license defense.
defendants were required to establish that the products have no noninfringing uses and that the circumstances of the sale plainly indicate
1544
that the grant of a license should be inferred.”
The panel agreed
with the district court that the defendants had failed to satisfy this
test, stating that “[r]egardless of any non-infringing uses, Intel
expressly informed them that Intel’s license agreement with LG[] did
not extend to any of defendants’ products made by combining an
1545
Intel product with non-Intel products.”
The panel held that “[i]n
1546
light of this express disclaimer, no license c[ould] be implied.”
F.

Patent Exhaustion

The Federal Circuit decided two cases addressing the doctrine of
1547
patent exhaustion in 2006. In LG Electronics, the panel noted that
an “unconditional sale of a patented device exhausts the patentee’s
1548
right to control the purchaser’s use of the device thereafter.”
The
panel noted the rationale for the patent-exhaustion doctrine—once
“the patentee has bargained for, and received, an amount equal to
the full value of the goods,” the receipt of that money fully
1538. 453 F.3d 1364, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1539. See id. at 1368, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446.
1540. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446.
1541. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446.
1542. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446.
1543. See id. at 1369, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447.
1544. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447 (internal quotation marks and ellipsis
omitted).
1545. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447.
1546. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447.
1547. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447.
1548. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447.
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1549

compensates the patentee for the subsequent uses of the product.
Yet, the panel noted that a conditional sale precludes application of
the doctrine, because the bargained-for price of the product would
1550
not then incorporate the value of uses violating the conditions.
The district court had applied the doctrine based upon Intel’s
purportedly unconditional sales of components of the patented
1551
systems to its customers, the defendants in LG Electronics.
The
panel held that this ruling was erroneous, because the plaintiff’s
license to Intel had “expressly disclaim[ed] granting a license
allowing computer system manufacturers to combine Intel’s licensed
parts with other non-Intel components,” and had “required Intel to
1552
In light of this requirement,
notify its customers” of this condition.
the panel held that Intel’s sales of the components to the defendants
“were conditional, and Intel’s customers were expressly prohibited
from infringing LGE’s combination patents,” thus precluding
1553
application of the patent-exhaustion doctrine.
The Federal Circuit rejected another patent-exhaustion defense for
1554
In that case, the
similar reasons in Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs.
defendant argued that it had “purchased the Monsanto seeds in an
unrestricted sale, and that it was therefore entitled to use those seeds
in an unencumbered fashion under the doctrine of patent
1555
exhaustion.”
Again, however, the panel found that the factual
predicate for the defense was absent: “There was no unrestricted sale
because the use of the seeds by seed growers was conditioned on
1556
obtaining a license from Monsanto.”
In the alternative, the panel
found the patent-exhaustion doctrine inapplicable, because
Monsanto had sold only the original generation of seeds to the
defendant; “[w]ithout the actual sale of the second generation seed
1557
to Scruggs, there can be no patent exhaustion.”
More generally,
the panel held that “[t]he fact that a patented technology can
replicate itself does not give a purchaser the right to use replicated
1558
copies of the technology.”

1549. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447.
1550. Id. at 1369-70, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447.
1551. See id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447.
1552. Id. at 1370, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1447-48.
1553. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448.
1554. 459 F.3d 1328, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also supra
notes 1430-1449 and accompanying text.
1555. Id. at 1335, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817.
1556. Id. at 1336, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817.
1557. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817.
1558. Id., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817-18.
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CONCLUSION
On many of the “big issues” in patent law, the Federal Circuit’s
voice was more muted than usual in 2006, owing to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s unprecedented incursion into the Federal Circuit’s work.
Viewed as a “dialogue” between these courts, these decisions in 2006
begin to chart the course for the next wave of Federal Circuit and
Supreme Court decisions in the patent-law area. The next several
years should be interesting, to say the least.

ADDENDUM
In our Article surveying the Federal Circuit’s year 2000
1559
jurisprudence, we provided an Addendum discussing, in statistical
terms, the year’s patent-law decisions from the Federal Circuit. We
were motivated by trying to provide an empirical (rather than
anecdotal or impressionistic) answer to the question we are
frequently asked, as Federal Circuit practitioners, by our clients:
“When can we expect a decision?” So we provided a statistical
“snapshot” of the Federal Circuit’s work in the year 2000, based on
our study of the court’s ninety-two published patent opinions from
that year.
We have reprised that effort for the year 2006, with a few additional
analyses.
For 2006, there were ninety-eight published patent
opinions—slightly higher than in 2000. In addition to repeating the
analyses we provided in 2000, we have added two others: a table of
the most frequent lower-court or agency venues from which appeals
originated, and a tally of how many of these opinions resulted in
affirmances, reversals, partial affirmances, etc.
There are caveats aplenty here. First, the universe of opinions
being surveyed consists of the court’s published, patent opinions. Our
survey does not account for the presumably shorter disposition time
of unpublished patent opinions, or “Rule 36” affirmances, or the other
areas of the court’s work (government employment cases,
government contract cases, etc.). Second, the statistics we provide
may be of limited predictive value, especially where they are based on
a statistically insignificant number of data points. Finally, treating
each decision as an equal data point for statistical averages may not
be fair or accurate: Every case is unique. Nevertheless, as in our 2000
survey, we have found many of the results set forth below to be
enlightening, and for that reason we are again sharing them with the
1559. Adamo, supra note 14, at 1699-1706.
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bench, bar, and other persons interested in the work of the Federal
Circuit.

TABLE 1: PUBLISHED PATENT OPINIONS BY JUDGE, JANUARY 1,
2006 – DECEMBER 31, 2006
JUDGE

#
Authored

# on
panel

# separate
opinions

# authored
generating
separate
opinions
1
1
1
2
4
4
0
1
1
4
5

%
author
(3-judge
panel)
26.1
34.6
26.7
60.0
46.9
17.4
17.4
40.9
44.0
30.3
34.8

Michel
Newman
Mayer
Lourie
Rader
Schall
Bryson
Gajarsa
Linn
Dyk
Prost

6
9
4
12
15
4
4
9
11
10
8

23
26
15
20
32
23
23
22
25
33
23

3
8
3
1
1
3
0
0
1
6
0

Friedman
Archer
Plager
Clevenger

1
0
1
3

6
10
4
9

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

16.7
0.0
25.0
33.3

Per Curiam

1

—

—

1

—

Court

98

—

26

25

—

Table 1 sets forth some raw numbers about the published patent
opinions issued by the Federal Circuit during 2006, listed by judge.
The first column (“# authored”) reflects the number of majority
patent opinions each judge published in 2000. Thus, Chief Judge
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Michel authored six majority patent opinions that were published in
2006, Judge Newman wrote nine, and so on. Judges Rader, Lourie,
Linn and Dyk led the way in double-digits with fifteen, twelve, eleven,
and ten opinions respectively. Judges Mayer, Schall, and Bryson
trailed with four authored opinions each. Only one case was decided
per curiam.
The second column (“# on panel”) sets forth the number of times
each judge was on a panel for one of those cases decided in 2006.
One interesting discovery this year are the outliers—while most of the
active judges participated in anywhere from twenty to twenty-eight of
the published patent opinions, two judges—Judges Dyk and Rader—
participated in thirty-three and thirty-two of the published decisions
respectively, a difference that is perhaps statistically significant. Even
more striking is the discovery that Judge Mayer participated in an
uncommonly low number—fifteen—of the court’s published
opinions in 2006. One possible explanation for this difference—
assuming that all active judges are likely to participate in roughly the
same number of cases during the course of a year—is that Judges
Rader and Dyk are somewhat more likely than their colleagues to
request that the panel publish its disposition, which requires the
concurrence of a panel majority (two of three judges) under Federal
Circuit Rule 47.6(b).
The third column (“# separate opinions”) lists the number of
separate opinions (concurrences and dissents) that each Federal
Circuit judge filed in 2000. Two observations about this column are
in order. First, these numbers reflect a high degree of unanimity in
reasoning and result—only twenty-three separate opinions were filed
in 2006. Second, two judges—Judges Newman and Dyk—were most
likely to write separately in patent cases, far more than their
colleagues, statistically speaking.
Because of the relatively small number of separate opinions issued
by Federal Circuit judges in 2006, the fourth column (“# authored
generating separate opinions”) may not prove much at all. It is
meant to indicate the authoring judge for the majority in the cases
where separate opinions were filed. One unusual data point here is
the fact that every one of Judge Schall’s four published majority
opinions in 2006 occasioned a separate opinion from another of the
judges on the panel.
The final column (“% author (3-judge panel”)) on Table 1
indicates, based on the published patent opinions from 2006, how
likely it was that a particular Federal Circuit judge would be the
author of the resulting opinion in a particular case argued before a
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three-judge panel. In a hypothetical world where opinions are
randomly and evenly assigned, one would expect that each judge on
a three-judge panel would wind up writing 33.3% of the opinions.
What stands out as significant from this data is that three judges—
Judges Lourie (sixty percent), Rader (almost forty-seven percent),
and Linn (forty-four percent)—who in 2006 wrote a majority (or
close to a majority) of the opinions in cases where they voted on
published patent decisions in 2006.
TABLE 2: SEPARATE OPINIONS IN PATENT CASES 2006
JUDGE

Concur in
Opinion

Concur in
Judgment

Michel
Newman
Mayer
Lourie
Rader
Schall
Bryson
Gajarsa
Linn
Dyk
Prost

0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
0
1
0

Friedman
Archer
Plager
Clevenger

0
0
0

0
0
0

Court

1

5

Concur in
part,
Dissent in
part
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
3
0

Dissent

Total

1
7
2
1
0
0
0
0
1
2
0

3
8
3
1
1
3
0
0
1
6
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

6

14

26

Table 2 sets forth a breakdown of the twenty-one separate opinions
by type and by authoring judge. Again, because of the relative
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paucity of separate opinions, these statistics may not carry much
meaning. As in 2000, these numbers for 2006 illustrate the Federal
Circuit’s largely unanimous nature—only fourteen dissents, and six
partial dissents, were filed all year. If there is a striking statistic here,
it is that Judge Newman wrote seven dissenting opinions (and her
eighth, a separate opinion styled as “Additional Views,” was a separate
opinion in a case where she herself wrote the unanimous opinion for
the panel).
TABLE 3: DISPOSITION TIME BY JUDGE (IN DAYS) JANUARY 1,
2006 – DECEMBER 31, 2006
JUDGE

Avg. time
per opinion
authored

Michel
Newman
Mayer
Lourie
Rader
Schall
Bryson
Gajarsa
Linn
Dyk
Prost

69
155
76
64
162
244
71
121
131
148
103

Friedman
Archer
Plager
Clevenger

77
—
—
36

Per Curiam

Court

Avg. time per
unanimous
Opinion
authored
66
155
66
65
150
—
71
112
122
100
109

Avg. time
when writing
separately

Avg. time
when on
panel

267
164
211
112
311
101
—
—
72
133
—

101
128
113
90
138
180
74
117
122
135
112

77
—
—
36

—
—
—
—

123
108
31
96

—

—

—

—

121

105

166

121
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Table 3 sets forth the average length of time it takes the Federal
Circuit and its judges to dispose of published Federal Circuit patent
appeals. This table is at the same time the most interesting, and also
perhaps the one most subject to the criticism that every case is unique
and demands unique treatment, and thus cannot be “averaged”
together with other cases to yield meaningful results.
Because the Federal Circuit does not publish the date of argument
on the face of its opinions, we obtained from the PACER docket on
the court’s website, or from the database of oral argument recordings
now available there, the date of argument for each of the court’s
1560
patent opinions published in 2006.
We then calculated the
difference, in days, between oral argument (or submission) and
decision, and used those calculated figures in our statistics.
The first column on Table 3 (“Avg. time per opinion authored”)
lists, in days, the average time from argument to decision for each
judge of the Federal Circuit. Thus, for the six published patent
opinions Chief Judge Michel authored in 2006, the average time
from argument to decision was sixty-nine days (slightly more than two
months), while for the four published patent opinions authored by
Judge Schall, the average time from argument to decision was 244
days (about eight months). The average time of disposition for all of
the Federal Circuit’s published patent opinions (in cases that were
orally argued or submitted on the merits briefs) was 121 days, or
about four months. This is a significant change from the results of
our year 2000 study, which showed an average disposition time of
1561
almost six months from argument to opinion.
The second column on Table 3 (“Avg. time per unanimous
opinion authored”) is meant to account for one type of delay in
publication not attributable to the author of the majority opinion—
the authoring and issuance of a separate concurring, or dissenting,
opinion. In most—but not all—cases, limiting the relevant data set to
unanimous opinions decreases the average disposition time per
1560. Excluded from the calculations here were three published opinions in cases
counted elsewhere in the statistical Addendum—Purdue Pharma v. Endo
Pharmaceuticals, 438 F.3d 1123, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
Nautilus Group v. Icon Health and Fitness, 437 F.3d 1376, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2012
(Fed. Cir. 2006), and In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1676 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The first of those decisions was excluded because it
was an amended decision on rehearing; the other two were decisions issued on a
motion (Nautilus) and a petition for mandamus (EchoStar) and were not orally
argued or “submitted” for decision on an ascertainable date, making a calculation of
days between argument or submission and decision impossible.
1561. Adamo, supra note 14, at 1704-05.
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judge. The average time for the entire court for issuance of
unanimous published patent opinions was 105 days after argument,
or a bit more than three months—down significantly from the 1541562
day (five months) figure we calculated in 2000.
The third column (“Avg. time when writing separately”) supplies
the average time from argument to disposition when the judge in
question has written a separate opinion. This data may suffer from
some inadequacies. First, it is based solely on the limited number of
separate opinions in published patent cases in 2006. Second, it
cannot account for the unknown factor of how long the author of the
majority opinion took to prepare the draft opinion which occasioned
the separate concurrence or dissent. Here, the overall court average
is 166 days, or a bit more than five months—down from the 205 days
1563
(almost seven months) we found for 2000.
The fourth and final column on Table 3 (“Avg. time when on
panel”) supplies the average time from argument to disposition
whenever a certain judge is on the panel hearing the case. We have
supplied this statistic on the assumption that the time a nonauthoring judge spends reviewing one of his or her colleagues’ draft
opinion, even if it does not ultimately occasion a separate opinion,
may have some influence on the disposition time. For active judges,
the results range from thirty-one days for Judge Plager (on limited
data, since he is a Senior Judge and participated in only four patent
cases resulting in published opinions in 2006) to 180 days for Judge
Schall. The court average, as earlier noted, was 121 days from
argument to decision for published patent cases.
TABLE 4A: LOWER COURT OR AGENCY ORIGINATING CASE
Northern District of Illinois
Southern District of New York
Central District of California
District of Delaware
Northern District of California
District of Massachusetts
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
Eastern District of Michigan
Western District of Washington
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
1562. Id. at 1704, 1706.
1563. Id. at 1704, 1706.

10
8
6
6
6
5
5
4
4
3
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Eastern District of Texas
District of Arizona
District of the District of Columbia
District of Minnesota
District of New Jersey
Northern District of Iowa
District of Colorado
District of Maryland
District of Nevada
District of Oregon
District of South Carolina
Eastern District of Arkansas
Eastern District of California
Eastern District of Missouri
Middle District of Tennessee
Northern District of Georgia
Northern District of Indiana
Northern District of Mississippi
Northern District of New York
Northern District of Texas
Northern District of West Virginia
Southern District of California
Southern District of Florida
Southern District of Indiana
Southern District of Iowa
Southern District of Texas
United States Court of Federal Claims
United States International Trade Commission
Western District of Kentucky
Western District of Michigan
Western District of Missouri
Western District of New York
Western District of Pennsylvania
Western District of Texas

3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Total

98

PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER

2007]

4/7/2007 11:15:24 AM

2006 PATENT SUMMARY

983

TABLE 4B: CIRCUITS ORIGINATING CASE
Ninth Circuit
Third Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Second Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
First Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
D.C. Circuit
Tenth Circuit
No circuit (agency or U.S. Court
of Federal Claims)

Total

22
12
12
10
8
7
7
5
3
2
2
1
7

98

Tables 4A and 4B are new. They demonstrate where the cases
decided by the Federal Circuit (at least those resulting in published
opinions) are originating. Table 4A contains the unsurprising
information that the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago), the
Southern District of New York (New York City), the Central District of
California (Los Angeles), the Northern District of California (San
Francisco, Oakland, and Silicon Valley), and the District of Delaware
(the preferred state of incorporation for so many American
companies) are leading the way. But Table 4A also has some
surprises: the relatively low number of cases originating in the
Eastern District of Texas (a so-called “rocket docket” with special
patent rules that has attracted more patent lawsuits than any district
1564
court save the Central District of California),
and the complete
absence of cases originating in the original “rocket docket,” the
Eastern District of Virginia.
1564. See Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
2006, § 3, at 1 (“More patent lawsuits will be filed [in Marshall, Texas] this year than
in federal district courts in San Francisco, Chicago, New York and Washington. Only
the Central District of California, in Los Angeles, will handle more patent
infringement cases.”).
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Table 4B simply breaks down the data in Table 4A by Circuit rather
than by district court; it suggests that, if Congress had not centralized
all patent appeals in the Federal Circuit, the Second, Third, Seventh
and Ninth Circuits would be the major patent-law circuits today.
TABLE 5: RESULTS OF PUBLISHED OPINIONS
Affirmed
Affirmed in part, dismissed in part
Affirmed in part, reversed in part
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
Cross-appeal dismissed
Mandamus granted
Reversed
Reversed and remanded
Reversed; cross-appeal dismissed
Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
Appeal transferred
Vacated
Vacated and remanded
Vacated in part, dismissed in part, and remanded

Total

42
1
3
5
1
4
10
1
1
6
4
1
3
1
2
12
1

98

The final table, Table 5, is also new. It sorts the “decretal
language” from the Federal Circuit’s published patent opinions in
2007 to demonstrate how many of those opinions resulted in
1565
alterations of the rights of the parties. Table 5 thus shows that, in
2007, the Federal Circuit’s ninety-eight published patent opinions
yielded across-the-board affirmances in forty-two cases; total reversals
in eleven cases (six “Reversed,” one “Reversed and remanded,” and
1565. See, e.g., Hon. Jon O. Newman, Decretal Language: Last Words of an Appellate
Opinion, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 727, 727 (2006) (“‘Decretal language’ is the portion of a
court’s judgment or order that officially states (‘decrees’) what the court is
ordering.”).
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one “Reversed; cross-appeal dismissed”); and a variety of dispositions
in the rest. Of course, using the universe of published opinions to
compile these statistics will not reflect the court’s true rate of
affirmances or reversals; it is probable that the decisions the court
chooses to publish under its Rule 47.6(b) are those that address
issues of first impression or otherwise “ad[d] significantly to the body
1566
of law” —and those cases are more likely to result in different
outcomes than in the lower court as compared to the body of
unpublished opinions.

1566. FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b).

